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Abstract 
 
Business schools are facing an increasingly competitive marketplace driven by the 
globalization of management education and the many new entrants providing educational 
and research services within this space.  School rankings have become a substitute for 
independent assessments of quality by constituencies, often driving schools toward 
isomorphism in bids to climb higher in the rankings.  Business school leaders need to 
fully understand their strategic options as they lead their schools during this challenging 
time.  The purpose of this case study was to explore the pursuit, implementation, and 
potential performance effects of a type of reconstructionist strategy, Blue Ocean Strategy, 
within the context of two collegiate business schools.  For schools that meet certain 
criteria, employing a reconstructionist strategy in the pursuit of uncontested markets 
appears to be a viable approach to the crowded, global market for management education. 
 
Using three strategic moves, two at one US business school and one at a European 
business school, this study used a case study methodology to explore the use of 
reconstructionist strategy.  A total of 15 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
school administration, faculty, and staff along with a review of documentation relevant to 
these three moves.  In concert with findings from previous studies in corporate 
environments, this study found that schools that were poorly positioned for direct 
competition with higher ranked and better-funded schools could effectively employ 
reconstructionist strategies when the school had an organizational orientation toward 
innovation.  Further findings included general support for the six principles of Blue 
Ocean Strategy in this context although some divergence was found due to differences 
between corporate and academic organizational structures.  In effect, these schools were 
found to foster innovation by individual faculty entrepreneurs although no clear pathway 
emerged for innovative activities to be incorporated into the overall school strategy or 
marketing plans.  Nevertheless, the three strategic moves studied did bring overall benefit 
to their schools. Business school leaders and researchers are urged to continue research in 
this area to further understand how reconstructionist moves may be better integrated into 
a school’s overall strategy as well as how to use them in a school’s market positioning.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Background and Context 
The current environment for collegiate business schools is challenging due in part 
to the convergence of multiple factors including dissatisfied constituency groups (Bennis 
& O’Toole, 2005; Lorsch, 2009; Pfeffer & Fong, 2002; Podolny, 2009), increased 
competition from both traditional and nontraditional competitors during a time of fiscal 
restraint (Harmon, 2006), and increased scrutiny brought upon schools by the media 
through rankings (Corley & Gioia, 2000; Machung, 1998; Morgeson & Nahrgang, 2008; 
Peters, 2007) which are all set against the backdrop of a rapidly globalizing market for 
business education (Association for the Advancement of Collegiate Schools of Business 
[AACSB], 2011) .  This highly competitive environment drains resources and potentially 
diminishes quality (Harmon, 2006) as schools compete head to head in an environment 
based more upon image than substance (Corley & Gioia, 2000).  Although positioning in 
the rankings may “dominate business schools’ thoughts and action” (Gioia & Corley, 
2002, p. 108), the rankings themselves are actually quite stable from year to year as they 
tend to hinge on factors such as a school’s longevity as opposed to actual quality or 
performance (Morgeson & Nahrgang, 2008). 
In addition to creating a tough competitive environment which drains precious 
resources, direct competition among business schools also tends to drive homogeneity in 
school’s offerings (Adler & Harzing, 2009; Gioia & Corley, 2002; Friga, Bettis, & 
Sullivan, 2003).  Instead of focusing on innovative research and how to employ core 
 
2 
competencies to best advance their missions, business school faculty and administrators 
are often distracted with how to better position themselves or their schools in the rankings 
(Adler & Harzing, 2009).  While business school leaders are certainly wise to remain 
vigilant about their schools’ rankings, a single-minded focus on rankings alone may 
prove to only be costly and frustrating.  The conundrum of having to play the rankings 
“game” but not being able to win creates a serious challenge for business schools hoping 
to advance their interests and those of their constituencies, maintain their stature within 
the marketplace, and give an appropriate amount of attention to a bevy of rankings and 
media players (Corley & Gioia, 2000). 
A chorus of respected business scholars has called for a different approach by 
highlighting the need for additional research in how business schools might deemphasize 
costly, unfruitful direct competition and instead chart a course toward success that skirts 
head-to-head competition (Adler & Harzing, 2009; Antunes & Thomas, 2007; Friga et 
al., 2003; Gioia & Corley, 2002; Harmon, 2006).  In particular, Naudé, Henneberg, & 
Jiang (2010) identified the need to explore how dimensions of strategic success other 
than those directly captured by the rankings might assist business schools.  Niche or 
differentiation strategies that force schools to be more strategic with their resources have 
also been highlighted as a topic meriting further study (Friga et al., 2003; Gioia & Corley, 
2002).    
While strategies that differentiate a school from others may at first appear to be 
contrary to what is necessary to achieve success in the rankings, research has shown that 
schools can take different routes to success, even success in the rankings.  For example, 
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the European business school environment, which is marked by less direct competition 
and more diversity than the US market, has proven to be a worthy environment for study 
of how alternative competitive strategies may simultaneously find success in the 
educational marketplace (Antunes & Thomas, 2007).  
The current competitive environment for business schools is also characterized by 
the globalization of business and a resulting increase in demand for global business 
education; this presents substantial opportunity for business schools to address a growing 
and underserved market (AACSB, 2011).  Globalization engenders a larger and more 
complex marketplace for business education that has the capacity to value differentiation 
and distinctiveness in a way that nationalized markets have not (Friga et al., 2003).  By 
taking advantage of the changes brought about by globalization, business school leaders 
appear to have the rare opportunity to redefine their school’s approach and value 
proposition within the market.  They may even have the opportunity to actually recast the 
market itself.  In a time of such great opportunity and challenge, business school leaders 
have a pressing need to understand the strategic and competitive options open to their 
schools as they pursue success in a rapidly changing marketplace.  
Statement of the Problem 
 Despite the intense competitive environment and the opportunities for growth 
offered by the increasing globalization of management education, many business schools 
appear to be primarily engaged in direct head-to-head competition largely based upon 
rankings (Gioia & Corley, 2002).  Previous research has highlighted the opportunity for 
business schools to instead place their strategic foci on advancing the core competencies 
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of a school which differentiate it from others in the marketplace (Friga et al., 2003; 
Naudé et al., 2010).  By focusing on distinctive core competencies, a business school may 
be able to not only successfully position itself favorably in the market but also capture the 
demand of unexplored markets, and even possibly achieve a favorable position in the 
rankings through the recognition of the distinctive nature and activities of the school.  
Although previous research has called for further investigation of this alternative 
approach to direct competition, virtually no research to date has formally explored the 
strategic option of differentiation or the pursuit of uncontested markets within the context 
of collegiate business schools. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this case study was to explore the pursuit, implementation, and 
potential performance effects of a type of reconstructionist strategy, Blue Ocean Strategy, 
within the context of two collegiate business schools.  Blue Ocean Strategy seeks to 
create new markets instead of relying solely on direct competition in existing markets. 
This study provides additional understanding about the opportunities and merits of 
employing strategies to advance the distinctive qualities of a particular business school 
instead of remaining solely focused on rankings and the fierce direct competition to 
which rankings often lead.  
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Research Questions 
The following questions guided this study. 
 
1. What organizational and environmental factors led to the pursuit and 
implementation of a reconstructionist approach for the strategic move under 
study? 
2. How were the principles of a reconstructionist approach, as articulated by Blue 
Ocean Strategy, employed during the implementation and execution phases for 
the strategic move under study? 
3. How has the reconstructionist approach for this strategic move affected the 
overall performance of the business school in which it was implemented? 
Theoretical Framework 
 In contrast to traditionalist competitive strategy (Porter, 2008) which views direct 
competition as a given, Blue Ocean Strategy takes a reconstructionist view of the external 
environment by urging organizations to tap unmet needs in ways unlike any other current 
market player.  In this reconstructionist view, the boundaries of the market are only set in 
the minds of the people, so the goal is to redraw the boundaries in a way that creates an 
uncontested market space or a blue ocean (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005a).  The focus is 
shifted from supply (i.e. the product or service) to demand (i.e. customer needs and 
desires), thereby allowing an organization to pioneer a new approach that fills this 
demand without necessarily directly competing with existing providers.  Although Blue 
Ocean Strategy has received significant attention in both profit and non-profit sectors, its 
use within higher education has not been formally explored.  Therefore, this study adds to 
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the existing literature by exploring the application of Blue Ocean Strategy within 
collegiate business schools and offers strategic options for business school leaders during 
a challenging time.   
 Blue oceans represent uncontested market spaces due to unmet wants or needs 
whereas red oceans are descriptive of existing market spaces that are red from the 
metaphorical blood drawn through fierce competition.  Using data from over 150 
companies across 120 years, Kim and Mauborgne (2005a) not only noted the benefits of 
pursuing blue oceans when applicable, but they also identified the strategy that was most 
often successfully pursued in search of these blue oceans.  Blue Ocean Strategy emerged 
from this research as a pathway by which numerous organizations have identified and 
successfully pursued uncontested markets. 
 A particular strategic move, as opposed to an organizational strategy, is used as 
the primary unit of analysis in Blue Ocean strategy.  When evaluating a strategic move, 
Blue Ocean Strategy offers a way to systematically assess both the current market 
boundaries and new market offerings to determine whether an opportunity exists to 
pursue a blue ocean using the six principles identified through the expansive research 
undertaken by Kim and Mauborgne (2005a).  The decision to pursue Blue Ocean Strategy 
or traditional competitive strategy is not to be viewed as a binary decision.  Most 
organizations will be forced to continue to participate in competitive markets, but Kim 
and Mauborgne (2005a) proposed that the pursuit of blue oceans is strongly preferred 
when conditions warrant.  Their research identified three factors by which an 
organization can determine whether Blue Ocean Strategy may be appropriate for a given 
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strategic move:  environmental attractiveness, organizational capabilities and resources, 
and a company’s strategic orientation for competition and innovation. 
 Blue Ocean Strategy represents a fundamentally different perspective to the 
traditional view on business school strategy.  The intent of this reconstructionist view is 
to provide novel insights into the strategic options for business school leaders who are 
tasked with directing their schools through challenging times.  In light of dissatisfied 
constituencies and a rapidly changing competitive landscape, a reconstructionist approach 
merits consideration as a potential tool to systematically identify and pursue a strategy 
toward continued success. 
Significance of the Study 
 Competition between business schools continues to intensify, and schools are 
often not making satisfactory progress toward satisfying their constituency groups 
(Bennis & O’Toole, 2005).  Schools expend vast amounts of resources in an attempt to 
place higher in the rankings although studies have shown that a remarkable level of 
stability exists in most ranking systems (Gioia & Corley, 2002).  This study explored how 
a reconstructionist approach using Blue Ocean Strategy provides a complementary path 
for business schools that may allow them to at least partially skirt the draining task of 
direct competition with other schools.  Based upon the gridlock observed, business 
schools are in need of new ideas for how to advance their missions and satisfy their 
constituencies (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005; Khurana, 2007; Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007).  As 
such, this study is significant to at least three constituencies: business school leaders, 
business community leaders, and university leaders at large. 
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 Business school leaders are faced with increasing competition and increased 
expectations from constituencies amidst a time of decreasing financial support (AACSB, 
2011; Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007).  In this perilous time, academic leaders have an 
extremely limited literature base from which to devise their strategy. The most popular 
strategies for business schools seem to be either vying for higher rankings or continuing 
to muddle through without a defined strategy or, in some cases, both (Corley & Gioia, 
2000; Khurana, 2007).  Competition from other schools or new entrants will likely not 
allow business schools to continue to meander (Friga et al., 2003).  Instead, their leaders 
will be called upon to articulate a direction for their schools, and in doing so, they will 
benefit from further research regarding strategic options.  This study adds to the scant 
literature base offering insight on the strategic options open to business school leaders as 
they plot a course for the future of their schools. 
 The business community, a powerful business school constituency, routinely 
voices displeasure with business school performance (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005), and they 
have a vested interest in righting the ship.  Businesses have long depended upon business 
schools to provide talented graduates skilled in both the art and science of business 
(Khurana, 2007).  For the most part, these graduates have served businesses well over the 
past century using the knowledge and skills at least partially acquired through their 
business school education (Porter & McKibbin, 1988).  However, as business leaders 
have become increasingly dissatisfied with business school graduates, some have begun 
to utilize non-traditional competitors or even founded their own corporate universities to 
meet their talent needs in lieu of continuing to rely on business schools (Bennis & 
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O’Toole, 2005).  Businesses have long benefited from scholarly research and education, 
and they will probably continue to do so in the future if business schools are able to 
emerge from this current crisis.  Even though business leaders are not necessarily pleased 
with current school performance, and are in some cases looking for talent elsewhere, it 
would likely be to their benefit to help business schools improve the quality and diversity 
of their graduates and research.  This study assists in the identification of options by 
which businesses can have access to a wider diversity of graduates and research than they 
presently do.  Increased diversity among business schools would provide a higher 
likelihood that businesses could find a school that identifies with their own perspective 
and positioning as opposed to the largely homogenous market that exists today. 
 In addition, university leaders at-large are facing many of the same challenges as 
business school leaders.  Amidst this time of increasing expectations and decreasing 
resources, higher education leaders must plot a strategy for how to remain viable and 
relevant.  Little research has been conducted to address potential strategies for higher 
education institutions attempting to thrive in this new competitive reality.  This study 
contributes to that void by offering a novel perspective built around creating 
distinctiveness and then employing it as a tool for success.  University leaders may also 
be able to use this study as a foundation for thinking about alternative approaches to 
strategy within the context of their own universities at-large.  
 Finally, this study has significance as business schools continue to struggle to 
address the impact of globalization on business education.  According to the AACSB 
(2011), the premier business school accreditation association, “business schools are not 
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responding to globalization in a coherent way” (p. 4).  As globalization appears to afford 
a business school the rare opportunity to redefine its strategy and mission, it is critical 
that leaders have the necessary understanding and tools to do so in a way that will 
position business schools to continue to serve businesses and the society in general for 
generations to come.  Direct competition, based upon a narrow set of parameters which 
are set by the media through rankings, does not serve as a solid base from which schools 
can address a global need for business education. 
Limitations 
 As this study was an initial investigation into the applicability of a 
reconstructionist approach using Blue Ocean Strategy, it has multiple limitations.  First, 
this case study focused on a limited number of strategic moves at two business schools.  
Therefore, the generalizability of the findings in this study is limited (Merriam, 2009; 
Yin, 2009).  However, as the purpose of the study was to explore the potential of Blue 
Ocean Strategy within the context of collegiate business schools, the study instead offers 
initial insight into how reconstructionist strategy can be applied and when it makes 
strategic sense to do so.  While this information may be not theoretically generalizable, 
the intent was to offer a foundation on which future studies can build (Merriam, 2009; 
Yin, 2009).   
 A further limitation is created through the researcher’s employment at one of the 
business schools where a portion of the study was conducted.  Even though the researcher 
does not serve in a position of authority and was not critically involved in any of the 
strategic moves under study, the potential existed for bias to unknowingly influence the 
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study.  As such, a robust methodology is described in Chapter 3 that was used to expose 
and properly take any bias into account.  Significant barriers to entry exist for researchers 
desiring to study business school strategy (Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007); this may explain 
the dearth of research on the topic.  Ironically, business school scholars often do not seem 
willing to expose their own strategies to rigorous academic research.  Taking this barrier 
into consideration, the opportunity to study such an important topic in an in-depth manner 
outweighed the potential for bias as a result of the researcher’s employment at one of the 
business schools under study.  
Delimitations 
 This case study is delimited to two collegiate business schools, and therefore the 
findings may not apply to business schools in general. The intent of this case study was to 
explore the pursuit, implementation, and potential performance impacts of Blue Ocean 
Strategy within the context of collegiate business schools. As such, this limited sample of 
two business schools and three strategic moves offered the insight necessary for the 
completion of this study and, in doing so, provides a foundation upon which more broad-
based studies can be built.   
The three strategic moves were chosen in a purposive manner to explore the 
applicability of Blue Ocean Strategy within the collegiate business school environment; 
however, these moves may not be representative of other types of moves within the 
schools under study or at other schools.  As this was an initial exploration, the three 
moves provided sufficient exploration to advance the discussion of the use of Blue Ocean 
Strategy within this setting. 
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Definitions 
Collegiate business school - For the purposes of this study, a collegiate business school is 
defined as a business school that has been accredited by the Association for the 
Advancement of Collegiate Schools of Business [AACSB]. 
Direct competition - For the purposes of this study, direct competition is used to denote a 
focus on achieving higher scores or rankings when compared to other schools based upon 
criteria from major rankings such as Businessweek, the Financial Times, and US News 
and World Report. 
Traditional competitive strategy – A strategy as advanced by Porter (2008) which views 
direct competition as a given and therefore necessitates that organizational strategy be 
oriented around addressing the threats of competition. 
Reconstructionist strategy – A strategy whereby an organization focuses on redefining 
the current market or identifying a new market in a distinctive way based upon their 
organization’s unique core competencies, culture, and competitive environment. 
Blue Ocean Strategy – A type of reconstructionist strategy developed by Kim and 
Mauborgne (2005a) through their study of over 150 organizations across 120 years.  Blue 
Ocean Strategy provides a framework for how to assess and implement reconstructionist 
strategy for a given strategic move or decision. 
Organization of the Study 
 This study is organized into five chapters.  Chapter 1 introduces the challenges 
faced by business schools and provides important context for this study.  This 
introductory chapter also contains the purpose statement, research question, an 
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introduction to the conceptual framework, definitions of key terms, and the limitations 
and delimitations of the study.  Chapter 2 offers a critical review of the scholarly 
literature on business school history, key business school constituencies, the competitive 
strategy used by business schools with a focus on rankings and their impacts, and the 
impacts of globalization on the business education market.  This review then continues by 
contrasting Blue Ocean Strategy with traditional competitive strategy.  Chapter 3 details 
the methods that were used in this case study including the design, the particular cases 
chosen for this study, and the data collection and analysis procedures used.  Chapter 4 
presents the findings from the study.  The three cases are first presented separately and 
then followed by a cross-case analysis that integrates and summarizes the overall findings 
from the study.  Finally, Chapter 5 compares and contrasts these findings with the extant 
literature base, discusses the implications and areas for future research, and concludes 
with the conclusions from the study. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
The purpose of this case study was to explore the pursuit, implementation, and 
potential performance impacts of Blue Ocean Strategy within the context of collegiate 
business schools.  To properly frame the context and importance of this study, this critical 
review of the literature will begin by briefly summarizing the history of collegiate 
business schools in the US.  The current competitive environment for business schools 
will then be detailed focusing particularly on the impact of rankings on the competitive 
environment and the opportunities that globalization brings for business schools.  Next, 
institutional theory will be introduced as a theoretical lens through which the current 
competitive environment of business schools will be viewed for the purposes of this 
study.  Finally, the chapter will conclude with a discussion of Blue Ocean Strategy that 
highlights its applicability to business school strategy. 
History of Collegiate Business Schools in the US 
Over the past fifty years, the opportunity for higher education has grown from a 
luxury of the privileged few to an expectation of the masses.  This massification has 
modified the scope and scale of the higher education enterprise turning universities into 
large, complex entities which compete for the best students, top faculty, and their share of 
research dollars (Yielder & Codling, 2004).  The growth of collegiate schools of business 
has outpaced even the rapid growth of their parent institutions so that now approximately 
22% of all undergraduate degrees and 25% of graduate degrees obtained are in the field 
of business (Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007).  Today’s business school leaders not only find 
 
15 
themselves responsible for significantly more students and faculty, but they also report 
the competitive landscape to be quite different from the traditional collegial environment 
of higher education (Corley & Gioia, 2000).  This section briefly outlines the critical 
points over the past century that have led business schools to their position of 
prominence, and it sets up a discussion of the competitive environment which follows in 
the next section. 
The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, founded in 1881, is 
generally accepted to be the first university-based school of business.  Other schools were 
founded in rapid succession including those at the University of California, the 
University of Chicago, Dartmouth, New York University, and the University of 
Wisconsin (Khurana, 2007; Miles, 1996; Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007).  The creation of new 
business schools continued unabated with 100 university-based business schools in 
existence by 1929 (Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007).  The impetus behind this wave of business 
school creation was a desire on the part of leading business practitioners and academics 
alike to professionalize the practice of business.  Their desire was to move away from the 
apprentice model where no single body of knowledge and expertise existed to a more 
rigorous and standardized system similar to those found in other professions such as 
medicine and law (Khurana, 2007).  This effort enjoyed success as the rapid growth of 
the number of business schools and the enrollment in these schools has no parallel within 
academia and has been regarded by some as the most significant development within US 
higher education during the twentieth century (Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007). 
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The pattern of rapid business school growth continued for the next four decades, 
even intensifying with a post-WWII influx of students eager to improve their lives 
through higher education.  By the mid-1950s, business schools were creaking under the 
weight of a half-century of growth and the criticism that schools were not preparing 
students well for careers in business.  The Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Foundation 
commissioned two studies regarding the state of university-based business schools which 
culminated in book-length reports that were both published in 1959 (Khurana 2007; 
Miles, 1996; Silk, 1960).  The Ford Foundation report, better known as the Gordon and 
Howell (1959) report, was authored by Robert Gordon of the University of California and 
James Howell of Stanford University while Frank Pierson of Swarthmore College wrote 
the Carnegie report.   
During the course of an extensive three-year study, Gordon and Howell (1959) 
found that business schools tended to lean heavily toward vocational training which often 
consisted of faculty entertaining students with stories about past business experience.  
Khurana (2007) summarized the report’s findings by saying, “Students studying business 
were among the least intellectual on campus; faculty had little understanding of basic 
research methods and were often most productive at exploiting their positions for gains 
from private consulting” (p. 269).  The report also chastised faculty for their tenuous 
connections with the larger university community.  Gordon and Howell (1959) identified 
across-the-board problems in business schools including the low caliber of business 
students and faculty, poorly constructed curriculum, and minimal levels of quality 
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research.  While the Pierson (1959) report was somewhat less provocative, it largely 
concurred with the criticisms raised by Gordon and Howell (1959). 
These two reports brought considerable attention to business schools and even 
spurred the writing of a book by Business Week editor Leonard Silk aimed at practitioners 
to summarize the findings from these landmark reports (Silk, 1960).  As a result of the 
pressure applied via these reports, along with generous funding from the Ford Foundation 
to implement changes, business schools made significant headway toward improvement 
over the next thirty years (Khurana, 2007; Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007).  For example, 
business faculty were supplemented with faculty from other university disciplines to help 
build research skills, schools implemented a more rigorous and standardized curriculum 
as suggested by Gordon and Howell (1959) and Pierson (1959), and the quality of both 
students and faculty alike was raised significantly (Khurana, 2007). 
By the late 1980s, substantial progress had been made in advancing the scientific 
rigor in business research which yielded significant gains toward a formal knowledge 
base for business disciplines such as finance, marketing, operations, and information 
management (Miles, 1996).  During this time, the advancement of managerialism also 
firmly replaced professionalism as the central goal that schools were attempting to 
advance.  Managerialism, the idea that a generic set of management skills and theory can 
be used to best manage businesses, became a foundational principle upon which business 
faculty based their research and which they regularly taught to students (Khurana, 2007).  
Managerialism continues to serve as the foundation for business research and education 
to the present day.   
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Business schools listened and responded to the stinging critique from Gordon and 
Howell (1959), so much so that a new type of criticism began to arise of a polar opposite 
nature—critics charged that there was a growing divergence between business schools 
and the profession they purported to serve.  Another landmark book-length report by 
Porter and McKibbin (1988) confirmed these weaknesses by examining business schools 
in a manner similar to the Gordon and Howell (1959) and Pierson (1959) reports a 
generation earlier.  In this report, Porter and McKibbin (1988) also questioned the 
relevancy of research being conducted in business schools and noted the complacency of 
many business schools with respect to improvement.     
In contrast to the 1959 findings including low-caliber students and ill-structured 
curriculum, Porter and McKibbin (1988) found that business students were now being 
prepared and faculty were conducting scientifically rigorous research within narrow, 
structured disciplines.  These disciplines were, in response to the earlier critique, filled 
with coursework built upon theoretical principles; however, students were not being 
prepared to integrate this knowledge, a necessary skill for practitioners to successfully 
lead businesses.  In addition, students were not receiving appropriate exposure to subject 
areas outside of business and did not display suitable oral and written communication 
skills (Khurana, 2007; Miles, 1996).  Khurana captures this new culture of business 
schools in the following statement. 
The culture of business school faculties came to resemble the larger academic 
 culture with its social structure built around regular research seminars, decreased 
 emphasis on teaching, strong loyalty toward disciplines rather than institutions, 
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 and a status order that placed what James March and Robert Sutton have called 
 “the priests of research purity” at the top (p. 307). 
Albeit for entirely different reasons, business schools were once again under criticism for 
not properly serving the students and the business community which they were created to 
improve. 
 The Porter and McKibbin (1988) report received significant attention; however, 
unlike the Gordon and Howell (1959) report, it was not coupled with substantial funding 
to implement change.  Even so, business schools were now firmly established within 
universities and business faculty had built scholarly circles in which they sought 
acceptance and acclaim largely apart from the business community.  The divergence 
between the academic study of business and its practice continued to grow as faculty with 
no experience, and sometimes even no interest, in business pursued careers as faculty 
within the now highly scientific business school.  Without business experience, faculty 
became even more entrenched in their disciplines (Khurana, 2007).  Oddly enough, the 
adoption of a scientific, discipline-based perspective as advocated by Gordon and Howell 
(1959) “left business education itself at the mercy of institutional influences incompatible 
with, if not downright hostile to, its very purpose” (Khurana, 2007, p. 334).  Instead of 
maintaining a balance between the two extremes, business schools went from the extreme 
of a solely vocational education to the extreme of overly detached scientific rigor. 
 The discipline-based approach to business education with its focus on the 
production of highly scientific research, often to the exclusion of relevance to the 
practitioner base, remains a feature of many contemporary business schools (Khurana, 
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2007).  It is with this foundation and from this perspective that business schools are now 
facing the current competitive environment and the challenges presented by a rapidly 
changing external environment.  Instead of being grounded in providing research and 
education of use to practitioners, business schools often choose to pursue the status 
connected with the production of detached scientific knowledge as their primary goal. 
The issue with this status-based approach is that it does not directly serve the 
business community or students, so business schools do not benefit from the consistent 
accountability or critique of stakeholders.  Khurana (2007) captured this danger in the 
following statement. “In the absence of an internal driving purpose, the external 
environment drove schools” (p. 340).  In other words, as many business schools did not 
have a clear understanding of their purpose nor any plans to pursue it, schools were 
carried to and fro by the capricious opinions of rankings, academic journals, and other 
elements of the external environment.  The next section further details the factors that 
comprise this external environment before turning to a discussion of rankings, which 
have come to define and drive contemporary business schools. 
Competitive Environment for Collegiate Business Schools 
 As evidenced in the historical sketch above, business schools are complex 
organizations with multiple constituencies that often come into direct conflict with one 
another (Cameron 1978, 1986; Ramaswamy, 1992).  While it is sometimes necessary for 
business schools to prioritize one constituency over another in the event that conflicting 
priorities arise, in the past it seemed that even in the worst case scenarios business school 
leadership could generally satisfy some of their constituencies some of the time.  
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However, over the past decade, the primary business school constituencies—students, 
faculty, and the business community—have made increasingly clear their general 
dissatisfaction with business school performance albeit for varying reasons (Bennis, 
2010; Bennis & O’Toole, 2005; Lorsch, 2009; Pfeffer & Fong, 2002, 2004; Podolny, 
2009).  The reasons for this dissatisfaction are valuable guideposts in understanding the 
competitive landscape and exploring the strategic alternatives which this study 
undertakes, therefore the discussion of the competitive environment will begin with a 
discussion of the perspective of each major business school constituency group. 
 Students are arguably the most important business school constituency as the 
impetus behind the creation of the business school was to professionally educate business 
practitioners (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005; Khurana, 2007).  However, students now 
complain that they receive poor preparation from business schools for careers as 
practitioners (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005; Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007).  Although student 
complaints could be attributed to an increase in consumerism by business students at all 
levels (Zell, 2001), other constituencies provide further credence to complaints of poor 
student preparation.  For example, Pfeffer and Fong (2002) report that “a large body of 
evidence suggests that the curriculum taught in business schools has only a small 
relationship to what is important for succeeding in business” (p. 84).  Instead of focusing 
on student needs, critics claim that business faculty simply talk about their research, and 
in doing so faculty “too often forget that executive decision makers aren’t fact collectors; 
they are fact users and integrators” (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005, p. 101).  If the needs of the 
student constituency were prioritized, business school structure might more closely 
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resemble that of other professional schools such as law and medicine (Pfeffer & Fong, 
2004) where an extremely tight integration of classroom activity and applied learning 
exists. 
 The second major constituency, the business community, hires business school 
graduates and benefits from faculty research, at least in theory.  As mentioned above, 
businesses echo the complaints of students who decry their poor preparation by business 
schools (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005; Pfeffer & Fong, 2002, 2004; Lorsch, 2009; Starkey & 
Tiratsoo, 2007).  Even business faculty, who are responsible for student preparation, have 
joined the chorus of calls for improvement in student preparation (Lorsch, 2009; Podolny, 
2009).  Business leaders offer pointed criticism that the research and teaching of business 
schools is often irrelevant to the business profession (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005; Pfeffer & 
Fong, 2002; Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007).  The business community also desires a clear 
return on investment from their relationships with business schools due to the 
hypercompetitive climate in which businesses now operate.  To many, this return on 
investment is less than satisfactory when it is marked by poorly prepared students and the 
production of arcane research (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005; Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007). 
 The business community also points to a wide chasm between the research 
activities of business schools and the professional practice of business (Bennis, 2010; 
Khurana, 2007).  This criticism becomes pointed and personal at times such as in 
Pearce’s (1999) assertion that business faculty are “underproductive, esoteric 
technophobes who teach obsolete notions about business practice under the protection of 
an arcane tenure system” (p. 105).  While there are those who disagree (Kieser & Leiner, 
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2009; Peng & Dess, 2010), the root of the issue appears to be a conflict between 
constituencies.  Business leaders desire research that can be directly applied within their 
businesses and students who can directly contribute to organizational success.  As 
business schools have evolved into an academic discipline, faculty are incentivized to 
focus more and more on the production of highly rigorous scientific research.  Faculty 
often shun applicability in their research to meet the high methodological standards set by 
the academic journals and the academy itself.  The time consuming nature of rigorous 
research also tends to isolate faculty from all but the minimum of student and practitioner 
contact.  While this may seem to be an unwise tradeoff, from the perspective of a faculty 
member it often looks quite different. 
 As noted above, business school faculty, the third major business school 
constituency, have become accepted within the university academy as purveyors of 
scientific research.  This evolution from practitioner to academic began almost fifty years 
ago as a result of the aforementioned Gordon and Howell (1959) report, and the march 
toward increasing scientific rigor by business faculty has continued, largely unabated, 
since that time (Chait, 1985; Khurana, 2007).  Consequently, faculty now find themselves 
in an environment where they are expected to focus on the production of research using 
highly scientific methods to even have a chance for acceptance into the faculty guild 
(Harmon, 2006).  By placing a primary focus on becoming accomplished scientific 
researchers, business schools and faculties have demoted the priority of a tight 
relationship between the academy and practice that other professional schools such as law 
and medicine still enjoy.  Instead, faculty remain doggedly focused on research as this is 
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usually the sole means by which they can advance within the academy (Bennis & 
O’Toole, 2005; Khurana, 2007; Lorsch, 2009; Pfeffer & Fong, 2002).  As the faculty 
control business school strategy and are heavily incentivized to focus on themselves, it is 
no surprise that the student and business community constituencies are complaining of 
neglect and are withdrawing critical support from business schools. 
 In addition to conflicts between constituencies, an increasingly crowded 
competitive landscape has only served to intensify the issues for business schools.  The 
majority of the factors which have changed the business profession—globalization, 
disruptive technologies, demographic shifts, and deregulation—have also been at work 
within the field of business education (Friga et al., 2003).  As the market for higher 
education has become more globalized, schools are forced to compete outside their 
traditional geographies (AACSB, 2011).  This competition is further fueled by disruptive 
technologies such as distance learning and online degree programs.  Finally, demographic 
shifts have led to increased diversity in student population and a shift toward a service-
based economy which opens the door for new competitors to address this rapidly 
changing market (Friga et al., 2003).  Business schools need to be more nimble to 
respond to these changing trends within the marketplace (Acito, McDougall, & Smith, 
2007).  This relatively new competitive environment is complex and still transitory in 
nature which requires careful attention and skill on the part of business school leaders 
who are attempting to lead their schools toward success. 
 A plethora of new competitors has also emerged in response to this new 
competitive environment.  First, traditional business schools have expanded their online 
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offerings to allow competition outside of their immediate area.  For example, in the 
researcher’s own locale no fewer than three schools located in outlying cities have begun 
to offer distance education or satellite campuses across the local metropolitan area.  
These new offerings are now in direct competition with the land-grant university in the 
city and have the potential to siphon off students who traditionally have not had these 
options.  In addition, for-profit schools have entered the fray with both online and 
satellite campuses.  For-profit schools tend to be especially attracted to business 
programs as they are in high demand and often result in profit for the school (Khurana, 
2007).  In a move similar to the consolidation seen in other industries such as commercial 
aviation and transportation, business schools are also forming alliances and partnerships 
at an increased rate in an attempt to defend their competitive space against the increasing 
number of competitors (Friga et al., 2003). 
 Secondly, non-traditional competitors have also emerged to cherry pick portions 
of a business school’s traditional scope of responsibility (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005).  The 
business community itself is taking on additional responsibility in educating current and 
future employees themselves as Fortune magazine reports that 40% of Fortune 500 
companies now operate their own corporate university (Iniquez de Onzoño & Carmona, 
2007).  Trade organizations are developing certification programs that are gaining 
traction within the business community as accepted forms of education.  Consulting firms 
have stepped into the void created by business faculty pursuing increasingly theoretical 
research to provide businesses with applied research that is directly applicable to business 
operations.  These nontraditional competitors have helped to further weaken the 
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connections between business schools and the business community they were created to 
serve (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005). 
 In a time marked by fiscal constraint and a competitive environment increasingly 
crowded by both traditional and nontraditional players, business schools face substantial 
obstacles to continued success and viability (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005; Khurana, 2007; 
Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007).  While many of these issues have been recognized for almost 
a decade (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002), scant progress has been made toward satisfactorily 
addressing them (Lorsch, 2009; Podolny, 2009).  Meanwhile competition between 
business schools continues to significantly intensify as schools vie for the best students 
and public recognition, so the discussion will now turn to a primary contributor to this 
intensification—rankings. 
Influence of Rankings on the Competitive Environment 
 Business school rankings as compiled by publications such as Businessweek, The 
Wall Street Journal, and The Financial Times are often the dominate factor in business 
school strategy and action (Corley & Gioia, 2000; Holbrook, 2007).  The impact of 
rankings on the competitive landscape is such that they have pushed business schools into 
a competitive environment which bears many similarities to that of for-profit businesses 
(Corley & Gioia, 2000; Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007).  While rankings have become 
prevalent at the university level in both the United States (Sponsler, 2009) and 
internationally (Hazelkorn, 2009), business school rankings arguably lead the way 
amongst school rankings and have become a primary focus for leadership in many US 
business schools.  This is not surprising when one reviews the impact on the number and 
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quality of student applicants and the increased interest from corporate recruiters that a 
higher ranking brings to a school (Corley & Gioia, 2000). 
 In a seminal study of business school rankings, Corley and Gioia (2000) 
interviewed business school leaders and communications officers to better understand the 
impact of rankings on business schools.  This study established the following rules for 
“the game” which has become an accepted moniker for the rankings: 
1. You must play the game. 
2. Once you start you cannot quit. 
3. The rules change without notice. 
4. You can’t really win this game. 
As these rules explicate, the rankings are a mandatory game for business schools, yet it is 
impossible to win the game as the rules continually change.  An understanding of the 
rankings and their influence upon business schools is a prerequisite for studying business 
school strategy.  This discussion begins with an examination of the weaknesses of the 
rankings before turning to the strengths of the rankings and the positive impacts which 
they foster.  The discussion of the rankings will conclude with an examination of the 
direct effects of the rankings upon business school competition. 
Weaknesses of rankings.  First and foremost, the rankings ensure a focus on 
image and reputation management often to the detriment of substance and quality.  This 
creates a blurring between image and substance (Gioia & Corley, 2002) that serves as a 
smokescreen for anyone attempting to assess the quality, capability, and strategy of a 
business school.  Reputation management becomes the key competitive lever and 
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therefore the focus of business school leadership (Argenti, 2000).  As business schools 
play the rankings game, strategy often suffers (Policano, 2007).  For example, Morgeson 
and Nahrgang (2008) found a pronounced shift away from educating students toward a 
focus on student perception of job placement.  In addition to the overall shift from 
substance to image, a shift within business schools from a focus on undergraduate 
programs to MBA programs has occurred as many rankings measure MBA programs 
instead of the business school as a whole (Gioia & Corley, 2002).  In short, rankings 
appear to impact a business school’s ability to set a strategy based upon substance and 
instead focus business schools on the short-sighted goal of image and perception. 
 The rankings themselves are also fundamentally flawed if the intent is to measure 
the quality and value of business education in a relatively unbiased manner.  Considering 
that the goal of the publications which compile and publish the rankings is to maximize 
their circulation and profits (Policano, 2007), a picture of the perverse incentives created 
by the popularity of the rankings begins to clearly emerge.  From the arbitrary nature of 
some ranking criteria (Adler & Harzing, 2009) to the statistical invalidity of others 
(Morgeson & Nahrgang, 2008), no shortage of criticism exists in the scholarly literature.   
Morgeson & Nahrgang (2008) found that the Businessweek rankings are extremely stable 
across time to a fault.  In fact, the best predictors of the Businessweek ranking are factors 
that cannot be changed such as the ranking of the school in Businessweek’s initial 1988 
ranking and the longevity of the school’s MBA program.  In addition, the top 27 schools 
are separated by 1 scale point on a 10 point scale.  Therefore, minor changes in the 
calculation methodology produce wide swings in the rankings (Morgeson & Nahrgang, 
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2008).  The Businessweek rankings are not alone in their weakness as Holbrook (2007) 
found US News and World Report’s business school rankings to be “a very imperfect 
gauge of educational quality” (p. 11). 
 Rankings also tend to apply a one-size-fits-all approach to business schools 
(Peters, 2007), similar to overall university rankings (Hazelkorn, 2007).  In this forced-fit 
approach, schools that look very different are often ranked in similar positions and vice 
versa (Naudé et al., 2010).  In a study of the Financial Times rankings, Naudé et al. 
(2010) found that, contrary to popular perception, schools were able to use different 
routes to achieve success in the rankings; however, this is not apparent from a review of 
the rankings themselves.  Of course, a counterpoint to the argument that rankings miss 
crucial differentiating factors between schools is that even the current one-size-fits-all 
model already places too heavy of a burden onto business schools as publications require 
schools to do all of the data collection and self-report information.  Even the elite 
schools, which benefit greatly from the rankings, complain of the resource drain to 
complete time-consuming questionnaires from multiple publications (Harmon, 2006). 
Self-reporting can also lead to the possibility of biased or untrue reporting although this is 
beyond the scope of this discussion. 
Strengths of rankings.  Even though rankings have significant weaknesses, they 
do provide benefit to business school constituencies.  If the rankings were completely 
absurd they would simply be ignored (Gioia & Corley, 2002).  Since they continue to 
hold sway over the market, they must provide some type of value for business school 
constituencies.  The primary benefit of the rankings appears to be their provision of a 
 
30 
source of standardized information to students and employers where none previously 
existed. This information raises awareness of business school capabilities and assists both 
students and employers in choosing business schools with which they want to have a 
relationship (Bickerstaffe & Ridgers, 2007; Machung, 1998).  From the business school 
perspective, the rankings also create positive motivation for those schools that fare well 
(Zemsky, 2008). 
Rankings can also provide other substantive benefits as they tend to force 
business schools to improve and to address problems—that is, those problems that affect 
the school’s reputation and ranking.  Historically, business schools have not faced a 
highly competitive market as market communication was limited and inefficient (Gioia & 
Corley, 2002).  Rankings have provided a means, however imperfect they may be, for 
market communication and therefore increased competition.  Generally speaking 
“competition improves the breed” leading to better performance, satisfaction, and 
innovation (Gioia & Corley, 2002, p. 109).  This competition also tends to force schools 
to develop a strategy and prioritize their activities (Gioia & Corley, 2002).  The variety of 
rankings may also benefit schools that focus on particular niches as each has a different 
calculation methodology which tend to favor different schools (Bradshaw, 2007).  
 In this discussion of business school strategy, the rankings play an important role 
as they heavily impact competition between schools.  As such, rankings tend to create 
generalist programs as schools focus directly on “gaming” the rankings to increase their 
positions.  Therefore, obsession with the rankings pushes schools toward conformity and 
uniformity and preserves the status quo (Glick, 2008; Harmon, 2006).  In this 
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environment, innovation is likely to be ignored and specialist programs are dropped in an 
all out bid for head-to-head competition based solely upon the rankings components 
(Glick, 2008; Iniquez de Onzono, 2007).  This move toward isomorphism created by the 
strength of the rankings leads to suboptimization of business school value to conform to 
rankings (Adler & Harzing, 2009; Harmon, 2006).  This isomorphism can be seen when 
comparing US business schools to European business schools, which have not been as 
affected by the rankings to date.  Examining European schools provides a window into 
the diversity and opportunity of an environment that is not wholly dominated by rankings 
(Harmon, 2006).  In sum, although rankings do serve as a way to improve market 
communication, a primary focus by business schools on rankings drives homogeneity in 
the market, suboptimizes the output of schools, and tends to stifle innovation.  Since this 
is the case, business school leadership would do well to explore their strategic options 
even in view of Corley & Gioia’s (2000) assertion that business schools must play the 
game.   
The Defining Nature of Globalization on Business Education 
 Alongside the intense focus on program rankings, the globalization of 
management education is the other predominant trend facing contemporary business 
schools.  The ways in which business school leaders deal with globalization will likely be 
no less than a defining mark in the history of their respective schools (AACSB, 2011; 
Altbach & Knight, 2007; Altbach, Reisberg, & Rumbley, 2010; Czinkota, Grossman, 
Javalgi, & Nugent, 2009; Ghemawat, 2008; Naidoo, 2006).  Globalization has been 
characterized as the “third wave” of management education with the formalization of 
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business into a profession in the early 1900s as the first wave and the intellectualization 
of business schools in the 1950s-60s as the second (AACSB, 2011).  The group of ten 
preeminent business scholars who wrote the AACSB (2011) special report on 
globalization detailed the significant impact that this “third wave” of globalization may 
have on business education in the following statement. 
 Globalization seems likely to transform management education at least on par 
 with major inflection points in the past, such as the turn from application into 
 research in the 1950s as advocated by the Gordon and Howell report and the turn 
 toward humanism in 1988 as  advocated by the report of Porter and McKibbin 
 (p. 2). 
Speaking generally about higher education, Altbach et al. (2010) went even further with 
their statement that globalization will lead to fundamental changes that may be as large as 
the development of the modern US research university in the 19th century.  Whether these 
predictions are completely correct or not, globalization seems poised to be a major 
defining force within management education both in the US and globally. 
  Since the inception of formal management education over a century ago, business 
schools in the US have led the world in both prestige and research production.  However, 
globalization is already beginning to level the playing field as top students think “the US 
is no longer the only place to go and pursue the dream of getting an MBA” (Czinkota et 
al., 2009, p. 283).  Research reveals that a new global system of management education is 
emerging which has elements of the dominant US system, but which also infuses the 
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innovation, diversity, and influences of a global marketplace (AACSB, 2011; Naidoo, 
2006).   
 As business schools continue to be pushed by the powerful forces of 
globalization, it seems likely that a tipping point will be reached where a new global 
system will become the new gold standard taking over from the current US system. The 
AACSB (2011) report further builds on this line of thought by emphasizing the 
international connections and influence of this emerging system when they write “the 
connections and depth of interaction among institutions and individuals around the globe 
will become the most important defining characteristic of the new system” (p. 210).  
Based upon the comprehensive report from the AACSB (2011) regarding the 
globalization of management education as well as other empirical studies on the subject 
(Czinkota et al, 2009; Naidoo, 2006), business school leaders have no reason to delay or 
downplay the importance of formulating a strategy to lead their schools into this new age 
of globalization. 
 With great challenge comes opportunity.  If they are willing, business school 
leaders might use globalization as a catalyst to instigate change within their schools 
helping to regain the confidence of key constituencies which has been lost in a decades 
long battle for status.  Disruption in a system provides an opportunity for a business 
school to reset and redesign its strategy and programming (Somers, 2009).  As a result of 
this disruption, changes are not limited to those aspects of the program directly affected 
by globalization; rather, they afford an opportunity to reexamine and strengthen all 
aspects of programming (Olcott, 2009).  The vastness and diversity of the new global 
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marketplace will allow additional opportunities for schools which typically compete 
within a national market, such as the US, to develop and serve students outside of their 
traditional markets.  Business school leaders have hypothesized about how to escape the 
merry-go-round of rankings and ratings through new rules or regulations (Adler & 
Harzing, 2009; Bennis & O’Toole, 2005; Harmon, 2006).  Could the answer be that a 
globalizing market will induce enough change into the system to allow this to happen? 
 From the perspective of the recent AACSB (2011) report, the emerging market 
for globalized management education “remains full of untapped and underdeveloped 
opportunities” (p. 13).  Instead of maintaining a focus on disjointed or fragmented 
activities which often currently represent US business schools’ international programs, 
leaders have the opportunity to truly determine how their school might respond to 
globalization.  The particular mission and identity of a business school will ultimately 
influence the way in which a school responds to globalization.  No single approach will 
dominate, rather schools will globalize in a variety of ways (AACSB, 2011).   
 Whenever new opportunities are assessed they should always be viewed through 
the lens of the vision and strategy for the school (AACSB, 2011; Green & Gerber, 1996).  
With this mindset, business schools might choose to harness their school’s unique 
identity as a foundation on which to build their new strategy.  In this way, a school would 
utilize their strengths in the identification and prioritization of strategies which are most 
likely to yield success given their school’s institutional mission, strategy, and resource 
constraints (AACSB, 2011).  In a market where virtually all management education 
programs are “struggling for identity and distinctiveness” (Montgomery, 2005), any 
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school which is able to articulate a coherent strategy is likely to immediately stand out 
from the crowd. 
 Finally, the recent AACSB (2011) report highlighted the opportunity for 
globalization to increase opportunity for differentiated programs and schools in their 
statement that “globalization is highly complex and likely to be shaped (and result in) 
asymmetries across schools and countries” (p.82).  The diversity of constituencies in the 
global marketplace means there is much more room for schools to follow a path which 
fully uses the unique core competencies and skills of a given faculty and school. In 
addition to the AACSB (2011) report, other research has suggested that differentiation 
and innovation should be at the foundation of the new era of globalization (Clarysee, 
Mosey, & Lambrecht, 2009).  Friga et al. (2003) also wrote that schools will need to 
focus on core competencies and squeeze out redundancies from their cost structures.  In 
this same study, they predict further market segmentation going forward in a more 
globalized marketplace for business education. 
 As is the case in so many sectors of society and the economy, globalization 
appears to be ushering change into the world of business education.  Although it will 
likely force business schools to make changes to their structure and focus, globalization 
may also provide suitable cover for many schools to retreat from current strategies of 
generalist competition and positioning in the rankings.  With the opening of a larger, 
globalized market that has more tolerance for diversity in schools and programs, business 
school leaders appear to have more options as they contemplate the approach that their 
schools will take to the market. 
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Strategic Options for Collegiate Business Schools 
 When it comes to making strategic decisions, business school leaders can choose 
between at least two strategic directions for the schools that they lead.  First, they could 
continue on the present course, continuing to devote primary attention to playing the 
rankings game and serving their traditional markets.  Based upon the stability of the 
rankings, the chances for a school to drastically change its ranking are unsure at best.  
Even if a school can change it’s ranking, this may not signal that it is doing a better job of 
satisfying its multiple constituencies.  In addition, the large numbers of business schools 
which have flooded the market with a generalist image in hopes of gaining market share 
have decreased market sensitivity and opportunity (Gioia & Corley, 2002).  The 
excessive signaling necessary in head-to-head competition heightens the challenge and is 
wasteful of precious financial resources available to higher education institutions (Mause, 
2009).  To further complicate this choice, Naudé et al. (2010), in their study of European 
business schools in the international rankings, found the opportunity for a school to climb 
in the rankings is low unless the school relies on a particular competitive strength or 
distinctiveness.  While this study focused on European business schools, the same 
principle may hold true in other markets which are marked by intense competition in the 
rankings. 
 An alternative to the sole pursuit of climbing in the rankings is to pursue a 
strategy based upon the individual school’s unique mix of competitive strength and 
positioning (Gloeckler, 2010; Friga et al., 2003; Porter & McKibbin, 1988; Vidaver-
Cohen, 2007).  Porter and McKibben (1988) wrote that “more diversity of mission (but 
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not of quality) is vital if university-based management education and development is to 
make major strides toward improvement in the future” (p. 314), and they specifically 
highlighted internationalization as one way to increase this diversity.  Vidaver-Cohen 
(2007) suggested that “most schools would be better served by adopting a strategic 
approach to reputation management—positioning themselves on specific characteristics 
highly valued by their own unique constituents” (p. 301).  Employment of niche strategy 
based upon unique competitive advantage can help schools fare better in the rankings 
(Gloeckler, 2010).  This type of strategy may include specialization on a market niche or 
alliances with international universities (Friga et al., 2003).  As mentioned above, 
European business schools provide examples of this differentiation with their foci on 
innovation, partnerships, and a diversity of approach to business education (Antunes & 
Thomas, 2007).  
 Although the current challenges and competitive environment are tough, they also 
offer opportunity.  In these turbulent waters, business schools would do well to 
continually “reinvent themselves in an ongoing search for challenges and opportunities” 
(Iniquez de Onzoño & Carmona, 2007, p. 28).  The difficulty of this reinvention is that it 
leaves the charted course where the masses of schools ply for a higher spot in the 
rankings.  When a business school leaves the crowd, how can leadership be confident it is 
on a course toward success?  When viewed through the lens of traditional competitive 
theory, competition is a mainstay and the competitors will be many.  Direct competition 
dominates the day.  Is there a course that leads away from the heated fray of competition 
but still toward success? 
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Theoretical Framework 
A rich base of organizational and competitive theory exists within which the 
competitive environment of business schools can be examined.  This section begins by 
introducing institutional theory before applying it to the current competitive landscape for 
business schools. Then, Blue Ocean Strategy will be introduced and followed by a 
discussion of how it was used to explore business school strategic options in this study. 
Institutional theory.  Institutional theory has been widely used to generally 
describe and explain the behavior of organizations (Adler & Harzing, 2009; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Goodrick, 2002; Scott, 1987; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Westney, 2005, 
Zucker, 1987).  According to this theory, organizations, “adopt patterns that are 
externally defined as appropriate to their environment, and that are reinforced in their 
interactions with other organizations” (Westney, 2005, p. 47).  Over time, the patterns 
adopted as a result of the institutionalizing forces move organizations toward sameness or 
isomorphism with other organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  For example, the 
structure of primary and secondary educational systems across the continental US 
dramatically converged onto a similar model over the course of four decades in the 
middle of the 1900s (Meyer, Scott, Strang, & Creighton, 1987). 
 Although disagreement amongst institutional theorists has led to the creation of 
multiple conceptualizations, the view that institutionalization is a “social process by 
which individuals come to accept a shared definition of reality” is a common thread that 
runs through all of the conceptualizations (Scott, 1987, p. 496).  Accordingly, 
organizations and the individuals which comprise and lead them can be subject to three 
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categories of forces which lead toward institutional isomorphism (Dimaggio & Powell, 
1983). 
1. Coercive Isomorphism-Imposition of organizational patterns or structure upon an 
organization by powerful external forces (often the government). 
2. Normative Isomorphism-Organizational patterns or structure are advanced by 
professional associations or groups. 
3. Mimetic Isomorphism-Organizational leaders choose to mimic the decisions of 
other successful organizations when faced with uncertainty in decision making. 
Through the influence of some or all of these institutionalizing forces, organizations tend 
toward sameness over time according to institutional theory.  
 As organizations become successful, these institutitionalizing forces within the 
organization often begin to discourage change, and organizations become beholden to the 
status quo (Friga et al., 2003; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Westney, 2005; Zucker, 1987).  While institutionalized organizations can usually fulfill 
requirements and are often important in transmitting legitimacy, they do not perform core 
tasks as well as market-oriented organizations (Zucker 1987).  Instead, the 
institutionalizing forces lead organizations to convert past decisions and behavior patterns 
into organizational myths and rituals which are followed even when they do not 
necessarily best advance the goals of the organization (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 
1987). 
 These myths and rituals can create an “iron cage” around the organization 
constraining it from undertaking innovative activities which often involve deviation from 
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established patterns (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  In the case of business schools, Adler 
and Harzing (2009) noted the high degree of isomorphism due in part to the prevalence of 
rankings.  Gioia and Corley (2002) also assert that an increase in the number of business 
schools taking a generalist strategy in pursuit of a higher ranking dilutes the opportunity 
of success for all; this aligns with institutional theory as advanced by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) who write that “strategies that are rational for individual organizations 
may not be rational if adopted by large numbers” (p. 148).   
 Although institutional theory does tend to lean toward environmental 
determinism, elements of voluntarism have certainly been incorporated into the theory 
since its infancy (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Astley & Van de Ven, 1983; Dimaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987; Westney, 2005) especially as it relates to the concept of 
mimetic isomorphism discussed above (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Westney, 2005).  
Porter and McKibbin (1988) noted that an inhibitor to diversity in business schools is the 
belief on the part of leadership that changes to their focus or programming would make 
their students and services less attractive although this was not found to be the case in 
interviews with business leaders and students.  While business schools are no doubt under 
external pressure from constituencies and rankings, it is unclear whether this has forced 
schools through coercive isomorphism or whether business school leaders chose to mimic 
other schools to climb in the rankings.  Whatever the case, many business schools appear 
to be trapped in the iron cage of direct competition and need a way out to better fulfill 
their core tasks and advance their mission as assigned by their constituencies. 
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Blue Ocean Strategy.  Blue Ocean Strategy encourages organizations to 
deliberately break free from the iron cage of isomorphism by pursuing uncontested 
markets or unsatisfied demand instead of continuing direct head-to-head competition for 
existing markets and demand (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004, 2005a, 2005b).  In contrast to 
most structuralist or environmental determinalist views of strategy (e.g. Porter, 2008), 
Blue Ocean Strategy takes the reconstructionist view that a company can create markets 
that previously did not exist (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005a). Using Blue Ocean Strategy 
vernacular, “red oceans” are those existing competitive waters which are bloody from 
intense competition over an existing customer base whereas “blue oceans” are 
uncontested markets which represent an opportunity for distinctiveness for an 
organization.  Kim and Mauborgne (2005a) detail a process, called Blue Ocean Strategy, 
for identifying blue oceans and how to deliberately move an organization toward these 
uncharted waters.   
 An important initial tenet of Blue Ocean Strategy is that the proper unit of 
analysis is the strategic move instead of the more commonly used organizational unit of 
analysis.  Instead of attempting to assess whether an overall organization has a good 
strategy, individual strategic moves are the more fitting unit of analysis (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 2005a).  Through an ex post facto analysis of strategic moves at over 150 
companies across 120 years, Kim and Mauborgne identified patterns that emerged in 
companies which were successful in creating blue ocean markets.   
 A major contribution of Blue Ocean Strategy is its specificity and the process 
provided for systematically identifying uncontested market spaces and guiding an 
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organization toward capturing these new markets.  The six principles of Blue Ocean 
Strategy as outlined by Kim and Mauborgne (2005a, p. 21) are: 
1. Reconstruct Market Boundaries 
2. Focus on the big picture, not the numbers 
3. Reach beyond existing demand 
4. Get the strategic sequence right 
5. Overcome key organizational hurdles 
6. Build execution into strategy 
Each of these six principles is designed to attenuate a particular type of risk.  First, 
companies can reconstruct the boundaries of their market in a systematic way and 
therefore minimize search risk.  A chief complaint from companies attempting to 
innovate through the reconstruction of market boundaries is how to choose a particular 
idea from the plethora of possibilities and therefore not needlessly invest in a product or 
service which will not survive.  By systematically looking across six different domains of 
comparison identified through research and visually plotting similarities and differences, 
Blue Ocean Strategy offers a systematic approach to identify suitable ways to expand the 
market.  These six domains emerged from Kim and Mauborgne’s study of over 150 
companies.  This process of visual mapping, called a strategy canvas, allows 
organizational leaders to see how their product or service might create uncontested 
market space (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005a). 
 The second principle entreats leaders to focus on the big picture instead of the 
numbers and thereby attenuate planning risk.  The process of strategic planning in most 
 
43 
organizations is an exercise that creates “muddle” instead of clear strategic moves.  Kim 
and Mauborgne (2005a) elaborate on this principle in the following passage. 
 “Executives are paralyzed by the muddle.  Few employees deep down in the 
 company even know what the strategy is.  And a closer look reveals that most 
 plans don’t contain a strategy at all but rather a smorgasbord of tactics that 
 individually make sense but collectively don’t add up to a unified, clear direction 
 that sets a company apart—let alone make the competition irrelevant” (p. 82).  
By using the previously developed strategy canvas, leaders can develop how they might 
craft a strategy which leads the organization toward uncontested space.  Through their 
field research, Kim and Mauborgne (2005a) found that organizations often do not involve 
employees, key partners, or customers in this process.  This is troublesome as many times 
the uncontested market space is not found by a stroke of genius, but rather from a clear 
understanding of how to push the boundaries of current competition.  Often, the 
employees, key partners, and customers know the business best and can be an extremely 
valuable source of input (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005a). 
 Addressing scale risk, the third principle of reaching beyond existing demand 
calls for organizations to challenge two conventional strategy practices—a focus on 
existing customers and finer segmentation of markets (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005a).  “To 
reach beyond existing demand, think noncustomers before customers; commonalities 
before differences; and desegmentation before pursuing finer segmentation” (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 2005a, p. 103). While it may be best to eventually settle upon serving 
existing customers or further segmenting the market to focus on the specific needs of a 
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particular customer group, blue oceans are best found when the product or service attracts 
non-customers across a wide swath of the market.  Even if a company eventually chooses 
to focus on existing customers or to further segment, the experience of reaching beyond 
existing demand can offer valuable insight.  In the words of Kim and Mauborgne 
(2005a), “noncustomers tend to offer far more insight into how to unlock and grow a blue 
ocean than do relatively content existing customers” (p. 106). 
 The principle of “getting the strategic sequence right” deals with the conversion 
of the idea to a viable strategy for a particular organization’s business model and 
therefore attenuates business model risk.  Kim and Mauborgne (2005a) report that 
companies should first consider buyer utility followed by price, then cost, and finally 
adoption hurdles.  If a product or service under consideration does not first provide 
exceptional utility to the buyer then the remainder of the discussion is moot.  If buyer 
utility is high, the next question to ask is if the product can be made available at a price 
attractive to the mass of buyers.  If so, can the organization manage costs so as to make a 
profit from the sale?  If all of the above are true, can the product or service under study be 
successfully adopted by the organization?  If the answers to all of these questions are yes, 
then an organization is likely ready to undertake the project.  If the answers to any of 
these questions are no, the idea should be rethought or discarded (Kim & Mauborgne, 
2005a). 
 In the final two principles, overcoming organizational hurdles and building 
execution into the strategy, Kim and Mauborgne (2005a) found that just having a good 
idea is not enough.  Organizations that successfully implemented blue ocean ideas 
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conquered four organizational hurdles:  the cognitive hurdle, the resource hurdle, the 
motivational hurdle, and the political hurdle.  Any one of these four hurdles can disrupt 
the successful execution of blue ocean strategy.  The list below provides additional detail 
about these four hurdles from Kim & Mauborgne (2005a, p. 150): 
1. Cognitive Hurdle—An organization wedded to the status quo 
2. Resource Hurdle—Limited resources 
3. Motivational Hurdle—Unmotivated staff 
4. Political Hurdle—Opposition from powerful vested interests 
Finally, organizations must create a culture of trust and commitment to properly foster 
the new strategy.  Blue Ocean Strategy employs a fair process approach to build trust and 
commitment.  This approach uses early engagement, explanation, and clarity of 
expectations to build trust and commitment.  This trust and commitment leads to more 
voluntary cooperation and self-initiated response to the Blue Ocean Strategy.  In this 
study of over 150 companies, proper attention to and buy-in from stakeholders emerged 
as critical success factors (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005a). 
 In addition to the identification of the six principles enumerated above, Kim and 
Mauborgne (2005a) found that good strategies generally have three characteristics: focus, 
divergence, and a compelling tagline.  These may seem a bit shallow at first glance; 
however, these three characteristics run deep into an organization’s strategy.  Focus 
highlights whether the strategy is organized and coherent and not a muddle.  Divergence 
addresses whether the strategy diverges from existing competition to create uncontested 
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markets.  Finally, the compelling tagline ensures that companies can clearly communicate 
the strategy to stakeholders (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004, 2005a). 
 Two common misconceptions exist about companies that pursue Blue Ocean 
Strategy.  First, it is often assumed that established market players are not able to 
effectively pursue Blue Ocean Strategy; however, Kim and Mauborgne (2005a) found 
that incumbents regularly create uncontested market space by extending their existing 
business.  Second, many times technology is seen to be the primary enabler to create new 
markets.  While technology can play a part, the crux of Blue Ocean Strategy is the 
concept of value innovation where the customer sees additional value in a product or 
service in a new and different way.  This concept of value innovation rejects the 
cost/value tradeoff which is usually assumed by most strategists.  Instead, Blue Ocean 
Strategy asserts that organizations can deliver exceptional value often for less cost by 
expanding the current boundaries of the marketplace (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004, 2005a, 
2005b). 
 Blue Ocean Strategy may not always be the best course for a strategic move, nor 
does the use of Blue Ocean Strategy completely free an organization from competitive 
and market forces.  However, organizations are rarely faced with a binary decision of 
choosing a traditional structuralist strategy or Blue Ocean Strategy.  Rather, strategic 
moves are better envisioned on a continuum with classic structuralist strategy on one end 
and Blue Ocean Strategy on the other.  The factors surrounding each strategic move and 
its resulting decisions will place a strategy along this continuum (Burke, van Stel, & 
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Thurik, 2009; Kim & Mauborgne, 2005a, 2009).  Kim and Mauborgne (2009) suggest the 
following three factors to use as a guide for when to employ Blue Ocean Strategy: 
1. Environmental attractiveness:  If the competitive environment allows for a healthy 
profit margin, has healthy demand, and lacks cutthroat competition, a structuralist 
approach may be satisfactory.  However, excess supply, cutthroat competition, 
and low profit margins would tend to favor a reconstructionist approach. 
2. Organizational capabilities and resources:  If the organization has the capabilities 
and resources to succeed against direct competitors a structuralist approach may 
be satisfactory.  However, if the organization cannot compete against traditional 
competitors, the reconstructionist approach would tend to be favored. 
3. Strategic orientation for competing or innovating:  As discussed above in the six 
principles of Blue Ocean Strategy, the organization must be fully committed to 
the strategy.  If the organizational culture is built around direct competition, a 
structuralist course may be more easily adopted whereas an innovative culture 
could usually adopt a reconstructionist approach more easily. 
Choosing when to employ Blue Ocean Strategy is a critical decision that should only be 
made after a thorough evaluation of the market (Kim & Mauborgne, 2009). 
Summary 
The leaders of collegiate business schools face an intensely competitive 
environment in which they must prioritize the desires of their multiple constituencies.  
Constrained fiscal resources and increasing competition from both traditional and 
nontraditional providers add to the complexity of the situation.  Furthermore, rankings 
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have significantly raised the stakes in the competition and are a driving force that pushes 
business schools toward uniform programming and behaviors.  Finally, the globalizing 
market of management education creates both additional challenges and opportunities.  
The leaders of business schools are now faced with tough decisions regarding the futures 
of their schools.   
Blue Ocean Strategy stands in contrast to traditional competitive strategy in that it 
entreats organizations to create distinctiveness as a means to achieve organizational 
success.  In the particular case of business schools, Blue Ocean Strategy would lead 
school leaders away from the uniform programs that the rankings have created and 
instead focus schools on uncontested market spaces which may be opening as a result of 
the globalization of management education.  Blue Ocean Strategy has been studied across 
a variety of different industries and organizational types including for-profit, non-profit, 
and governmental agencies (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005a).  However, virtually no study has 
examined its applicability and potential use with higher education and specifically 
collegiate schools of business.  Blue Ocean Strategy takes on even more relevance in 
tough environments similar to the intense competition now found between business 
schools (Kim & Mauborgne, 2009).  Highly-ranked business schools are well-entrenched 
and favorably positioned in the rankings.  Virtually all other business schools are lacking 
in resources and capabilities to directly compete with the highly-ranked schools in an 
effort to dislodge them from the rankings.  In this situation, Blue Ocean Strategy may be 
a viable option for those schools not already highly-ranked to chart a course for their own 
success. 
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Chapter 3  
Design and Methodology 
 The purpose of this case study was to explore the pursuit, implementation, and 
potential performance effects of a type of reconstructionist strategy, Blue Ocean Strategy, 
within the context of two collegiate business schools.  This study extends the 
understanding of available strategic options for business school leadership operating in 
today’s turbulent environment.  To guide the study, the following research questions were 
used: 
1. What organizational and environmental factors led to the pursuit and 
implementation of a reconstructionist approach for the strategic move under 
study? 
2. How were the principles of a reconstructionist approach, as articulated by Blue 
Ocean Strategy, employed during the implementation and execution phases for 
the strategic move under study? 
3. How has the reconstructionist approach for this strategic move affected the 
overall performance of the business school in which it was implemented? 
This chapter provides an explanation of the research design and methods that were used 
to investigate these questions.  It begins with a discussion of why a case study 
methodology was chosen followed by a description of how this methodology was applied 
in this particular study.  The profile of the business schools studied will then be presented 
along with an explanation of relevant data collection and analysis techniques.  Finally, 
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the chapter will conclude with a discussion of the limitations of this design, the 
trustworthiness of the study, and ethical considerations. 
Research Design 
 A qualitative approach was chosen for this study as it best aligns with the inherent 
complexity of the strategic moves under study and best advances the goal of exploration 
and detailed description of these strategic moves (Creswell, 2007).  The nature of the 
subject under study explicitly drives the methodological choice, so a qualitative approach 
was most likely to yield the type of information which was sought due to the complexity 
of the case (Merriam, 2009; Morgan & Smircich, 1980).  A qualitative design also 
situated the business schools under study in their natural environment allowing for 
emergence and flexibility in data collection as the researcher learned more (Mertens, 
1998; Merriam, 2009).  Finally, the qualitative design chosen did not limit the researcher 
to predetermined categories or responses, but instead the researcher was free to determine 
the concepts and categories which appeared to be most meaningful to the research 
participants (Adler & Adler, 1998).  
 A case study is defined by Merriam (2009) as “an in-depth description and 
analysis of a bounded system” (p. 40).  Case studies are primarily defined by the object 
under study, the case (Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2009), and are particularly useful for their 
ability to “capture complex action, perception, and interpretation” (Merriam, 2009, p. 
44).  Case study methodology fit well with the exploratory research questions under study 
concerning how reconstructionist strategy was pursued and implemented as well as how 
this type of strategy performed within the context of collegiate schools of business.  
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Finally, case studies have proven particularly useful in the study of educational 
innovations (Merriam, 2009). 
 In particular, a case study methodology was chosen for this study for three 
primary reasons: (1) previous research on Blue Ocean Strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 
2005a) has successfully used case study methodology, (2) the complexity and 
overarching nature of strategic moves lends itself well to case study research (Creswell, 
2007; Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2009), and (3) case study allows a scholar to research where 
the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are not clear (Stake, 1995; Yin, 
2009).  The boundaries of each strategic move undertaken by the business schools in this 
study were unclear, so case study was used to enter into the frame of reference of the 
business school leaders as they undertook each strategic move.  By doing this, the study 
was able to further understanding of the richness, complexity, and paradox associated 
with each strategic move, and therefore reveal how the principles from Blue Ocean 
Strategy apply in the context of a business school environment. 
 This study employed a multiple, embedded case study design (Yin, 2009) that 
involved the study of three strategic moves, which Kim and Mauborgne (2005a) have 
previously classified as the primary unit of analysis, at two business schools.  This design 
not only provided the opportunity to gain understanding and to capture additional detail 
necessary to properly consider the use of reconstructionist strategies, but it also allowed 
an initial investigation of any significant differences across the multiple study sites (Yin, 
2009).    
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Case studies are valuable to build theory and understanding where there is a 
shortage of existing research (Merriam, 2009). The particular schools chosen are known 
for pursuing differentiated strategies and new markets which made them suitable choices 
for this study of Blue Ocean Strategy within the business school environment.  Stake 
(1994, 1995) called this type of case instrumental as it is used to provide insight into a 
particular issue.   As previously detailed, virtually no research has been completed on this 
subject within the confines of business schools, so this methodology and the use of these 
instrumental cases were a suitable choice.    
 Substantial barriers to entry exist with this type of research as the business faculty 
tasked with business school strategy are often hesitant to allow a formal review of their 
processes to be conducted and published (Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007).  By using a case 
study approach, this initial investigation offers in-depth insight not previously available 
to business school leaders.  In sum, this case study design provided additional 
information useful for building a more detailed understanding of the strategic options 
open to business school leaders as they attempt to successfully lead their schools in a 
changing market. 
Site selection. For this study, the inquiry was first narrowed to business schools 
which are accredited by the Association for the Advancement of Collegiate Schools of 
Business.  AACSB-accredited schools comprise the majority of top tier business schools 
and are therefore likely to be subject to the intensely competitive rankings environment.  
This competitive environment is characterized as a “red” ocean and lays the foundation 
for the selection of instrumental cases (Stake, 1995).  The sample was narrowed further to 
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include only schools that maintain both undergraduate and graduate business education 
programs as the context of schools that operate only limited programs (e.g. only graduate 
programs) may oversimplify the strategic moves undertaken.  In sum, the business 
schools chosen were done so purposively to meet the above criteria for the objectives of 
this instrumental case study (Merriam, 1998; Stake, 1994).   
Pilot Business School.  The first business school chosen is a large college of 
business administration housed within a public land-grant university in the Southeastern 
United States.  For the purposes of this study, the school is referred to as the Pilot 
Business School. The Pilot School has approximately 5000 students which comprise 
approximately 20% of the overall student body of its parent university; this is an average 
size and percentage for a business school in this type of institution.  Pilot has 
approximately 117 full-time faculty and supplements with adjunct faculty as needs arise 
and budget permits.  Pilot offers a full complement of academic programs including nine 
undergraduate majors, nine Masters level degree programs, and eight doctoral majors.  
As a public land-grant institution, the Pilot School is tasked with educating students to 
function as a part of the business community throughout the state where it is located.  
Similarly to other business schools within public universities, Pilot has seen its public 
funding decrease in the face of higher enrollments and increasing competition.  Tuition 
has increased dramatically over the past 10 years to partially offset this decrease in public 
funding. Consequently, students have increasingly higher expectations due to the higher 
prices paid and competitive alternatives.  The Pilot School has currently just completed 
participation in a university-wide five-year development campaign to raise private funds 
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to support the school and funds approximately two-thirds of its budget through private 
funds. 
 Over the past 15 years, the Pilot School has successfully undertaken multiple 
strategic moves that have focused programming on new or uncontested markets.  Some of 
these programs are nationally and internationally recognized even though the overall 
school does not rank in any major rankings organization’s Top 25.  These strategic moves 
provide the context for two of the three embedded cases conducted as a part of this study.  
Below is a short description of the two Pilot School strategic moves that were studied. 
• Physicians Executive MBA program.  This niche executive MBA program was the 
first of its kind and is now ranked at the top of the list for physicians who wish to 
undertake a formalized business education to support their performance in 
healthcare management positions. 
• Shopper Marketing Forum.  Shopper Marketing is a new area of business that has 
emerged as the capability to tailor product and service offerings to particular 
retailers or customers has become possible through modern technology.  While 
Shopper Marketing is a burgeoning activity in many businesses and consulting 
firms, very few universities have adapted to address it.  The Pilot School has 
developed and implemented the Shopper Marketing Forum to partner with key 
businesses to advance the practice of Shopper Marketing through research, 
education of students, and associated activities. 
Diamond Business School.  The second business school chosen for inclusion in this 
case study is a large, well-known business school located in a major metropolitan area of 
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Western Europe.  For the purposes of this study, it will be known as the Diamond 
Business School.  The Diamond School has approximately 5000 students and is an 
independent school as contrasted with the Pilot School’s linkage to a larger university.  
The Diamond School has approximately 138 academic faculty through which it offers a 
comprehensive suite of programs.  The school offers eight undergraduate and graduate 
degree programs although one of these programs, a specialized Masters degree, has ten 
different specialization options.  The Diamond School is a private university although it 
does receive substantial funding from the national government to support its 
programming. 
 The Diamond School attracts a significant population of international students 
which comprise almost 30% of its enrollment.  In addition, the school boasts a 
comprehensive group of international partner universities and an international faculty of 
whom 30% are from outside the country where the Diamond School is located.  The 
Diamond School has built a reputation on offering programming that provides direct 
value to students and employers.  The third case undertaken as a part of this study is a 
strategic move that was made by the Diamond School over 15 years ago which is 
described below. 
• International Luxury Brand Management MBA program.  Recognizing the 
nuance of managing luxury brands which includes special attention to 
tradition and prestige, the Diamond School launched this program to capture 
this untapped market.  Combining a traditional MBA program with the 
subtleties of managing luxury brands, this program has opened a new pathway 
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for individuals to gain competency in this area.  In the past, one would have to 
devote years to learning the business in an apprentice type position whereas 
now this program offers the opportunity for students to accelerate their 
development.  In addition, corporate partners now have an educational partner 
that is intent upon focusing on issues important to the luxury goods industry. 
Data collection procedures. Approval from the University of Tennessee’s 
Institutional Review Board was secured for this study prior to the collection of any data 
(Appendix A).  IRB guidelines were followed in the development of an Informed 
Consent Form (Appendix B), which was completed by each participant prior to their 
interview.  As a part of this process each participant was reminded that their participation 
was voluntary, and that they were able to withdraw from participation in the study at any 
point without penalty.  Participants were also informed that all written records associated 
with the study would be kept in a locked cabinet in the UTK Haslam Business Building, 
and all electronic files would be securely stored with appropriate password protection.  
Furthermore, pseudonyms were used for organizations, and codes were established for 
any particularly confidential information. 
 In designing the approach to this case study, multiple sources of information were 
incorporated into the design in an effort to triangulate toward an accurate, detailed 
portrayal of the situation (Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2009).  Accordingly, faculty members, 
staff, and administrators who played a significant role in the strategic moves under study 
were interviewed.  In addition to these interviews, meeting minutes and other internal 
documents were examined, as they were available.  Finally, external press releases and 
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news stories regarding these strategic moves were reviewed.  Additional detail is 
provided below regarding the process used for each type of data. 
Interviews.  Individual semi-structured interviews of approximately one hour in 
length were conducted with each participant associated with a strategic move.  Semi-
structured interviews use an established protocol (Appendix C); however, they also 
allowed for additional probes and follow-up questions on a particular area of interest 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Merriam, 2009).  This semi-structured interview format best 
aligned with the research goals of this case study.  After IRB approval, formal permission 
was obtained from the schools to conduct these interviews, and school administration 
sent correspondence announcing the study to faculty, staff, and administrators identified 
to participate in the interview process where it was not clear to the researcher (Appendix 
D).  A follow up introductory letter (Appendix E) was sent by the researcher to each 
interviewee inviting their participation, and the researcher addressed any concerns they 
had through individual dialogue.  This process properly introduced the researcher to the 
participants without divulging critical details related to the study (Taylor & Bogdan, 
1984).  Each participant was then individually contacted by the researcher to arrange an 
initial interview which was conducted in the office of that faculty member or at an 
alternate private location of their choice (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).  Follow-up 
conversations were conducted to address conflicting information or areas that arose later 
in the course of data collection (Yin, 2009).  Two additional participants were identified 
through the initial set of interviews using chain sampling and process tracing techniques 
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(Tansey, 2007).  No more than three interviews per day were scheduled to allow time to 
properly compile notes and comments from each interview.   
 In preparation for the interviews, the researcher became familiar with the written 
documents collected as a part of the case study so as to be able to ask more appropriate 
questions (Yin, 2009).  The researcher also became thoroughly familiar with the 
interview protocol and used it to guide the interview; however, the interview was allowed 
to deviate from the list of prepared questions so long as it did not stray from the study’s 
focus (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Merriam, 2009).  Each interview was recorded and 
transcribed to help identify themes which emerged from the interview (Merriam, 2009).  
If a participant declined the request to record the interview, handwritten notes were taken 
instead.  Immediately following each interview, field notes and reflections about the 
content of the interview were recorded including the relation to other interviews and 
themes and thoughts on further data collection (Yin, 2009).    
Documents.  Documents also represent an important source of data for a case 
study (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009).  Internal documents including meeting minutes and 
strategic plans were collected as a part of this study.  As these documents are intended for 
internal use, it is likely that they portray a balanced perspective of the activity associated 
with each strategic move (Yin, 2009).  With the permission and assistance of key faculty, 
staff, and administration members on each strategic move, relevant internal documents 
were assembled and examined.   
 In addition to the internal documents, press releases and news stories which relate 
to the strategic moves under study were collected.  The press releases were accessed via 
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the online archives of the schools’ websites.  Finally, an internet search was used to 
locate newspaper and magazine articles relating to the strategic moves.  The intent was to 
examine both the internal documents and the public documents for information to aid in 
understanding how these strategic moves aligned with Blue Ocean Strategy. 
Pilot activities. The interviews of faculty, staff, and administration members were 
the primary means of data acquisition for this case study.  To properly plan and prepare 
for these interviews, a pilot interview process was conducted as they have proven to be 
helpful to increase the quality of the final study (Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2009). After an 
initial preparation of the interview protocol, an expert panel, comprised of faculty 
members who were not directly affiliated with the strategic moves under study, reviewed 
the questions to assess their clarity and applicability to this study’s research questions.  
This expert panel made suggestions for improvement.  Feedback on the questions served 
to eliminate glaring inconsistencies and confusion (Merriam, 2009).  A pilot interview 
was conducted with a colleague to assist in time management during the actual 
interviews, help to smooth the flow of questioning, and determine whether the line of 
questioning had the potential to yield helpful information.  For each individual with 
access to source data, a written agreement to maintain confidentiality and anonymity in 
cooperation with the overall case study design was secured via a Research Team 
Member’s Pledge of Confidentiality (Appendix F).    
Data analysis plan. No codified system exists for case study data analysis (Yin, 
2009).  Instead, the analysis of case study data is an iterative process in that the 
researcher should always be thoughtful of how data collected may or may not integrate 
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into the overall study and the associated theoretical framework (Merriam, 2009; Yin, 
2009).  Therefore, data analysis began from the outset of the data collection phase 
(Merriam, 2009).  First, the internal documents and public documents obtained were 
coded for emerging themes (Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2009).  Information gathered from the 
document review was incorporated into the interviews.  As interviews were conducted, 
transcripts were constructed of each interview by the primary researcher, and the 
transcripts were thematically coded in a similar fashion to the documents (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009; Merriam, 2009).  Information gleaned from early interviews was 
incorporated into subsequent interviews.  Through the entirety of data collection, 
documents and interview transcripts were read and reread to identify the themes which 
emerged.  Comparisons were made within each strategic move as well as between the 
three moves and two schools to better understand and capture the case under study 
(Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2009). 
   The researcher continued to collect data until a point of saturation was reached, 
where saturation is defined as the point at which previously collected information is 
repeated without the addition of pertinent new information (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  At 
that point, data was again reviewed to best understand how these strategic moves 
positioned the schools as viewed through the lens of Blue Ocean Strategy (Merriam, 
2009; Yin, 2009).  Over the course of the interviews, a colleague who was engaged in the 
pilot process was used as a source of peer review and critical comment to ensure a good 
assessment of what the interviews and documents revealed was being gained (Merriam, 
2009).     
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Limitations and delimitations.  While it is possible that the findings from this 
study would be similar in other business schools besides the two under study, it is outside 
the scope of this study to make generalizations.  Instead, the primary goal in this study 
was to better understand how the principles of Blue Ocean Strategy may be used to create 
distinctiveness for the two schools as an alternative to a sole reliance on direct 
competition; it was not the intention of this study to develop a generalized theory.  
Readers may choose to draw appropriate parallels to their particular situation and assess 
potential generalizability according to their own assessment of this study (Merriam, 
2009).   
 The schools were chosen as they offered strategic moves which could be studied 
to ascertain the applicability of Blue Ocean Strategy within the collegiate business school 
environment (Merriam, 1998, Stake, 1995). As detailed above, they are representative of 
major business schools and are thought to be subject to a typical range of decisions.  
However, it is not known whether the findings of this study would have any relevance to 
other business schools as each school brings a unique set of competencies and strategies 
to the academic marketplace. 
Trustworthiness.  The validity and reliability of case study research is often 
questioned by researchers who use more traditional methods (Merriam, 2009).  
Consequently, every effort was made to ensure this case study accurately portrays the 
findings from the schools under study.  In qualitative research, understanding of the 
phenomenon under study drives validity (Maxwell, 1992; Wolcott, 1990).  In this 
exploratory case study, descriptive validity, correctly describing the object of study, and 
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interpretive validity, capturing the meaning of the participants, are particularly important 
(Maxwell, 1992).   
 To build trustworthiness or validity, this study was designed to use multiple 
sources of data collection from the outset to triangulate the findings of the study; this 
triangulation approach helps to ensure validity by cross-checking the data through 
multiple sources (Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2009). Throughout the data collection process, the 
researcher continued to pursue new data including interviews and documentation until a 
saturation point (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) was reached or the incremental benefit of new 
information did not outweigh the cost of obtaining further data. 
 At the end of the data collection phase, the data collected from multiple sources 
was critically reviewed and alternate explanations for the findings were explored.  If 
discrepancies were found between multiple data sources, additional investigation was 
completed through follow-up interviews or searches for missing written documentation to 
mitigate any inconsistencies (Yin, 2009).  A colleague familiar with the strategic moves 
studied was used to review the validity of the themes and findings that emerged from the 
collected data (Merriam, 2009).  To add credibility and reliability to this study, an audit 
trail of all interviews and documents reviewed over the course of this study has been 
maintained.  Interview recordings, transcripts, and documents used during the study have 
been maintained in an organized system (Yin, 2009).  
Ethical considerations.  As a matter of disclosure, it would be inappropriate to 
omit that the researcher is an employee of the Pilot Business School.  However, he is not 
a tenure-track faculty member, does not serve on the leadership team, and was not 
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employed at Pilot when the strategic decisions under study were made.  Traditional 
guidance is for researchers to avoid study of a subject in which they have a personal or 
professional stake (Taylor & Bodgan, 1984).  However, the researcher’s connection with 
the Pilot school has the potential for positive as well as negative impact to this case study 
which merits further discussion.  After first discussing the positive aspects of this 
association, a discussion of the potentially negative aspects will follow.   
 Existing commentary about business school strategy has detailed the wall of 
protection established by current business school leadership around their strategy and 
management processes (Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007); this has also been observed in other 
settings such as the high echelons of corporate settings where strategic decisions are 
made (Taylor & Bodgan, 1984).  Consequently, very little research has been successfully 
completed to address this critical issue. 
 From a positive point of view, the insider position has afforded the opportunity to 
access key Pilot faculty members and associated data where an outsider would likely be 
denied this access.  In addition, a base familiarity with the Pilot school allowed for the 
construction of highly relevant questions which had a higher potential to lead to 
significant findings; without tacit knowledge of the inner workings of Pilot, these critical 
factors might have gone uninvestigated (Adler & Adler, 1998).  One of the most difficult 
aspects of case study from the researcher’s perspective is entering into the frame of 
reference for a subject. This can take months or even years before a researcher has 
sufficient understanding to integrate the complexities of a particular object of study.  As 
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an employee of Pilot, the researcher had a natural advantage of regularly spending time 
within the frame of reference for two of the three moves under study.   
 Adler and Adler (1998) describe this role as the “complete membership” role 
where the researcher is already a member of a setting or becomes a member over the 
course of the research, and they report that this type of role has been successfully used in 
qualitative research.  Furthermore, the direct observation which is possible because of the 
researcher’s position led to increased validity for the other formal data collection aspects 
of the study (Adler & Adler, 1998).  Angrosino and Mays de Perez (2000) extend the 
concept of complete membership through their description of how Angrosino was able to 
transition himself from a complete member to “interested-but-ignorant” bystander during 
his study of the academic community of which he had been a member for almost 30 years 
(p. 684).  Finally, some qualitative researchers are even beginning to question whether 
the disinterested researcher position is the preferred stance or even a possibility in 
qualitative projects where a deep understanding of the phenomenon under study is 
desired (Angrosino & Mays de Perez, 2000; Wolcott, 1990). 
 The potential for negative effects clearly does exist due to the researcher’s 
association with Pilot.  A negative effect could have manifested itself through a conscious 
or unconscious application of a particularly ingrained perspective about Pilot which 
might improperly bias the research.  While this is a possibility, the researcher has been 
employed at Pilot for only two years which has served to lessen the possibility of biases.  
Second, the researcher could have possessed a particular agenda or motive for this 
research other than the pursuit of knowledge.  While some argue that a researcher should 
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be completely without bias in their approach to an object of study, this argument is quite 
incredulous when applied to case study.  Case study research requires the significant 
commitment of time and effort on the part of the researcher (Yin, 2009).  If the researcher 
does not have some affect for the object of study, it is highly unlikely that the research 
will be seen through to completion.  Concern for the object of study will, in many ways, 
lead to a stronger study.  Any bias can be summed up in the researcher’s desire for 
business schools to be more effective.  While it is possible that this affect could have 
negatively manifested itself, the short tenure of employment at Pilot and personal 
devotion to the betterment of business schools has likely offset the potential for harmful 
bias to this study. In fact, it has probably lead to a deeper, richer case study containing 
thicker description and understanding.   
 Further research in this area is sorely needed.  Effective education of future 
businesspeople is an area of critical importance to the future of our economy and our 
nation.  It is also a major undertaking in scope and complexity.  The importance of this 
subject outweighed the potential for the harm to the Pilot school or the researcher’s own 
career.  This study helps fill a void that merits the serious attention of business scholars. 
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Chapter 4  
Findings 
The purpose of this case study was to explore the pursuit, implementation, and 
potential performance effects of a type of reconstructionist strategy, Blue Ocean Strategy, 
within the context of two collegiate business schools.  This study extends the 
understanding of available strategic options for business school leadership operating in 
today’s turbulent environment.   
The International Luxury Brand Management MBA Program at the Diamond 
Business School, along with the Physicians Executive MBA Program and the Shopper 
Marketing Forum at the Pilot Business School, were the three strategic moves by 
collegiate business schools used as the cases this study.  Information and documentation 
were first gathered about each of these strategic moves to provide a strong base of 
understanding for semi-structured interviews which were subsequently conducted with 
key faculty, staff, and administrators in each of the three cases. 
The following research questions were used to guide the study: 
1. What organizational and environmental factors led to the pursuit and 
implementation of a reconstructionist approach for the strategic move under 
study? 
2. How were the principles of a reconstructionist approach, as articulated by Blue 
Ocean Strategy, employed during the implementation and execution phases for 
the strategic move under study? 
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3. How has the reconstructionist approach for this strategic move affected the 
overall performance of the business school in which it was implemented? 
This chapter details the findings from the cases involving these three strategic moves.  
The chapter is divided into four primary sections.  The first three sections focus 
individually on each case and convey the findings that emerged in response to the three 
research questions that guided this study.  The fourth section in the chapter relates the 
findings from a cross-case comparison, thereby outlining the similarities and differences 
found between the three strategic moves studied, and presents the overall findings. 
Each of the four sections will follow a parallel format.  Findings related to the first 
research question concerning the environmental or organizational factors which 
influenced the pursuit of a reconstructionist approach will be organized into three 
categories found in Kim and Mauborgne (2009): 
1. Environmental attractiveness 
2. Organizational capabilities and resources 
3. Organizational orientation for competition or innovation 
The second research question sought evidence of how reconstructionist principles were 
employed in these cases, and the findings associated with this question are organized 
around the six principles of Blue Ocean Strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005a): 
1. Reconstruct market boundaries 
2. Focus on the big picture, not the numbers 
3. Reach beyond existing demand 
4. Get the strategic sequence right 
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5. Overcome key organizational hurdles 
6. Build execution into the strategy 
Finally, findings from the third research question which center on any impact to the 
schools’ overall performance due to these strategic moves will be presented and 
organized based upon whether the impact is primarily external, such as branding or 
position, or internal, such as an increased capability developed through the move. 
Case I – International Luxury Brand Management MBA Program at Diamond 
 The Diamond Business School is a private institution located within a major 
Western European metropolitan area that serves as a hub for business within the 
European Union and globally.  Although the Diamond School is a private institution, it 
does receive some funding from governmental sources; however, the majority of funding 
comes through student tuition and from corporate partners in the form of grants, 
endowments, and sponsored research.  While the Diamond School is now quite well 
known in Europe and even globally, study participants characterized it as well known and 
well respected within the country, but virtually unknown by anyone outside the country, 
during the mid-1990s when this strategic move was undertaken. 
 The Diamond Business School has a distinctive culture that differentiates it from 
many other schools in Europe and globally.  Four features of this culture emerged from a 
review of relevant documents and the seven participant interviews conducted.  These 
cultural features are described below to allow for a deeper understanding of this study’s 
findings, which are then presented.  First, the Diamond School values freedom for faculty 
and students.  A Diamond faculty member characterized this cultural trait as a “do-what-
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you-want” philosophy.  All participants interviewed were careful to emphasize that this 
propagates not only through the faculty ranks but also to the students.  Upon his 
appointment to the Deanship, a former Diamond School Dean recounted the principal 
counsel given to him by the Diamond School President at the time, “Let the people do 
what they want.  Your authority will be the result of the freedom you give to the students, 
the faculty, to the people.”  This freedom allows faculty and students alike to pursue their 
own interests even if they stray from the mainstream or the established interests of the 
Diamond School. 
 In conjunction with this freedom, the Diamond School also has an entrepreneurial 
environment.  While this will be discussed further in the findings below, the deliberate 
focus on innovation is one of the primary defining factors of the Diamond School.  A 
former President of the Diamond School remembered regularly entreating his leadership 
team to “have at least one major innovation every year or two midsized innovations as a 
minimum.”  Consequently, Diamond has a number of specialized programs and institutes 
that span across the spectrum of business and represent decades of entrepreneurship by 
the faculty and administration. 
 In the words of a longtime Diamond faculty member, “Diamond makes room for 
personal entrepreneurship…Diamond is quite an innovative organization and trusting of 
colleagues, professors, as well as staff.  People could, for a long time, innovate by 
themselves.”  Although this has allowed for some exceptional products, sometimes the 
implementation is not always flawless due to personnel changes or even a change in 
interests on the part of individual entrepreneurs.  Nevertheless, the diversity and size of 
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the Institutes at Diamond, virtually all of which began in the mind of an individual 
faculty, are an enduring testimony to the entrepreneurial nature of the Diamond School 
culture. 
 A third defining factor of the Diamond School culture is a close connection with 
business.  Through the creation of institutes and programs focusing on particular areas of 
business, the Diamond School maintains a tight connection with business.  This is 
represented in the pedagogy as related by a former Dean when he said, “we made 
systematic [the practice of] going back and forth from theory to practice and from 
practice to theory.”  It is also represented by the executives which are regularly on the 
Diamond School campus and through the myriad of corporate connections visible on the 
Diamond School’s website. 
 The fourth and final aspect of Diamond’s culture that will be highlighted is the 
faculty and administration’s preoccupation with what will be called a “challenger’s 
mindset.”  Due to a wealthier, better known national rival and a perennial lack of funding, 
Diamond School faculty and administrators never feel secure.  Consequently, they remain 
focused on creating new programs and finding new funding sources.  A former faculty 
Dean expressed the challenger’s mindset this way. 
We always challenge.  We are always doing a bit more, a bit better, but with less 
means…We are weaker than [national rival], but the outsider who challenges and 
this is the image of Diamond, innovative, challenging, weaker, but always with 
energy and stronger to a certain extent…We run, we are always running, always 
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challenging, always trying to invent new orientations.  This is dangerous, and at 
the same time, it is the quality of the [Diamond] school. 
Description of the International Luxury Brand Management MBA.  In the 
mid-1990s, the Diamond School launched a specialized MBA program focused on 
International Luxury Brand Management.  At that time no business school globally had 
an MBA program that was completely focused on educating students to enter the luxury 
goods sector.  The Diamond School worked in conjunction with two major companies 
from this industry to design and launch this unique program, which was custom designed 
to be one-year in length and include significant contact with industry insiders.  The 
program grew out of an initial partnership between the Diamond School and a major 
luxury goods conglomerate that provided Diamond School graduate students with 
coursework and exposure to the luxury goods industry. 
Organizational and environmental factors that influenced approach. 
Environmental attractiveness.  Entry into this market was attractive to Diamond 
for two primary reasons.  First, the relatively immature field of luxury goods appeared to 
be poised for substantial growth, yet the major corporate players lacked the employee 
talent they needed to support this growth.  A Diamond faculty member who was working 
in the industry at this time said that the “industry was hardly an industry in the early 
1990s” and contained “no real professionals” but was rather “run by people who were 
born in this industry.”  Industry leaders realized that a major opportunity for growth 
existed in the industry, particularly in developing markets.  In response, the Diamond 
School’s corporate partner was “looking for a partner [school] which could help them 
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develop some credentials in the field of luxury marketing, do some research, and also 
attract smart candidates to join the industry,” according to the current Diamond MBA 
program Director. Through this conversation with their industry partner, the Diamond 
School not only realized the existence of a sizable market but also identified at least two 
corporate partners who were willing to open a door for the Diamond School to enter. 
 Leadership at the Diamond School also characterized this as an attractive 
opportunity because it had the potential to allow Diamond to internationalize their school.  
Both the President and Dean at Diamond who participated in this study conveyed that 
they were already scanning the environment for a way to boost the visibility and 
reputation of the Diamond School outside of their home national market.  The ability to 
attract international students and faculty and participate at an international level was the 
goal, and it seemed that this opportunity in the luxury goods sector might advance this 
goal.  In the words of the Dean at the time, “I thought that maybe luxury goods would be 
a good idea to help Diamond enlarge its brand image.  To help Diamond build up a brand 
image on an international scale.”  The opportunity to partner with industry to grow 
globally was a pivotal factor for Diamond in the decision making process. 
Organizational capabilities and resources.  Diamond’s close relationships with 
key industry executives from luxury goods firms such as LVMH and L’Oreal, as well as 
their poor positioning vis-à-vis their major national competitor for a generalized approach 
to the management education market, comprise the most critical organizational 
capabilities that influenced Diamond’s decision to pursue a reconstructionist approach.  
While personal relationships are important in virtually all contexts, they are “radically 
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important in this sector, maybe more important than any other sector” according to a 
former Diamond School Dean who has had responsibility for this MBA program in the 
past.  The Diamond School had one of these radically important connections through a 
Diamond School marketing faculty’s relationship with key executives at two luxury 
goods companies.  Furthermore, this marketing faculty member also possessed a desire 
for the Diamond School to pursue programming in the luxury goods field.  All of the 
participants interviewed agreed that the privileged relationship between this individual 
faculty and key industry executives was likely the controlling factor which eventually led 
to Diamond’s successful entry into this market.  This industry partnership led to financial 
support of Diamond’s programming in this area, access to high-level industry speakers, a 
pipeline to hire program graduates, and possibly most importantly, it allowed the 
Diamond School to use established industry brands to launch their own nascent MBA 
program in International Luxury Brand Management. 
 Diamond’s position as a challenger in the generalized management education 
market also lent credence to pursuit of the uncontested market.  According to a past 
President of the school, Diamond’s primary national competitor was “created by the most 
powerful organization [which was the largest chamber of commerce] in the country.  We 
[Diamond] were starting with no money, no power, and that was stimulating.”  The 
Diamond School was consistently described as poor when compared with their main 
university competitor, and this drove Diamond faculty and administrators toward 
unconventional competitive strategies.  To further their less-than-ideal positioning, the 
Diamond School was also relatively unknown outside of their home country.  This helped 
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to push the strategy toward specialized programs and away from a strictly generalized 
approach.  A current Diamond School administrator and long time faculty member 
recounted, “We were a national school… For this reason, we felt that to have a 
specialized MBA was maybe a better way than to develop our own [generalized] MBA 
because we were competing with general MBA programs all over the world and 
especially at that time, American programs.” 
Organizational orientation for competition or innovation.  An innovative spirit 
runs through the Diamond School; this was clearly visible in the documents reviewed as 
well as a theme of conversation with each participant interviewed.  Participants 
characterized this spirit in the following ways. 
• “Innovation is in the DNA at Diamond. Constant innovation.” 
• “The essence of Diamond is innovation.” 
• “Innovativeness, open-mindedness.  We are artisans.” 
• “The governance of Diamond understands this particular strength [Diamond’s 
innovativeness] and allows the professors to innovate, to create, to develop, 
and so on.” 
Innovation is viewed as being at the heart of their organizational strategy, so Diamond 
clearly has an orientation for innovation.  This comes from the spirit of the faculty but 
also from their relatively poor positioning and funding vis-à-vis their national competitor 
as discussed above.  When characterizing the success of the Diamond School, a past 
President remarked that “If Diamond has been able to maintain its position at the top 
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level…it is not a question of money or funding, it’s a question of the innovation, 
flexibility, and involvement of the faculty.” 
 Diamond also possesses a predisposition toward risk taking and pursuing 
unconventional strategies, such as the pursuit of specialized MBAs in spite of the 
generalist nature of an MBA and the inclusion of apprenticeships as a key component in 
their graduate education programs.  This may be best captured in the words of a longtime 
faculty member and former academic Dean who said, “we do not have any preconception 
of markets.”  Faculty members feel free to implement ideas that may have been in the 
works for years.  This freedom appears to be partly cultural and partly borne of necessity 
due to a lack of funding or recognition when compared with their major competitors.  The 
Diamond School Dean during the launch of the International Luxury Brand Management 
MBA relayed, “If you take the example of [major competitor], the behavior of their 
faculty is more like civil servants. Why should they take a risk? At Diamond, that is not 
the attitude.”   
Risk taking is in Diamond’s DNA although there was concern noted that this risk-
taking tendency might be minimized now that the Diamond School is better known in 
Europe and around the world.  Examples of the Diamond School’s orientation toward 
innovation in programs and processes surfaced repeatedly during the research conducted 
for this study.  Diamond was the first to introduce apprenticeships to their graduate 
program in their country where, at the time, apprenticeships were thought to only be for 
vocational training.  In these apprenticeships, students spend over half of their time 
working in businesses and applying principles learned at Diamond; in return, the 
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businesses pay the majority of the student’s tuition costs.  In addition to the Luxury 
Brand Management MBA, Diamond has also launched an MBA focused on the 
hospitality industry that reaches out to candidates who previously were uninterested in 
management education.  Over the past thirty years, Diamond has launched two 
specialized MBAs, almost 20 other specialized programs and institutes, and challenged 
the foundational structure of graduate education within their home country through the 
use of nontraditional apprenticeships. 
Use of reconstructionist principles during implementation. 
Reconstruct market boundaries.  The International Luxury Brand Management 
MBA program was clearly unique when it was created over 15 years ago.  The luxury 
goods industry has historically been very closed to outsiders.  The overwhelming 
majority of leaders in this industry was born into the industry and rose through the ranks 
as craftspeople and designers.  However, the transition to leadership by industry insiders 
was easier when the industry was small and individual luxury goods houses focused 
almost exclusively on issues of aesthetics.  When the luxury goods industry began to 
quickly gain global popularity, many companies were caught unprepared to scale their 
organizations for success in the complex world of international business.  When the 
luxury industry began to turn to traditional MBAs to fill these leadership roles, they 
found most MBAs ill-prepared to lead in an industry filled with culture and nuance which 
is unfamiliar territory to those who do not understand the luxury ethos. 
 Through a relationship between luxury goods industry insiders and a Diamond 
School faculty member, a non-degree program was initially developed to serve the dual 
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roles of preparing individuals to lead in complex international business situations and to 
lead in luxury goods organizations that operate via a different ethos when compared to 
other types of companies.  Ultimately, the International Luxury Brand Management 
MBA developed from the non-degree program and reconstructed the market boundaries 
through the provision of both business acumen and a deep understanding of the Luxury 
Goods Industry.  The close partnership between Diamond and industry was also atypical 
within management education as schools are normally more distant from businesses.  In 
this case, the close relationship allowed the students an introduction into the extremely 
guarded world of luxury goods companies and provided a clear path for employment 
after graduation.  Figure 1 depicts the strategy canvas for the Diamond International 
Luxury Brand Management MBA Program and shows graphically how this program 
diverged from other market offerings at the time. 
 
Figure 1 -- Strategy Canvas for Diamond Intl Luxury Brand Management MBA 
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 Existing market offerings were churning out MBAs; however, the standard MBA 
mindset did not suit this sector well due to their sole focus on traditional business 
subjects such as finance and accounting.  The Director of this program at the Diamond 
School summarizes this point, “I think that is the difference with the people graduating 
from any general MBA, that they are so figure-oriented straightaway that they do not pay 
attention to the soft, intangible things which basically make the luxury brand.”  The 
industry had already realized this missing piece, which was likely why the opportunities 
for leadership were largely nonexistent for industry outsiders.  In response, the Diamond 
School created a program that expands the boundaries of the typical MBA to bridge these 
shortcomings and instills the luxury ethos in graduates alongside traditional MBA 
competencies.  For example, students become familiar with luxury products through 
participation in fashion shows, viewing art, learning about wine and watches and jewelry.  
More importantly, students are able to extensively interact with designers, winemakers, 
and artists through the course of the program, in addition to mastering core business 
knowledge such as finance and accounting.   
By bridging between an understanding of the luxury ethos and a robust business 
education, a new market was created that addressed an underserved need.  According to 
Diamond School President during the creation of this program, the missing piece was 
clearly seen by Diamond due to its close relationship with the industry.   
In selecting managers, the main difficulty for the human resources [organization] 
in this type of company is to have people very well trained for management 
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techniques but at the same time able to understand the culture and the culture of 
the artists who are creative. 
The current Executive Director of Diamond’s International Luxury Brand Management 
MBA program emphasized that companies in this sector highly value students who have 
a particular passion for this industry.  He further defined passion as “a certain sensitivity 
to what constitutes the culture of luxury brands-the product, the craftsmanship, the 
history, the culture around it.”  He also recounted the description of an ideal student from 
one of Diamond’s industry partners as “a peasant on one hand with all the rationale of a 
peasant, and a poet on the other with the capacity to dream.” 
 In response to this unfulfilled need, the Diamond School worked closely with its 
industry partners to create this MBA program.  The closeness of the partnership allowed 
Diamond faculty to poll industry leaders on exactly what was needed and then work to 
deliver it to students.  In addition to collaboration on curriculum, another significant 
differentiation of this program was its ability to place students into the industry after 
graduation.  Industry insiders were convinced that graduates of this program were 
properly educated as the corporate partners actually helped in creation of the program and 
delivery of the curriculum.  Furthermore, the students received significant exposure to 
industry practitioners and vice versa.  This not only guaranteed that students would learn 
how to understand and be successful in the industry, but it also ensured that virtually 
every graduate would be hired into the industry sooner or later if they so desired, 
according to the program’s Executive Director. 
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 Diamond reconstructed the market boundaries as summarized below in Table 1, 
and in doing so, created a means by which to internationalize their school and attain 
better international visibility. 
Table 1 -- Market Reconstruction by Diamond MBA Program 
 Diamond International 
Luxury Brand 
Management MBA 
Typical 
MBA 
Luxury goods 
industry 
apprenticeship 
Learn luxury goods industry 
ethos ✓✓  ✓✓✓ 
Master management education 
principles ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓  
Time required 1 year 2 years 2+ years 
Obtain global perspective with 
direct focus on emerging 
markets for luxury goods 
✓✓✓ ✓  
Interact with luxury goods 
practitioners, students, and 
academics to form professional 
relationships 
✓✓✓   
 
Focus on the big picture, not the numbers.  The decision making process was 
quite simple in this case according to the current Director of MBA Programs, “No 
program in Luxury Brand Management existed.  They [industry] found a need to have 
people with a good management background and an understanding of what is going on in 
the luxury sector.”  In the words of the current program Director, “They [corporate 
partners] almost asked us to do this specific MBA.”  According to each of the participants 
interviewed as well as the documentation reviewed, the market opportunity was clear for 
Diamond School faculty and administrators due to their close relationship and 
communication with luxury goods companies. 
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 Akin to most major decisions at the Diamond School, the evaluation of this 
program and decision to launch was not driven purely from a financial analysis.  
According to a Diamond School administrator who was in a leadership role at the time of 
the decision, money was not a driving factor in the decision to pursue this program 
launch.  Each of the participants interviewed confirmed that the decision to move forward 
was based upon the clear opportunity, the partnership commitment from businesses in the 
luxury goods industry who had previously given significant financial support, and 
alignment with the strategy to further internationalize the Diamond School. 
Reach beyond existing demand.  At the point of launch it would have been easy 
for the Diamond School to choose a particular sector of the luxury goods industry such as 
fashion or wine or jewelry as the industry had natural divisions along these lines.  In fact, 
other schools had courses which focused on these distinct areas of the luxury goods 
industry.  However, the Diamond School took a different path as outlined by a faculty 
member interviewed for this study. 
What was important for us in this program was not to specialize in a particular 
product, but to give the student, to share with the students, a different approach of 
luxury through different examples, in different areas of luxury but with as much 
diversity as possible.  At the same time, the thing, which was important for the 
companies, was they wanted [students] to have a strong core or foundation in 
management that is not specialized. That is something that we take care in the 
program to teach, to train the students in this foundation of management, and also 
to give them what is the luxury concept applied across different areas. 
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Faculty at the Diamond School understood enough about the market to realize that this 
program had broad appeal in both traditional and emerging areas of the luxury goods 
industry.  Consequently, the faculty designed the program to address as broad of a 
spectrum of students and companies as possible.  To operationalize this, the Diamond 
School eventually recruited corporate partners from many different areas of luxury goods 
to assist with the curriculum and recruit students. 
Get the strategic sequence right.  Existing partnerships between the Diamond 
School and two prominent luxury goods companies allowed for proper insight to make 
solid strategic decisions.  The Diamond School had previously developed some courses 
within their general programs working in conjunction with these industry partners, but 
the industry partners wanted more.  According to a faculty member at the time, “there 
was a need to have a longer program that went into depth on the luxury industry.”  To 
highlight the severity of this need, the Diamond School’s industry partners essentially 
asked them to start an MBA program with this focus, according to the program Director.   
The committed support of the companies solidified the viability of the program 
according to the program Director, “We had the support of these luxury conglomerates 
because they were saying, ‘No problem.  We will recruit the people coming from this 
program.’”  In turn, the high likelihood of recruitment fueled strong student applications 
to the program.  When asked about why students come to the program, the current 
Executive Director stated, “At the end, if you come to me [the program] it is because you 
want to work in this industry.”  With a network of companies committed to recruiting 
students and a strong pool of students interested because of the companies involved, the 
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only remaining factor was whether the Diamond School could successfully operate the 
program. Diamond already had established courses in this area that were taught by 
faculty with interest in the luxury goods sector, and they already operated a variety of 
management education degree programs which provided familiarity with process and 
costs. 
Overcome key organizational hurdles.  In spite of strong partnerships with strong 
industry players and students who were interested in the area, this program did and does 
face significant organizational hurdles.  Diamond School administration and faculty who 
were interested in this program had successfully identified a new market and had 
favorable positioning and partnerships necessary to enter it; however, they still needed 
the cooperation of additional Diamond faculty to launch the program.  According to one 
of the administrators at the time of the launch, “it was more difficult to convince the 
faculty than the industry, than the students.”  Another administrator and faculty member 
compared the difficulty of getting the Diamond faculty onboard with convincing a theater 
troupe to agree, “You know the Opera here in [city].  Faculty have the same attitude.  I 
know that faculty and dancing people [are] the same thing.”  Ultimately, the promise of 
industry support and enough interested faculty allowed the program to move forward.  
Interestingly, the current faculty and administration charged with leading this program 
continue to struggle to receive necessary faculty support even though it is more than 15 
years after the successful launch of the program. 
Build execution into the strategy.  Along with overcoming organizational 
hurdles, the building of execution into the strategy has been and continues to be a 
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formidable challenge.  The freedom and autonomy of the culture at Diamond allow for 
the natural ebb and flow of individual and organizational support.  In the words of a 
current faculty member, “That is what is lacking.  If you have the passion you will do it, 
but you just don’t do it if you lack the passion.  To me, that is a lack of professionalism, 
and that is what hurts Diamond the most.  You cannot just pursue your passion, this is not 
a hobby.”   
Even with a highly successful program such as Diamond’s International Luxury 
Brand Management MBA, the commitment of individuals and the Diamond School 
organization as a whole seems to be somewhat inconsistent.  For example, faculty 
resources continue to be highly constrained even though the program has been a 
programmatic and financial success for over 15 years.  One of the faculty spoke of the 
downside of success by saying, “this means you end up always having the same two 
people flying everywhere doing everything.  We may have an issue in training the next 
generation, in having the next generation of faculty.”  It is unclear that execution has 
been or is being built into the Diamond School strategy for this program. 
Connection with overall school performance. 
Reputation, branding, and external constituencies.  Diamond’s International 
Luxury Brand Management MBA Program has contributed significantly to the Diamond 
School’s growth from a relatively unknown national school 15 years ago to a Financial 
Times Top 10 European school today. Each of the seven participants interviewed agreed 
that this program has made a significant contribution to Diamond’s growth in brand 
visibility, reputation, and rankings.  Literature about Diamond often references this 
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program and assigns some measure of credit to it for the advancement of Diamond’s 
interests globally. 
From the perspective of brand visibility alone, this program has met many of its 
goals to internationalize Diamond as captured by the following participant statements. 
• “Diamond is known in some countries because of the MBA in Luxury 
Brand Management.” 
• “Luxury is the flagship of Diamond no matter how you look at it.” 
• “Outside of Europe, the Luxury Brands program is what is important for 
Diamond.” 
• “Diamond is most well known outside of Europe for this [program].” 
The unique position of the Diamond School in this market has driven visibility and 
benefit for the overall school.  By identifying with highly regarded luxury brands, the 
Diamond School has also been able to take advantage of their strength as the 
International Luxury Brand Management MBA has often used the brands of corporate 
partners in its marketing materials.  In this case, the strength of corporate luxury brands 
has likely transferred added value to the Diamond brand according to the participants in 
the study.  Finally, the strength in this particular segment has driven demand from strong 
top-tier schools (e.g. Kellogg at Northwestern, Booth at the University of Chicago, and 
Tuck at Dartmouth) to partner with the Diamond School to allow their students access to 
luxury goods coursework.  These partnerships have, in turn, further bolstered the overall 
strength of the Diamond School’s brand. 
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Internal capabilities and internal constituencies.  The visibility of the 
partnerships with luxury goods companies and with top-tier business schools has likely 
led to an increase in the number and quality of students who apply to the program.  This 
is especially true in the case of international students, particularly Asian students, which 
was one of the original reasons that the Diamond School chose to undertake this program.  
The President of the Diamond School at the time of this program launch phrased it this 
way. 
My objective was if we can enroll good students, good non-[native country] 
students, through this program progressively after several years, I didn’t know 
how many, but after several years progressively the name of Diamond will be 
associated [or more widely known instead of only the industry partners such as 
LVMH which were initially used as the primary brand for the program].” 
International students now comprise approximately 25% of Diamond’s student body, and 
this includes more American students, which is a clear sign for an international school 
that they have reached the top-tier globally. 
Potential missed opportunities.  A review of Diamond’s marketing materials and 
website reveals that this program is not as heavily used to promote the Diamond School’s 
overall brand as one might expect.  Instead, most of the materials focus on a much more 
generalized or generic message and programs.  The strong industry partnerships and the 
innovative nature of this program and others at the Diamond School are not regularly 
highlighted as a part of general marketing campaigns even though this is arguably the 
most impressive programmatic achievement in Diamond’s century of existence.  The 
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Diamond School does advertise its specialty programming in major newspapers and 
magazines, but this is distinct from the general marketing materials used by Diamond in 
major global publications. 
Summary.  The International Luxury Brand Management MBA Program at the 
Diamond School entered an uncontested market by offering the luxury goods industry a 
viable pipeline for their next generation of leaders to support their significant industry 
growth and internationalization.  This program was designed and is operated in close 
partnership with industry, preparing students for the careers they desire, and often even 
introducing them to their future employers.  It has given the Diamond School brand 
visibility, credibility, and accomplished one of its primary internal goals of boosting the 
internationalization of the school.  However, the Diamond School has seemed to shy 
away from using the program to more clearly differentiate their school in the 
international marketplace, instead choosing to promote generalist qualifications that often 
mirror other schools around the globe. 
Case II – Physician Executive MBA Program at Pilot 
 The Pilot Business School is housed at the flagship campus of a public land grant 
institution in the Southeastern United States.  The Pilot School receives approximately 
one-third of its funding from the state government with the remaining two-thirds coming 
from private donors, grants, contracts, student fees, and executive education.  The Pilot 
School has been heavily engaged in executive education for almost four decades and 
offers a variety of open-enrollment and customized offerings.  In contrast to the 
undergraduate student body, which is predominantly from the state and region where the 
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Pilot School is located, executive education programs attract students on a national and 
international basis across a number of differentiated programs. 
 The Pilot Business School is usually ranked in the Top 50 public business schools 
in the US on an overall basis.  Pilot’s accounting and supply chain management programs 
often rank in the Top 20 and Top 10 respectively on a national basis.  The Pilot School is 
also known for its leadership in process design and management through its Department 
of Statistics, Operations, and Management Science, which is an unusually amalgamated 
department, as statistics faculty are not usually found in US colleges of business.  In 
addition, the Pilot School also houses the Department of Economics for the university; in 
contrast, Economics departments are often found in Colleges of Arts and Sciences.  The 
inclusion of these two departments has led to a much more comprehensive approach to 
management education at the Pilot School than is the case at many other US business 
schools. 
 Over thirty years ago, Pilot School leadership realized that their success could not 
depend only upon educating undergraduates from within its State, as funding would not 
be adequate to grow or even maintain their operations.  The current Pilot School Dean 
described Pilot’s funding in this way, “It is survival and trying to be as good as you can 
be.  [Past Pilot Dean] told me when I interviewed here…He said if we limit what we do 
to what the State funds, we are not going to like it.  None of us are going to want to be 
here in 10-20 years.  Here we are 30 years later, and he is absolutely right.  There is no 
question about it.  He is absolutely right.”  The necessity to self-fund current operations 
and future initiatives has become a defining feature of the Pilot School culture. 
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 As a result, the culture has developed an entrepreneurial bent with new 
programming and new foci emerging as compared with other public business schools.  
The current Pilot School Dean characterized it by saying, “there seems to be an 
entrepreneurial attitude around here, of trying new things.”  This entrepreneurial spirit 
was identified as a defining cultural trait by each of the interview participants in both the 
Physician Executive MBA program and Shopper Marketing Forum cases.  Prior to the 
launch of the Physician Executive MBA, many of the Pilot School faculty had recently 
undertaken a complete redesign of Pilot’s general MBA program.  A faculty member who 
was involved in this redesign recounted the feedback that the Pilot faculty sought from 
key MBA constituencies, “The result of that [feedback] was we completely threw out the 
MBA program and revised it.” 
 Faculty also described having the freedom to undertake varying interests and 
areas as a vital element of the Pilot culture.  The Pilot Dean remarked “we have 
developed a [culture that is] flexible, fairly nimble, pretty respectful of different [faculty] 
areas.”  Another faculty member interviewed characterized the faculty as “live-and-let-
live” and went on to say, “as long as they weren’t proposing to do anything that would 
hurt ‘my’ program then I didn’t care what they did.”  The freedom to follow individual 
plans and desires, coupled with the necessity of additional funding, have worked together 
to create an entrepreneurial environment and culture at the Pilot Business School. 
Description of the Physician Executive MBA program.  The genesis for what 
would become Pilot’s Physician Executive MBA (PEMBA) program was a telephone call 
from the Regional President of a major for-profit healthcare firm to a Pilot School faculty 
 
90 
member who would eventually become the PEMBA program Director.  The healthcare 
executive inquired if anyone at the Pilot School had the interest and competency to 
develop a customized training program for this firm’s physician leaders.  Prior to the 
program launch, this corporate partner that had initiated the program’s development 
withdrew due to an unrelated crisis in their organization, and Pilot School faculty and 
administrators decided to launch the program as an open-enrollment program for 
physicians interested in building their leadership and management competencies.  The 
PEMBA program launched almost 15 years ago and continues to enjoy a successful run 
with over 400 alumni from the US and eight other countries.  The program is currently 
considering expansion from one to two classes annually, and it returns a surplus of 
approximately $300,000 annually back to the Pilot School coffers to support Pilot’s lack 
of funding discussed above. 
 The PEMBA program is an accredited MBA program that is one year in length 
and requires four one-week residency periods on the Pilot campus. In addition, interactive 
synchronous distance education is used for classes on a weekly basis between the 
residency periods.  A new cohort of approximately 50 physicians is admitted annually, 
and this group progresses together through the integrated curriculum during the course of 
one calendar year. This program enrolls only physicians and regularly has a diversity of 
clinical specialty and people in its classes. 
Organizational and environmental factors that influenced approach. 
Environmental attractiveness.  In the mid-1990s the healthcare industry was 
undergoing a transformation due to the influence of HMOs and insurance companies.  
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According to the PEMBA Director, “At the time, there was all kinds of turmoil in 
healthcare, not due to the government, but due to HMOs and insurance companies…with 
that turbulence, there was an appetite for physicians to learn, so they could lead.”  In fact, 
this appetite was so large, a major healthcare company had contacted the Pilot School and 
agreed to fund the development and launch of a program to educate 25 of their physician 
leaders annually. 
 Educating physicians in business and leadership principles was an underserved 
and possibly even a hidden market.  A Pilot School staff member who is involved with 
the PEMBA program relayed a popular opinion, “Everyone says, well they have a 
medical doctorate, they know it all.”  This may not always be the case as this staff 
member continues, “In a lot of cases they don’t, and they are willing to admit, ‘Hey, I 
need to figure out how to make this business work.’”  Whether due to the status they hold 
in their community, or simply the demands of a busy schedule, physicians were not being 
served by existing MBA program offerings. 
 In addition to recognizing the market opportunity, the environment was attractive 
for the Pilot School as very little competition existed at the time of the launch.  Three 
schools did offer programs for physicians, but they had extremely limited market reach 
due to their designs.  Two of the programs, in Georgia and Florida, had residential 
programs that required physicians to physically travel to the school on a regular basis to 
complete a degree while a school in Massachusetts offered an MBA for physicians which 
could be earned through a combination of completing a trade association certification and 
a series of correspondence courses which had been lightly adapted from the school’s 
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generalist MBA curriculum.  Neither of these programs was met with much success, and 
the two residential programs have since closed or significantly reformatted their offering. 
 Organizational capabilities and resources.  While the Pilot School was known 
for its pursuit of new and unconventional programs and for a reputation of risk-taking 
such as the redesigned MBA program, the Pilot School’s faculty did not possess any 
particular competency in healthcare management or physician leadership.  According to 
the current Pilot School Dean, “at the time, we didn’t have hardly any specialization in 
this college in healthcare.”  Instead, it was the relationship that developed between the 
healthcare management company and two Pilot faculty that emerged as the primary 
contributor to the launch of the program.   
Both of these faculty were senior members of the Pilot School faculty and already 
had well established careers as researchers and academic administrators.  All participants 
interviewed identified these faculty, particularly the one who would eventually emerge as 
the PEMBA program director as being in a time of transition.  One remarked during the 
interview that “I [faculty who did not become Director] had been involved in a number of 
program start-ups, and I think [future PEMBA Director] was looking for something to 
transition to when he left the Dean’s office.  So we teamed up.”  This team of two faculty 
formed the nucleus of interest at the Pilot School and did virtually all of the investigatory 
work which led to the eventual launch of the program.  The faculty member who did not 
become PEMBA Director eventually left the project prior to launch due to a 
disagreement with Pilot administration on how the program should be structured.  This 
left only one interested faculty member who essentially shouldered the entire load of 
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program development and, working with one staff member, successfully launched this 
program.  Even almost 15 years later, this same faculty member continues to serve as 
program Director and his support staff consists of the same individual as during the 
launch. 
Organizational orientation for competition or innovation.  The freedom given to 
Pilot School faculty and the need for funding to support operations combine to create a 
spirit of innovation at the Pilot School.  All faculty, administrators, and staff interviewed 
recognized that direct competition with established schools on a generalized basis would 
likely not yield the expected results.  The PEMBA program Director who also served as a 
Pilot School Associate Dean before taking his current role captured the faculty’s 
perspective on this in the following way. 
There is a recognition strategically that we are not about to come up with a 500-
student EMBA that is internationally ranked.  We are just not about to do that.  
The university does not have the reputation to draw that.  We don’t have the 
geography for it, so strategically there is a recognition that [a] focus[ed] 
[strategy], coming up with innovative things that deliver value to target groups, 
makes sense competitively.  I have to applaud this college for recognizing that.  
There are an awful lot of other universities that even if I could say the same thing 
about them, not being in a large catchment area and not being a Top 5 rank still 
don’t get it.  They don’t recognize that they have to be focused, and they try to be 
all things to all people. 
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The current Pilot School Dean emphasized this point when asked why the school did not 
prioritize its resources toward its generalist programming.  
“I don’t know that, from a college perspective, it is clear to me that taking the 
same resources that are in PEMBA and saying, ‘Ok, let’s make our general MBA 
better,’ I am not sure it would have accomplished a whole lot whereas PEMBA as 
an element of what we do in the MBA market has been really successful.”  
The faculty and administration at the Pilot Business School fully recognize their poor 
positioning to compete directly against schools with better funding, a better ranking, and 
a more convenient location for a national or international audience.  This has led to a 
strong history and culture of innovation within the Pilot School. 
 This innovative spirit is directly seen in the example of PEMBA.  The current 
program Director relayed his typical response to questions from colleagues about why he 
has remained a part of the Pilot School faculty for decades by saying it is “the innovative 
spirit in this culture…Pilot allows me to do some things that other schools won’t.”  One 
of the faculty interviewed also highlighted the PEMBA Director as an example of the 
innovative spirit characteristic of the Pilot School. 
[PEMBA Director] went out and did the classic thing for Pilot.  You put together 
a band of entrepreneurs, ne’er do wells, scalawags.  And they design a program, 
and have the chutzpah to…I mean think about this.  Imagine what it was like that 
first year.  Nobody had ever really heard of a program for MDs.  None of our 
faculty had ever taught in one, and yet we were in the business.  There was a 
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room of MDs waiting to be taught by our “experts”.  That just takes a certain kind 
of entrepreneurial character, its takes a band of those to launch it.  
Throughout each of the five interviews conducted for this case it was clear that the Pilot 
School has an orientation towards innovation instead of focusing solely on direct 
competition with schools that are often better funded and better positioned to compete in 
a generalist market. 
Use of reconstructionist principles during implementation. 
Reconstruct market boundaries.  Through a close relationship with a major 
industry player and direct access to physicians who worked for this industry partner, the 
Pilot School was able to identify how the current MBA market essentially excluded 
physicians.  Pilot faculty subsequently designed an offering that fulfilled the market 
needs and in doing so unlocked a market that was largely uncontested at the time.  This 
study identified two major areas that Pilot successfully identified as missing in the market 
and addressed with their PEMBA program.   
First, the concept of physician leadership was not understood or accommodated in 
existing programs.  Most physicians feel that they are called into their roles, and they take 
their oath of service seriously.  This difference in perspective is coupled with an unusual 
industry environment where patient care and business success are often confounded or 
even set in opposition to one another.  This has led to a general distaste for business 
education among many physicians.  In addition, Pilot faculty identified early on in their 
research that physicians often like to converse with and learn from other physicians in a 
fashion segregated from the general business student community.   
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This exclusivity and promise of a relatively safe environment where physicians 
can learn with other physicians who understand the constraints and demands of their 
profession has been crucial to the success of the program according to the PEMBA 
program Director.  Furthermore, the inclusion of other types of healthcare industry 
employees was identified as often dissuading physician participation by the PEMBA 
program Director, “Physicians are not as attracted to it [MBA] if they are sitting next to 
nurses, pharmaceutical company sales reps, if they are sitting next to non-healthcare 
professional hospital administrators.”  In response, the Pilot program requires a medical 
doctorate or its foreign equivalent for admission into the program and heavily advertises 
this exclusivity.   
Other programs also offer physician exclusivity; however, the programs do not 
allow for interaction as they are delivered primarily through correspondence course 
formats.  The Pilot School Faculty realized the importance of this interaction and 
therefore prioritized the opportunity for peer learning through interactive class sessions.  
The PEMBA program Director expounds on this by highlighting “the choice of blended 
delivery modes, discrete residency periods on campus combined with synchronous 
distance education, along with physician only…Those two delivery modes allow learning 
with and from peer physicians.” 
 The second major factor that was essential to address according to discussions 
with the physicians was the hectic schedule of most physicians and their limited time 
available for class.  Physician focus groups and guidance from Pilot’s corporate partner 
confirmed the need for a credentialed degree; physicians felt that they needed a degree to 
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show peer physicians that they have the knowledge and competencies to lead their 
organizations.  However, the physician focus groups also clearly communicated that 
limited time away from work was available for coursework.  The existing market 
offerings had failed to realize the need for both peer-to-peer interaction and degree 
completion within a limited amount of time.  The PEMBA director describes a 
competitor that has not yet addressed this critical issue. 
Rather than focusing on what does the customer want, and then using those design 
criteria to drive the program design, [competitor] did it the exact opposite way. 
They took the curriculum they already had for their full-time MBA program.  
Took those stand-alone 3-hour courses, put them into an electronic syllabus.  Put 
the syllabus online.  Made it all asynchronous meaning the physician downloads it 
whenever he/she feels like doing some work.  Does the work, sends it in, never 
meets a faculty member, never meets a peer physician in class.  That is part of the 
reason why it takes 3-5 years to do it because the courses are concatenated in 
series whereas ours is an integrated curriculum.  And [competitor] requires the 
physicians to have had the American College of Physician Executive’s PM1, 
PM2, and PM3 before they are even accepted into the [competitor] program. 
In contrast to anything that existed in the market, Pilot’s physician focus groups 
returned clear guidance from the physicians according to the two faculty involved in the 
initial interviews and focus groups, “I want you to do it [the MBA] in one year.” and “I 
can probably be on your campus for 3-4 weeks.”  The typical MBA program is two years 
in length and even many executive MBA programs required eight weeks or more on 
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campus over the course of a year.  One of the faculty involved in the program design 
remembered, “A big part of making that work was just the simple logistics of fitting it 
into their life and minimizing the amount of time they were away from work.”  
Ultimately, these criteria were accepted for the PEMBA program, but significant hurdles 
remained. 
 The Pilot faculty team still had to devise a way to operate an MBA program that 
allowed completion in one year with only 3-4 weeks on campus.  In the words of the 
PEMBA Director, “That pattern of accredited MBA, one-year long, at most 3-4 weeks on 
campus.  If you accept that as an overarching set of design criteria, you understand how 
and why the program was structured.”  When this program was going to be delivered as 
part of customized programming for a single industry client, the plan was to use the video 
conferencing facilities at this company’s locations around the US.  However, when the 
corporate client withdrew from the program and the program was continued as a public 
offering, the issue of how to facilitate interaction and not vastly increase the time 
commitment required was a major consideration for the Pilot School faculty team. 
 Program development was occurring in 1997, and the internet was still in the 
early stages of development with connection speeds around 24K.  After significant 
investigation by the Pilot team, they chose to become the 4th customer of a software 
provider who promised interactive two-way audio, two-way data technology via the 
internet.  This was a pioneering approach for this era and the Pilot School continues to be 
a leader in interactive distance education even 15 years later.  The PEMBA Director 
stated that the PEMBA program uses “interactive, synchronous distance education more 
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than any other program in the college.  We have more experience with it than maybe any 
other university in the country although I don’t have the data to prove that.”   
 
Figure 2 -- Strategy Canvas for PEMBA Program 
This use of interactive distance education allows the program to bridge the 
distance between physicians and the faculty who teach them.  A PEMBA staff member 
described it in the following way, “I guess a way to think of it is we have tried to make 
distance work for us.  We are at a distance, but we are not distant from each other.”  The 
PEMBA program at Pilot has found a way to successfully use distance education and four 
one-week, on-campus residency programs to offer a credentialed MBA program on 
physician leadership to physicians across the globe and thereby create an uncontested 
market.  The strategy canvas from Blue Ocean Strategy depicting the differentiation of 
PEMBA is above as Figure 2. 
 
100 
Pilot’s PEMBA program used a strong focus on an underserved market and a 
nontraditional approach to program delivery to reconstruct the market boundaries as 
summarized below in Table 2. 
Table 2 -- Market Reconstruction by Pilot PEMBA Program 
 Pilot’s 
PEMBA 
program 
Healthcare 
MBA 
Programs 
Typical MBA or 
Executive MBA 
programs 
Understanding of and focus on 
issues relevant to physicians ✓✓✓ ✓ ✓ 
Mastery of management principles 
and practices ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ 
Time Required 1 year 2-5 years 1-2 years 
Peer Physician Learning ✓✓✓ ✓  
Lack of disruption to physician 
practice (use of distance education 
and short, discrete residency 
periods) 
✓✓✓   
 
Focus on the big picture, not the numbers.  Initially, the Pilot School was 
approached by an industry leader with the request to design a program like this as none 
existed.  The industry leader withdrew from the project prior to launch, but not before the 
two faculty members at Pilot had become interested in this market as described by one of 
these faculty below. 
[PEMBA Director] and I had become convinced that there was a serious business 
opportunity here.  It was clear that physicians perceived the need to understand 
business, not all of them did, but enough did.  The ones who did perceive it felt it 
so passionately that you could just tell that this thing can go. 
As these two faculty members conducted focus groups and then 25 individual interviews, 
the strength of the demand came into focus. 
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 The PEMBA program Director assembled a core team of faculty to design and 
ultimately deliver this program.  They established their vision for the program to be “the 
preferred MBA for physicians in the world.”  Throughout the course of assessment and 
up through the decision to launch, financial analysis was not a dominant factor.  One of 
the two initial faculty members involved remembers that there was “not any quantitative 
analysis beyond what you might do on the back of an envelope.”  In fact, that aligned 
well with the general practice of the Pilot School, which is described by that same faculty 
member below. 
We have never placed particularly stringent or onerous earnings responsibilities 
on executive education [programming].  It has always been do what you think is 
right and if it produces a surplus the college will be grateful, but you need to first 
do what you think is right.  We are first and foremost a learning institution, so if 
this is taking our faculty in new directions and we are providing value to the 
students in the program…” 
For the PEMBA team, the focus was on providing value to physicians who needed 
business and leadership skills as well as the continued development of Pilot School 
faculty.   
Reach beyond existing demand.  Even though a case could be made that, at the 
time, physicians could take advantage of either existing generalized executive MBA 
programs or one of the programs that focused on the healthcare industry, this market was 
not particularly well served.  Physicians saw a need to learn with peer physicians and 
focus on physician leadership which differs, even if only in nuanced ways, from a 
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generalized MBA curriculum.  The demands of a busy schedule and limited time away 
from work further eliminated existing programs as an option. 
 The Pilot School designed a program that addressed these needs while still 
recognizing that restricting entry to physicians only was important to the success of the 
experience.  It was also possible for the Pilot School to open the program to a variety of 
clinical specialties and subspecialties to increase the diversity of the students and the 
market size.  A PEMBA staff member who highlighted this diversity explained that “it is 
interesting to see, for example, how a surgeon perceives something versus how a 
pediatrician perceives the same thing.”  The clinical diversity and geographic diversity, 
students from 47 US states and 9 other countries, provided through the blended delivery 
format of discrete residency periods and distance education has allowed the Pilot School 
to capture as much market demand as possible with the PEMBA program. 
Get the strategic sequence right.  PEMBA program development began with a 
call from an executive at a major industry company in the healthcare industry.  According 
to the PEMBA program Director this executive asked, “Could you help me design and 
deliver a customized program to train physicians in the art and science of physician 
leadership?” This made it quite clear that industry demand existed.  Even though the 
corporate partner eventually decided to withdraw from the program due to pressing 
organizational challenges which were unrelated to the PEMBA program, the strength of 
market demand was established through physician focus groups and individual interviews 
conducted by Pilot School faculty. 
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 After establishing the existence of the market, the next challenge was how to 
deliver a program that met the physicians’ requirements for content and schedule.  The 
PEMBA program Director realized that this “necessitated the use of some sort of distance 
learning platform.”  Analysis was performed to assess the capability of distance 
education technology providers, and the decision was made to go forward.  This put the 
Pilot School in a global leadership position according to the PEMBA program Director in 
that “we [PEMBA] were the first graduate education program in the world to do this [use 
synchronous distance education].”  Pilot faculty first determined that demand existed, 
then assessed whether they could deliver a program that both met that demand and did so 
at a cost that allowed for success.  Although the program was operated at a loss for 
several years early in its existence, Pilot School administrators remained confident of the 
value proposition and the PEMBA program Director has now positioned the program to 
create a significant annual surplus for use by the Pilot School. 
Overcome key organizational hurdles.  The culture at the Pilot School allowed 
the PEMBA program Director to work on the development and launch of this program 
without significant interference, as he was not negatively affecting anyone else.  This 
single faculty member, working in conjunction with a core faculty team for a portion of 
the process, effectively managed to design, develop, and launch this program without 
significant organizational support from across the Pilot School.  When the program was 
struggling to breakeven after the initial launch, that same faculty member doggedly 
pursued success until he found a way.  A Pilot administrator sums up this faculty 
member’s contribution. 
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[PEMBA Director] gets a lot of credit for that.  He has really been a devoted guy 
to make the thing happen.  If I had to imagine the real story behind PEMBA, it’s 
[PEMBA Director] and the way he has found to market that program.  He did a 
lot of very creative work.  He tried of a lot things that didn’t work, and then he 
finally stumbled upon things that did work.” 
The success of PEMBA rests largely on the efforts of the only Director it has ever 
had.  Even almost 15 years after the launch, “it is easy to identify it [PEMBA] with a 
single faculty and not to necessarily broaden it” according to another Pilot School faculty 
administrator.  The expansion of PEMBA beyond its Director and core faculty has been 
slow.  A Pilot administrator explained this by stating that “you have to remember that 
your first line of employees are for the most part tenured, independent contractors who 
care a lot more about the guild than about your institution.”  Creating interest within a 
faculty who are driven by their own interests and relationships is difficult as the Pilot 
School attempts to bolster the support for the highly successful PEMBA program.  
Another faculty hypothesized that the fact that “PEMBA is not really owned by an 
[academic] department” hampers its ability to become widely accepted across the Pilot 
faculty body. 
Build execution into the strategy.  PEMBA continues to enjoy financial success 
with a forecasted contribution margin in excess of $500,000 for the current year, and the 
program is also the top-ranked program for physicians according to industry publications.  
The faculty Director who developed and launched the program continues to lead its 
growth and is supported by a faculty team comprised of Pilot School faculty as well as 
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industry practitioners and faculty from other institutions. PEMBA was not identified as 
one of four strategic priorities in Pilot’s most recent strategic plan although it continues to 
be a success in an industry desperately in need of leadership and business solutions.  A 
Pilot administrator interviewed offered a perspective on what must be done to build 
additional support for PEMBA or any program at the Pilot School. 
You have to draw a Vinn diagram between faculty interests and marketplace 
realities, and there has to be an overlap between those two.  If there is, you can 
stumble upon a niche where there is an overlap between those two, good things 
happen.  If you don’t, you continue to offer commodity products into 
overcrowded marketplaces…  
In this case, the Pilot School has identified the uncontested market and successfully 
pursued it with largely one faculty fully dedicated to the effort.  However, it has not been 
able to grow this support within the Pilot School faculty either through faculty hiring or 
attracting the interest of other existing faculty. 
Connection with overall school performance. 
Reputation, branding, and external constituencies.  When the Pilot School 
initially launched the PEMBA program, industry and trade journals as well as popular 
business press carried news of the program, creating visibility for the Pilot School.  One 
of the staff stated that, “there was a lot of excitement about the program.  We were in 
Businessweek.  We were in other magazines…” This coverage has continued over the life 
of the program, and PEMBA has now been ranked as the preferred MBA for physicians 
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for 8 years in a row.  The Pilot School Dean commented that “it is a highly ranked 
program, so it certainly brings recognition to us [Pilot] that we wouldn’t have otherwise.” 
Internal capabilities and internal constituencies.  The PEMBA program has 
bolstered Pilot’s internal capabilities and benefited internal constituencies in a variety of 
ways.  First, the Pilot School Dean reports that it has broadened faculty development 
opportunities and “reenergized a bunch of faculty members.”  A PEMBA staff member 
also highlighted faculty development as a result of the PEMBA program. 
It also helped to broaden faculty and their experiences and their knowledge of 
handling the physicians through the research they were doing.  To hone the 
curriculum from one that is maybe more generalized to one that is very specific 
for healthcare. They got to see from a different vantage point as well.” 
The PEMBA program also gave the Pilot School the opportunity to push the boundaries 
of distance education and has led to the use of synchronous distance education 
throughout Pilot’s executive MBA programs.  In addition, a number of short courses 
focusing on the healthcare industry have been spawned as a result of the expertise and 
focus gained from PEMBA.  And finally, the Pilot School has been able to use financial 
surpluses for recent years to fund other programming.  The PEMBA program Director 
sums some of the internal benefits of the program below. 
In terms of dollar revenue generated, dollar surplus generated, pushing the state of 
the art in distance education, the diversity of the students we bring in, secondary 
program development in non-degree short courses…By all those measures, it has 
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been the singularly most successful customized executive MBA in the history of 
the college. 
Potential missed opportunities.  The PEMBA program is clearly successful, and 
it both directly and indirectly benefits the Pilot School’s position, capabilities, and 
finances.  However, it has never become a strategic priority of the school.  As mentioned 
above, PEMBA nor the healthcare industry was identified as one of Pilot’s four strategic 
priorities in the strategic planning process which occurred three years ago.  A current 
Pilot School administrator describes this in the following statement. 
I think we have missed an opportunity there.  As good as [PEMBA Director] has 
been in sheparding that one program, he has never had the broader vision of 
saying, ok, let’s go after the bigger challenge of emerging as a leader in healthcare 
management.  There has never been anyone around who has talked about 
healthcare management in the way that we often talk about [another strategic 
priority].  We want to be a preeminent school in this whole discipline.   
Instead, the PEMBA program continues to be a success and a small group of faculty work 
in this area on related research and short course programs.  When another administrator 
was asked about whether the PEMBA program was a priority for Pilot, the response was 
as follows. 
By the definitions that I just gave you, no; although I think that just because of 
length of time that it has been in existence and its #1 ranking, it is on that set of 
kudos that the college points out.  It is still not on the strategic plan.  We still do 
not have enough faculty.  We don’t have a hiring focus for faculty that have a 
 
108 
research interest in healthcare.  Healthcare is a huge opportunity, not just for 
PEMBA.  [The MBA Program] places a lot of students and has a lot of students 
with a healthcare interest.  [There are not] enough faculty to put together a 
healthcare concentration. 
Summary.  The Pilot Business School successfully launched the PEMBA 
program and has developed it into the premier offering for physicians who are interested 
in building their competencies in physician leadership.  The program is of benefit to the 
Pilot School’s national and international visibility and credibility.  In addition, this 
program has allowed faculty to further develop their interest in this area, and it has 
provided surplus funding to the Pilot School directly through student fees and indirectly 
through other spinoff programs in healthcare.  However, the success of this program has 
not influenced the Pilot School faculty to make healthcare an area of strategic focus nor 
does the school prioritize the healthcare industry in most of their other degree or non-
degree offerings.  This program was developed and launched largely through the 
contributions of a single faculty member, and a focus on healthcare and physician 
leadership has not spread to a larger group of faculty.  Without this prioritization, the 
PEMBA program remains an isolated success and an isolated entry into a healthcare 
market that seems to hold significant opportunity for business schools. 
Case III – Shopper Marketing Forum at Pilot 
 The Pilot Business School was also the setting for the third case researched for 
this study.  In contrast to the Physician Executive MBA program, which is housed in 
Pilot’s executive education group, the Shopper Marketing Forum is an activity that has 
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been undertaken by an academic department at Pilot.  The five participants interviewed 
for the Shopper Marketing Forum strategic move described the same overall culture at 
Pilot as has previously been described, so it will not be repeated in this section.  
However, the participants also identified a strong culture within the founding academic 
department, the Department of Marketing and Logistics, so that culture will first be 
detailed prior to describing the Shopper Marketing Forum. 
 The Department of Marketing and Logistics at the Pilot School is well known by 
academics and practitioners alike for their work in logistics and supply chain 
management.  The Pilot School programs in this area are typically ranked in the Top 10 
and enjoy wide support from industry.  The Department has a Supply Chain Forum that 
brings together practitioners, academics, and students to dialogue about the current trends 
and issues in supply chain management.  This Forum enjoys the support of over 50 
corporate member companies and is widely recognized as a place to discuss and debate 
supply chain management as well as gain access to top graduates in this field.  The 
Department of Marketing and Logistics at Pilot has been able to position itself in the top 
echelon of academic faculties within the area of logistics and supply chain management.  
As discussed above, the faculty within this department generally agree with the Pilot 
School position of recognizing that they are most likely to make an impact by competing 
within a differentiated area or niche.  A faculty participant interviewed about the Shopper 
Marketing Forum identified the challenge with this task in the vast landscape of 
marketing research and education.  “We do really well at niche areas. We are not so good 
at going head to head.  In the marketing space, there are thousands of marketing 
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departments.”  This culture has influenced some faculty within the Department to create a 
differentiated position built upon the concept of Shopper Marketing within the general 
marketing competitive landscape. 
 While the Pilot School works closely with industry partners in general, the 
Department of Marketing and Logistics at Pilot occupies a leadership position in this 
regard.  Through the Supply Chain Forum, the Pilot School faculty who focus on supply 
chain regularly interact with industry leaders and prize these relationships.  The 
Department Head noted the faculty’s “willingness to engage the business community in 
joint research and collaboration.”  A Pilot staff member interviewed who has familiarity 
with many other business schools remarked how “not a lot of universities interact with 
companies in that way [via a Forum structure]”. 
 The motivation for this close relationship with industry is to ensure that the 
Department is maximizing its influence through research, teaching, and direct 
collaboration; another motivation is to produce much needed funding for the Department.  
The lead faculty for the Shopper Marketing Forum characterizes it this way, “We want to 
stay connected to the business community for our research and to make sure our teaching 
is contemporary and relevant.”  The Department Head phrased it as viewing 
“organizations as our laboratories,” and he emphasized how much time scientists spend 
in their laboratories conducting research and teaching.  One of the Pilot staff members 
who worked in industry prior to joining the Pilot School identified the culture as “being 
more focused on industry and trying to resolve real-life problems.”  The Department that 
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launched the Shopper Marketing Forum is not only entrepreneurial as is the overall 
faculty at Pilot, but they are also highly focused on close partnerships with industry. 
Description of the Shopper Marketing Forum.  The Shopper Marketing Forum 
was launched to serve as a hub for academics, practitioners and students to gather and 
advance the development and practice of Shopper Marketing which is a nascent approach 
to business where the shopper’s desires and habits are investigated and incorporated into 
all aspects of marketing and sales.  For example, in the case of something as simple as 
laundry detergent, a consumer products manufacturer may work with a retailer to identify 
the best way to package, display, and sell the detergent.  This may lead to a different 
location or method of displaying the detergent, changes in product labeling or packaging, 
bundling with other products, and a variety of other adaptations that require 
communication and action on the part of every entity involved in the manufacturing and 
sale of the detergent.  All of these changes are directly based upon how the shopper 
behaves while in the store and what they base their purchase decisions upon.  
Consequently, Shopper Marketing requires a new approach to inter-firm partnerships and 
a high degree of responsiveness along a product or service’s entire supply chain.   
The Pilot School Department of Marketing and Logistics used their experience in 
supply chain management, their experience in managing other Forums, strong industry 
partnerships, and faculty interest in this area to stake out a position as a leader in the 
Shopper Marketing arena.  Through the Shopper Marketing Forum, interested companies 
and individuals can come together to discuss the challenges and future development of 
the area, sponsor research projects, and hire Pilot School students which have been 
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educated in shopper marketing.  Pilot School faculty use insight from this Forum to better 
educate students in Shopper Marketing which in turn provides stronger candidates for 
companies to hire.  Companies join the Forum upon a commitment of organizational 
participation and a regular financial contribution that helps to support Pilot’s 
programming in this area.  In addition, they have the opportunity to sponsor research in 
an area of particular interest to their firm. 
Organizational and environmental factors that influenced approach. 
Environmental attractiveness.  The environment was attractive to faculty in the 
Pilot School Department of Marketing and Logistics for three primary reasons.  First, a 
clear need for additional research and competency in this area emerged during 
investigation by a Pilot School faculty member who eventually became the Director of 
the Shopper Marketing Forum.  This faculty relates a pivotal conversation with two 
industry insiders. 
When we picked around the topic for a couple of times in the conference room, it 
turns out for the consumer package goods companies, this is a pretty big deal.  
They were saying they were spending hundreds of millions of dollars trying to 
figure this out. 
A Pilot staff member relayed this recognition of the market need in an even more direct 
manner. 
The fact that somebody comes to you and basically says I think we should do this 
and here are my buddies; we are all going to throw money at it.  How dumb are 
you not to say let’s have a look at this?  That doesn’t mean that you are a sellout.  
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That basically means that you understand what your mission is as a scholar and 
where you are going to go. 
Through conversation with industry, Pilot School faculty were able to learn that 
companies could not hire employees with suitable competencies in this area.  Significant 
opportunities also existed for research and thought leadership in this underdeveloped and 
uncontested market. 
 Second, as the Pilot School began to connect with industry on the topic of 
Shopper Marketing through the single Pilot faculty member who was leading this effort, 
it became more and more apparent that the market was uncontested.  The faculty Director 
reported that, “At trade meetings and conferences, we might be the only university there.”  
The Department Head emphasized this point, “I don’t think there are many other options 
on the academic front where the words shopper and marketing are being pronounced 
together.”  This opportunity to distinguish the marketing activities at the Pilot School in a 
way similar that the logistics faculty had also done within their department was attractive.  
The Shopper Marketing Forum Director summed up this position by stating, “By 
connecting with businesses directly on something important to them that few other 
universities are paying attention to, we get catapulted to the front of the line.” 
 Finally, shopper marketing was attractive as it gave a Pilot faculty member, who 
would later go on to be Director of the Shopper Marketing Forum, the opportunity to 
grow and develop in the area of his choosing.  This faculty member summarized his 
position by saying that he saw the following positives in a Shopper Marketing Forum 
launch. 
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…Alignment with interests of mine, what I saw was alignment with faculty in the 
department, at least a dozen, even if they didn’t see it themselves, I saw their 
connection, the fact that there was definitely a market need for at least teaching in 
this area and it looked like even more research in the area, and few competitors. 
The Pilot School Dean further cemented Pilot’s position by saying, “You have a key 
faculty member who is really interested in it.  It seemed like a way to differentiate what 
might otherwise be a somewhat generic marketing program from other marketing 
programs.”  In fact, the pivotal criterion for Pilot administrators may have been faculty 
interest as captured in this statement from a Pilot administrator, “I think some of that 
[decision] was based around a good idea and some of it was based around trust and faith 
in [Shopper Marketing Faculty Director] that he is not going to do something and not do 
it well.” 
Organizational capabilities and resources.  A faculty member who was 
interested in the topic, a close relationship with industry, and a proven Forum model in 
adjacent areas such as supply chain management comprise the major organizational 
capabilities and resources brought to bear by the Pilot School.  First, the individual 
faculty member who eventually became Director of the Shopper Marketing Forum had a 
keen interest in the subject, and the Pilot School has a keen interest in supporting this 
high potential faculty member.  The Pilot Dean offered that, at least in part, the Shopper 
Marketing Forum was to “capitalize on the interest of a faculty member that we see as 
really being someone we want to support and we want to build the future of the college 
around him and other people like him.”  The Department Head echoed this position 
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through his description of this faculty member’s unusual qualifications as a “very well 
thought of marketing professor also published heavily in logistics journals, so he 
understands supply chain issues as well as marketing issues.” 
 This faculty member had also developed a relationship with industry executives at 
key firms such as Pepsico and Crossmark that allowed a window into the needs of the 
industry.  The genesis for the Shopper Marketing Forum was a conversation between two 
influential industry executives who are also Pilot School alumni.  The faculty Director 
recalled that the idea for the Shopper Marketing Forum actually came from the 
executives, “They knew that we did work in general marketing and in consumer goods, 
that we knew supply chain management, and thought we might be interested.”  The 
criticality of this industry relationship cannot be overstated in the Pilot School’s decision 
to launch this initiative as is detailed in the following statement by a Pilot administrator.  
“We have some external champions in the network that are helping us more than we are 
helping ourselves even in terms of opening the opportunity for us.” 
 An established Forum model already in use in the supply chain management area 
was another capability upon which this department was able to draw.  In the words of the 
Shopper Marketing Forum Director, “I knew how to start a Forum.”   This faculty 
member had been involved in the successful Supply Chain Forum and was able to benefit 
not only from institutional knowledge but also from scaling the Supply Chain Forum 
support structure to the operations of the Shopper Marketing Forum.  By utilizing 
experienced support staff who had capacity to undertake this additional forum, the 
associated costs and risks were somewhat mitigated. 
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 Finally, the established position that the Department had in supply chain 
management provided a firm foundation on which to build.  The Shopper Marketing 
Forum Director explained that “most of the companies want us to leverage the supply 
chain side because we are pretty well known there and that is a pretty unique aspect.”  
The Department Head also supported this position by saying, “I think that we are well 
positioned.  It happens to be a niche area in marketing that is a good match with what we 
are already good at on the supply chain side.”  He continued by emphasizing the fit with 
existing organizational capabilities and priorities. 
This [Shopper Marketing Forum] is pretty close to what we consider to be our 
own strategic mission of demand supply integration, supply chain management, it 
does fit with what we are good at, and importantly we have this ready format 
[existing Forum structure] that it can just fit in.” 
Organizational orientation for competition or innovation.  In concert with 
Pilot’s overall orientation toward innovation and differentiated positioning, the 
Department of Marketing and Logistics at the Pilot School has a philosophy and a track 
record of pursuing nontraditional foci and programs.  As it refers to Marketing, the 
Department Head emphasizes that “anything that we can do to differentiate ourselves to 
be seen as somehow different and better than just your generic marketing department is I 
think a good thing.”  The Shopper Marketing Forum Director further explicates this point 
in the following statement. 
What most schools do if they want to be known for anything, they just copy 
another one.  They try to follow Kellogg in brand management or Wharton in 
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competitive strategy or Florida in consumer behavior or South Carolina in 
international marketing.  Those schools own those spaces. I looked at all those 
and had to think about when is there an opportunity to do something that nobody 
is paying attention to yet.  I like niche strategies and I like first mover advantage. 
If you are first in a niche area, the world is yours, for a while.  It gives you 
breathing room, so you can build the damn thing. 
The size of the general marketing space, the relative lack of funding when compared to 
other schools, and the dominance that key institutions already have over traditional areas 
in marketing have led this Department to search for an uncontested space.  When asked 
about why Pilot did not pursue more recognition in the traditional marketing areas, the 
Department Head responded with the following statement. 
There are only so many spaces [at the top].  It is kind of like to me, it would be if 
we said let’s become the consumer behavior school, it would sort of be like let’s 
develop and build a smartphone that has a little glass case on it where you can 
move icons around and use your finger. It’s like, yeah right, you are going to 
compete against that. Give me a break. 
The relatively poor positioning of the Pilot School Department of Marketing and 
Logistics to compete in the generalized marketplace for marketing education is 
recognized by the faculty and administrators and appears to have been a primary 
contributor to the launch of the Shopper Marketing Forum. 
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Use of reconstructionist principles during implementation. 
Reconstruct market boundaries.  A recognition and understanding of this 
developing area within business by the Pilot School faculty allowed the creation of the 
Shopper Marketing Forum to uniquely address the issues at hand.  The Shopper 
Marketing Director said he “was surprised it [shopper marketing] didn’t show up in any 
academic articles…so there clearly wasn’t a translation going on there.” The Department 
Head added to this position. 
Academics weren’t necessarily providing a lot of guidance [in the area].  It was 
one of those very common things we see in academia where practice is way ahead 
of academics. Where people go off and do things, and academics are running like 
hell to try to catch up and try to figure out what the heck people are doing. 
The close relationship with industry and an interested faculty member allowed the Pilot 
School to directly address industry needs and, in some cases, address them through a 
repositioning of previously existing programs. 
 The following statement from a Pilot School administrator describes the natural 
fit between industry needs in this area and the type of research and students historically 
provided by the Pilot School. 
I think partly you have to know how shopper marketing fits in the world of 
corporations and brand. The shopper marketing person at least to date, that all 
may change in the future, is not the most senior strategist in the company.  Those 
high-name, very prestigious schools, they are still going to get their most senior 
brand strategists pipeline.  They are not necessarily saying we are going to stop 
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hiring Kellogg [Northwestern University] people for our assistant/associate brand 
positions.  It is filling this gap between these super-strategist types of people and 
then everybody else on the line that is just working.  There is a big gap for a 
creative person who understands strategy, but also is willing to figure out how to 
implement, and can make decisions on the fly.  In supply chain, for example, that 
is one of the areas that Pilot is known for, we say we produce students who can 
roll up their sleeves and go to work, but they still have the knowledge base to 
understand the higher-level concepts.  But they don’t mind rolling up their sleeves 
and working.  Shopper Marketing fits into that brand placement hierarchy in a 
good spot that Pilot is known for, so it has been nothing but positive acceptance.  
Even the Northwestern and the Booth’s [University of Chicago], they are not 
looking at adopting shopper marketing because they have a place that makes 
sense based upon their reputation.  This is an opportunity for Pilot; there are not a 
lot of schools that can adopt this focus well. 
As captured in the quote above, the profile of the typical Pilot School student matches 
with industry needs in this area, and ongoing research by Pilot faculty members in 
shopper marketing naturally supports the development of students and industry partners 
in the area of shopper marketing. 
 In addition to redirecting students and research toward this underserved area, the 
formation of the Shopper Marketing Forum also gave key industry and academic players 
an opportunity to regularly gather to debate and discuss.  By pulling together industry 
leaders at the Shopper Marketing Forum, the Pilot School has quickly built a reputation 
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in this area.  A Pilot School staff member supported the importance of creating a hub 
where industry practitioners, academics, and students can assemble, “that is how you 
become known, and that is how you work.  It is a combination, research, industry goes to 
you, you do industry projects.” 
 Market boundaries were reconstructed through a call for attention and focus on 
this area by the Pilot School and through the creation of the Shopper Marketing Forum 
where substantive conversation could take place to advance knowledge and practice.  
Industry Associations such as the Grocery Management Association sponsor research and 
offer limited opportunity for practitioners to interact at trade conferences regarding this 
subject, but no other entity had created a Forum where practitioners, academics, and 
students with an interest in the area could join together to make real progress on key 
issues.  The integration of issues related to Shopper Marketing and a clear positioning of 
them in relation to Shopper Marketing has created an environment that is attractive to 
industry, academics, and students.  The power of this integration and the new market that 
it has created shows in the following statement from a Pilot staff member. 
The trick of this thing is the integration.  Use the strengths that you have on 
Demand Supply Integration.  Embrace the complexity of the subject matter, and 
then go attack it, recognizing full well that means that you have to add on to 
traditional parts of marketing such as shopper behavior or consumer behavior, 
product development, etc.  Take it from there.  The trick is to offer the wider 
realm of what it is.  Shopper Marketing is complex, so therefore you have to offer 
a complex solution.  I think that if you go out and be another I-know-everything-
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about-how-people-walk-through-a-store school.  Go to Texas A&M.  It is right 
next door to Pepsi, and they do that, too.  And they have a better lab than we will 
ever have probably.  You are trying to find something else.  You distinguish your 
product. 
The strategy canvas depicting how the Pilot Shopper Marketing Forum distinguished 
itself from contested markets is detailed below in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 -- Strategy Canvas for Shopper Marketing Forum 
 In sum, Pilot’s Shopper Marketing Forum has reconstructed market boundaries 
through providing focus on the relatively new topic of shopper marketing and by doing so 
in a way that brings together practitioners, students, and academics.  This market 
reconstruction is summarized below in Table 3. 
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Table 3 -- Market Reconstruction by the Pilot Shopper Marketing Forum 
 Pilot’s Shopper 
Marketing 
Forum 
Typical 
marketing 
programs 
Industry 
trade 
associations 
Focus on shopper marketing ✓✓✓  ✓✓ 
Provision of research on shopper 
marketing ✓✓✓ ✓ ✓ 
Competencies in key adjacent areas such 
as supply chain management ✓✓✓   
Source for shopper marketing talent 
development ✓✓✓ ✓  
Hub where practitioners, academics, and 
students can assemble to meet and have 
dialogue about shopper marketing 
✓✓✓  ✓✓ 
 
Focus on the big picture, not the numbers.  The Pilot Department of Marketing 
and Logistics and the Shopper Marketing Forum Director were already searching for 
some way to separate the school from the direct competition that is so prevalent among 
marketing schools.  A conversation between industry executives who were Pilot School 
supporters and a Pilot School faculty member, identified the area of shopper marketing. 
They were kicking around a lot of different ideas and [industry executive] actually 
hit on shopper marketing and said, “This is it. This is what every person in the 
consumer packaged goods industry is worried about.  If you can make some 
headway in prompting discussion here [at Pilot], we can make this work.”   
From that conversation, the focus was squarely on creating the Shopper Marketing Forum 
to provide a differentiated position for the Pilot School in this area.  It was not until the 
end of the initial Forum meeting that financial support from the companies was publicly 
discussed.  Even then, the industry practitioners present drove the conversation according 
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to the Forum Director.  “At the end of the meeting, a sponsor stood up and said, ‘Who’s 
in?’ I want commitments now.”  At the end of this meeting, five companies were on 
board to programmatically support this vision as well as provide approximately $100,000 
of annual funding to the Shopper Marketing Forum. 
Reach beyond existing demand.  The focus on Shopper Marketing not only 
connected with existing corporate partners, students, and faculty, but it also attracted 
those that were not affiliated with Pilot.  Pilot has been able to secure several corporate 
partnerships in Shopper Marketing with companies that previously did not have a 
relationship with the school.  The Pilot School MBA Program now has a Shopper 
Marketing concentration offered through the Forum faculty, and a Shopper Marketing 
fellowship was begun last year to attract students who would normally be drawn to top 
generalist marketing schools.  The Shopper Marketing Forum has also not limited 
industry connections to the marketing functions within companies, but rather has 
connected with companies across the entire supply chain who are interested in shopper 
marketing or must support it as a part of their business relationships. 
Get the strategic sequence right.  As the Shopper Marketing Forum originated 
during a conversation with industry executives, it was clear that there was market 
interest.  The Pilot School Department of Marketing and Logistics operated Forums in 
other areas and clearly understood the associated costs.  From the first meeting with the 
Pilot School alumni who were industry executives, it was clear to the involved Pilot 
faculty that industry would support this focus.  A Pilot staff member recalled a critical 
point during the launch meeting, “The members and the people who were there, it was 
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very much a snowball effect.  I know this guy, and I know that guy, and basically the few 
key players pulled people in.”  He went on to describe the part of the meeting where a 
practitioner asked for support from other industry players, “Here are all these industry 
people waving around checkbooks.  You better hurry [to get something launched]. I think 
it got traction at that meeting.”  Finally, the Pilot School Dean, who has not been heavily 
involved in Shopper Marketing, was also quick to note, “as soon as we expressed some 
interest in doing this, the corporate support for it was just like that.” 
Overcome key organizational hurdles.  The Shopper Marketing Forum at the 
Pilot School clearly began with the interest of one faculty member who eventually 
became its Director.  This faculty member is well respected by his Department and 
throughout the Pilot School.  The Marketing and Logistics Department Head describes 
the effort below. 
[It was] very entrepreneurial from a single individual, and it continues to be that 
way.  That is part of the thing that worries you a little bit about an effort like that 
until there is more institutionalization of the expertise or the added value that is 
provided to these folks then it is completely on the back of one person. 
A Pilot staff member remarked “the reason that it became such a big focus was the drive 
of [Faculty Director]” and “the good thing that [Faculty Director] did, which is 
remarkable, is that he subsequently spent a humungous amount of time doing internal 
selling.”  A fellow faculty member relayed the following sentiments about the individual 
efforts of the Shopper Marketing Forum Director. 
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I feel foolish…because the reality is that I underestimated the ability of one 
person to make that happen.  This hasn’t been a collective effort on the part of the 
Marketing faculty.  This has been handing [Shopper Marketing Forum Director] a 
lot of rope and saying go. 
Even with evidence pointing to a market opportunity and industry support, the 
Department faculty entrusted virtually the entire responsibility to a single individual.  
The Shopper Marketing Director knew from the outset that the success or failure 
of the effort largely rested on his shoulders. In the statement below he recalls the meeting 
where he received permission from the faculty to continue. 
I brought it [Shopper Marketing Forum] to a department meeting and gave a little 
pitch, a presentation, of what shopper marketing was.  I told them how it connects 
to a lot of things we are doing in marketing and some on the supply chain side.  I 
told them how the statistics department is working on data mining and shopping 
basket data.  The retailing department is doing a lot that we could build on.  At 
that time, I thought advertising would get excited about it, but they didn’t.  The 
Department said to go for it.  I think they were skeptical at the time when they 
said go for it, but they trusted me. 
Ultimately, an interest in the area and the desire to influence the industry drove this 
individual Pilot School faculty member to forge ahead. 
 Two years after the launch of the Shopper Marketing Forum, it appears that the 
majority of the responsibility remains on the Faculty Director and has not been 
transitioned to the wider organization.  A Pilot administrator stated, “It is a real turning 
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point to move this from one faculty member’s enthusiastic research stream that has had 
higher than expected response in the marketplace to a collaborative departmental effort.”  
The administrator continued, “We are nowhere close to that in shopper marketing, and I 
know [Director] would say that one of his biggest challenges is to get colleague buy-in 
and the hiring opportunities to build out a true Shopper Marketing team.” 
 The difficulty of gaining faculty buy-in was a focus for all participants 
interviewed.  It was identified by the Shopper Marketing Forum Director as his biggest 
challenge, particularly getting Pilot School faculty to engage with corporate partners on 
research in areas of mutual interest.  The Director highlighted this as a typical problem in 
academic environments.  “Then once you decide to do it [launch a program], it is not easy 
to do.  The reason that most of those other universities don’t have programs is because 
they can’t get more than those individual faculty on board.  Faculty are like cats.  They 
have PhDs. They have tenure.  They will do whatever they want to do.”  This position 
was supported by an account from a Pilot faculty member about times when the Shopper 
Marketing Forum was pitched by the Director. 
Well, I don’t know a lot of the details.  I will just tell you as a faculty member 
who was sitting in the room a lot of times when [Director] would get up there and 
say, “Here’s what I want to do in Shopper Marketing” and we are going to have 
this Forum, and we are going to have these people come in and we are going to 
have a meeting and I am working with these people...I can just very honestly 
remember sitting back there and saying, “What the hell is this?” 
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In fact, the Shopper Marketing Forum Director points to the Pilot School faculty as being 
much better than average at working together and supporting one another as one of the 
reasons for the success of the Shopper Marketing Forum.   
 Each of the participants interviewed confirmed that the only way to truly 
institutionalize Shopper Marketing into the department is to hire faculty for this purpose.  
The Department Head stated this succinctly when he said, “The only way that you really 
institutionalize something like this is through hiring people.”  However, hiring is limited 
due to resource scarcity and often faculty are hired based upon their individual strengths 
instead of how they fit into a given strategic initiative.  The Pilot School has recently 
hired two faculty members with an interest in Shopper Marketing, so this may be a sign 
that the Shopper Marketing Forum will become more institutionalized over time.  
Build execution into the strategy.  Despite the strength of the opportunity and the 
initial success, it does not appear that Pilot has yet been able to build execution into the 
strategy.  The Shopper Marketing Forum Director has previous corporate experience and 
compared the Shopper Marketing Forum launch to previous activities in the corporate 
sphere. 
Light years different. Light years different.  Moves at a snails pace versus what I 
would expect in corporate.  Much more influencing and less control, so I don’t 
have as much authority.  I have accountability for sure; if the whole thing fails 
they blame me.  I have no authority to influence anybody in this case except for 
maybe a couple of the staff… 
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On the other hand, the Director was quick to point out the relative strength of Pilot in this 
area. 
In my mind it is the best you can hope for in a university setting.  I think they 
have been very, very supportive here, more than anywhere else I would have been 
at.  But, it is still nowhere near what I would expect if I were back in business.  
I’d be five years ahead of where I am right now easily, in a corporate 
environment. 
Over two years after the initial meeting, and with success in attracting corporate partners 
and funding, the Shopper Marketing Forum is still an isolated effort of a few faculty and 
has not been embraced programmatically or financially by the Pilot School faculty and 
administration. 
Connection with overall school performance. 
Reputation, branding, and external constituencies.  The Shopper Marketing 
Forum has created a mechanism for companies that did not previously partner with the 
Pilot School.  The Pilot School Dean captured this by saying, “Go down to the Shopper 
Marketing Forum and look at the companies represented there.  It is an all-star cast.”  The 
Shopper Marketing Forum Director reports that he is getting “quite a few calls out of the 
blue” from companies who are interested in the Shopper Marketing Forum.  A Pilot 
School staff member who has recently interacted with academics from across the 
marketing field reported that there is recognition that the Pilot School is having success at 
gaining traction in this area.  The Shopper Marketing Forum Director says that he 
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ultimately wants mind share from these companies, and the Shopper Marketing Forum is 
beginning to deliver that. 
 The Pilot School MBA Program Director says the Shopper Marketing Forum has 
offered a storyline to successfully attract some students who would not have considered 
the Pilot School prior to these efforts although she admits that it is a bit early to truly 
determine what impact the Shopper Marketing Forum may have on the Pilot MBA 
program.  The Pilot Department of Marketing and Logistics Department Head echoes this 
position regarding the department in the statement, “it is still a little early to tell whether 
or not it becomes this fairly isolated effort.” 
Internal capabilities and internal constituencies.  The Shopper Marketing Forum 
is too early in its existence for many internal capabilities to have developed; however, 
there are positive initial signs.  The first two doctoral dissertations on shopper marketing 
are nearing completion and both of these students have accepted offers to join the faculty 
at excellent schools.  The two faculty members with interests in shopper marketing who 
have been hired have been able to bolster the individual efforts of the Director and are 
working with MBA students interested in Shopper Marketing.  The Pilot School Dean 
stated that the Shopper Marketing Forum likely aided in attracting these faculty members. 
“We have hired several new people in marketing this year.  It is pretty impressive [to 
prospective faculty] that we have moved into some new area this quickly…So, it has 
probably helped us in recruiting.”  Finally, the shopper marketing focus appears to be 
helping in recruiting MBA students with this interest and in attracting employers to hire 
these students.   
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Potential opportunities.  The Shopper Marketing Forum is still relatively new.  It 
is possible that the Forum will help to position Pilot as explicated below by the Head of 
Marketing and Logistics. 
Ultimately you may want to get to the point that we teach in class which is, “What 
is positioning?”  Positioning to me is an exercise in word association.  For our 
target audience, 10 years from now, if you say Marketing Department [Pilot 
School of Business] they may very well say, oh yeah, those are the shopper 
marketing people. And that wouldn’t be a bad thing to have happen.” 
At the present time, this is not the case, nor is Shopper Marketing trumpeted as one of the 
things which define the Pilot School.  The Pilot MBA Program Director made this clear 
when referring to what the Pilot Dean references in public appearances. 
If I look at what [Pilot School Dean] says if he does an interview, what he says 
that [the Pilot School] is known for, shopper marketing is probably not one of the 
things that he mentions.  If you look at overall positioning, we have probably not 
hit it yet for shopper marketing.  
Ultimately, time will tell the impact that the Shopper Marketing Forum will have on the 
Pilot Schools overall performance. 
Summary.  The Shopper Marketing Forum represents a clear market opportunity 
that fits well with the Pilot School’s organizational capabilities and historical market 
positioning in adjacent areas such as supply chain management.  Through the efforts of 
an individual faculty member, the Shopper Marketing Forum was successfully launched, 
and it appears to be yielding initial success in student and faculty recruitment as well as 
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doctoral research.  However, the Shopper Marketing Forum is still largely the effort of an 
individual faculty member as neither the Department in which it is housed nor the Pilot 
School have lent significant organizational support besides what has been directly 
requested by the involved faculty.  The Shopper Marketing Forum is too new to be a part 
of the Pilot School’s strategic plan and is not regularly mentioned by Pilot School 
leadership as an area of focus.  Although the Forum is too young to give a clear picture of 
overall organizational impact, for the purposes of this study, the recent launch allows a 
detailed account of the organizational hurdles that must be overcome to launch a program 
in an academic environment. 
Cross-Case Analysis 
 In addition to the detailed description of the cross-case findings in this section, 
Table 4 provides a summary of these findings below. 
Environmental and organizational factors influencing pursuit (RQ1).  In 
response to Research Question 1 concerning the environmental and organizational factors 
that influenced the schools across these three cases to pursue a reconstructionist strategy, 
four major findings emerged.  Although they do generally align with the three categories 
identified by Kim and Mauborgne (2009) that were used to organize the individual case 
findings, several of the cross-case findings overlap two or more of Kim & Mauborgne’s 
(2009) categories.  Therefore, to achieve maximum clarity, the four findings to Research 
Question 1 are presented below without categorization. 
Active Relationship with Industry Partners.  In each of the three cases a close 
relationship with industry precipitated the school’s decision to pursue an uncontested 
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market.  Whether the relationship rested primarily between a faculty member and an 
industry executive as it did with the Diamond School International Luxury Brand 
Management MBA, or it resulted from a request for assistance from a business leader 
located near the school as was the case with the Pilot School PEMBA program, or it 
sprang from a conversation with two alumni who are now successful industry executives 
as with the Pilot School Shopper Marketing Forum, the relationships and interaction with 
industry executives were critical for each school to realize that the market existed. 
The support of these industry partners was also critical in developing the plans for 
the launch of the strategic move, providing funding, and channeling customers to the 
moves in the form of students and corporate partners.  For example, two luxury goods 
companies helped the Diamond School design their program, provided brand recognition 
for the program, offered entrance to the closed industry environments, and hired the 
graduates from the program.  In the Pilot School’s PEMBA program, the initial partner 
provided development funds and offered access to its physicians to help design the 
program, and a PEMBA alumnus identified the most successful way to market the 
program through medical society meetings.  In the case of the Pilot School’s Shopper 
Marketing Forum, two alumni provided the topic area, worked to recruit other 
companies, and one literally made the sales pitch for financial support to colleagues at the 
first meeting.  It is the close connection with industry that defines these programs.  
Industry partners provided crucial support along every step of the way through market 
identification, design, and launch of each of these three strategic moves into uncontested 
markets. 
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Table 4 -- Summary of Findings 
Organizational and Environmental Factors Influencing Pursuit (RQ #1) 
Active Relationship with Industry Partners 
Alignment with Individual Faculty Interest and Capability 
The Heart and Mind of a Challenger 
Organizational Acceptance and Experience with Reconstructionist Moves 
Use of Reconstructionist Principles During Implementation (RQ #2) 
Reconstruction of Market Boundaries Tended to Occur Naturally through Contact 
with Industry Partners 
 
Organizational Structures Fostered Natural Focus on the Big Picture, Not the 
Numbers 
 
Lack of Organizational Support Drove Faculty Entrepreneurs to Reach Beyond 
Existing Demand and to Get the Strategic Sequence Right 
 
Individual Faculty Success was an Initial Requirement to Overcome Key 
Organizational Hurdles although even when Innovation was Supported, 
Institutionalization was Uncertain 
 
Building Execution into Strategy was Challenging due to the Lack of a Mechanism 
to Steer Resources toward a Successful Move and Little Use of the Move in Overall 
School Strategy and Positioning 
 
Connection between Strategic Moves and Overall School Performance (RQ #3) 
Increased Visibility, Strong Corporate Partnerships, and Global Differentiation 
were aided by Reconstructionist Moves 
 
Internal Capabilities, Competencies, and Finances were Strengthened 
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 Alignment with Individual Faculty Interest and Capability.  The importance of 
individual faculty interest cannot be overstated in these three cases.  It was clear that none 
of these strategic moves would have advanced had it not been for a single faculty 
member who took a personal interest in taking the initiative.  The freedom and autonomy 
characteristic of an academic institution populated by tenured faculty makes the interest 
of a faculty member a necessary prerequisite to undertaking this type of strategic move.  
While it is conceivable that more than one faculty member could be interested and 
therefore the workload could be better distributed, this did not happen for a variety of 
reasons in any of these three cases even where other faculty seemed to have significant 
levels of interest.  In each case, a single faculty member recognized the opportunity and 
carried the strategy all the way through launch.  Only in the case of the Diamond 
School’s MBA program has one of these moves been successfully transferred from the 
faculty who began the effort to a successor.  At the Diamond School, the founding faculty 
retired and handed the responsibility to a successor who also obtained his PhD at the 
Diamond School.  In the interview, the current program Director noted a fear of finding 
the next generation of leaders for this program. 
 As individual faculty members were the ones who recognized the attractiveness 
and carried the initiative through successful implementation, these faculty were required 
to have the capability and motivation to singlehandedly shoulder this responsibility.  In 
each of these cases, the founding faculty member had interest, respect, and the capability 
to successfully execute the program.  These individual faculty entrepreneurs, who 
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represent a markedly different profile from the average faculty member, were the 
foundation on which each of these strategic moves was built. 
Finally, the decision to pursue conversation with industry about these strategic 
moves often appeared to be more opportunistic on the part of the individual faculty 
member who was interested in the topic rather than a result of deliberate strategy by the 
school.  This is especially true in the two cases at Pilot where the moves gained initial 
traction as a result of a phone call inquiring about interest (PEMBA) and at the behest of 
two alumni (Shopper Marketing).  In contrast, the Diamond School’s move toward a 
luxury goods focus was supported by a strategic desire to internationalize the school even 
though the initial cooperation with the luxury goods industry was the initiative of an 
individual faculty member to pursue an area where she had a research interest. 
The Heart and Mind of a Challenger.  A pursuit of innovation, which might be 
described by some as being a wily challenger, characterizes these two schools and the 
individual faculty involved in the three cases.  Although the Diamond School is a well-
respected and highly ranked school in Europe, it has a strong competitor school within its 
home country and a perennial lack of funding that leads it to play the role of challenger.  
At the Pilot School, poor funding from the State government and the lack of a Top-25 
ranking force the Pilot School to always be looking for a way to fund programs and 
distinguish itself from other schools.  Both the Diamond and Pilot Schools have strong 
reputations as challengers.  It is important to note that virtually every participant 
interviewed was quick to admit their schools relatively poor positioning and challenger 
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status, and it seems that this, in some way, nurtures the next finding which is 
organizational acceptance and experience with reconstructionist moves. 
 Organizational Acceptance and Experience with Reconstructionist Moves.  
Faculty at these two schools have both the freedom to pursue areas of interest and the 
opportunity to employ the school’s name and reputation in these efforts.  Diamond and 
Pilot School Administrators are willing to employ the ideas and resources of individual 
faculty entrepreneurs to advance their schools’ position and lend financial support.  
While neither school seemed to appropriately prioritize resources behind successful 
programming, at least they both did allow faculty to advance differentiated programs in 
new markets.  The culture of entrepreneurship and innovation, which is identified as a 
prerequisite to reconstructionist moves (Kim & Mauborgne, 2009), was foregrounded in 
the documents reviewed and interviews conducted. 
Furthermore, both the Diamond and Pilot Schools have a history of working 
closely with industry partners and relying on individual faculty to enter new markets.  
Their administrators and faculty are accustomed to the process and certain organizational 
support mechanisms exist.  For example, the Diamond School has a process by which 
individual faculty can set up “Chairs” or “Institutes” which offer a vehicle for channeling 
programmatic and financial support.  In the case of the Shopper Marketing Forum, the 
Department of Marketing and Logistics at the Pilot School already had a similar Forum in 
supply chain management.  This organizational experience seemed to allow for a better 
understanding of how future reconstructionist moves might succeed. 
 
137 
Use of reconstructionist principles during implementation (RQ2).  In response 
to Research Question 2 concerning how reconstructionist principles were used during the 
implementation and execution phases, the cross-case findings naturally aligned along 
Kim and Mauborgne’s (2005a) six principles of Blue Ocean Strategy. 
Reconstruct market boundaries. 
 Appeared to occur naturally through contact with industry partners.  The 
Diamond and Pilot Business Schools have both benefited from relationships with 
industry partners and alumni who have been able to help the schools identify and pursue 
uncontested markets.  In a highly fractured academic marketplace, where schools often 
do not have a logical competitive strategy, a school’s natural connection with its alumni 
and business contacts, who desire to see the school be successful, seemed to create a 
natural place where conversation could occur to identify uncontested markets. 
Focus on the big picture, not the numbers. 
 Organizational structure fostered natural big picture focus.  Academics appear to 
have a tendency to focus on the big picture when pursuing these types of moves, and the 
academic organizations at the Diamond and Pilot Schools do not do much to discourage 
this big picture focus.  In the three cases studied, the academic organizations did not push 
individuals to focus strictly on financials and cost benefit analyses that are found so often 
in corporate environments.  As is the case in most academic organizations, the Diamond 
and Pilot Schools also have flat organizational structures where faculty receive very little 
direct supervision.  This type of environment allowed faculty to pursue their professional 
interests unimpeded by the hierarchy typical of corporate organizations. 
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Reach beyond existing demand. 
 Lack of organizational support drove search beyond existing demand.  In these 
cases the faculty responsible for the development of the three strategic moves studied 
were forced to arrange support for their programming with little formal organizational 
assistance.  This tendency seemed to incentivize the faculty to be creative to tap as much 
demand as possible.  In the case of the Diamond School International Luxury Brand 
Management MBA program, the Diamond faculty sought participation from the entire 
spectrum of luxury goods companies instead of focusing on one aspect such as fashion or 
wine.  In the PEMBA program at the Pilot School, the founding faculty member 
employed distance education to tap a worldwide market and break free from the 
geographic limitations that characterized other programs.  The Shopper Marketing Forum 
approached the subject from the perspective of interfirm coordination and therefore pulls 
corporate partners from all parts of the supply chain—manufacturers, retailers, 
advertising firms, consultants, and service providers. 
Get the strategic sequence right. 
 Lack of organizational support forced the correct sequence.  Contrary to what is 
seen in corporate settings where a new product or service is launched without regard to 
the companies ability to fulfill the market needs at a profit, the lack of organizational 
support for these three moves at Diamond and Pilot forced them to be successful on their 
own.  At first, this may seem counterintuitive, as academia is not necessarily known for 
its rigorous cost benefit analysis.  However, as each strategic move was forced to muster 
its own programmatic and financial support at each step of the way, it became a question 
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of survival of the fittest.  Only programs that fulfilled a market need, connected with 
customers, and self-funded moved forward.  Others died from resource starvation or lack 
of faculty attention.   
Overcome key organizational hurdles. 
 Individual faculty success was an initial requirement.  An interested faculty must 
first successfully balance his or her schedule to launch a program while fulfilling other 
required duties.  In each of the three cases studied, the faculty were senior faculty who 
were well-liked and trusted by colleagues.  Even though the faculty were trusted, they 
were forced to demonstrate program success prior to garnering much attention or 
resources from colleagues or administration. 
Innovation was supported, but institutionalization was uncertain.  The positive 
news from the three cases studied is that innovation is allowed to freely happen and is not 
muted by oppressive organizational structures or lack of communication with external 
constituencies.  Unfortunately, that innovation may or may not survive to the point that it 
becomes institutionalized within the school as the academic organizations studied seemed 
to have no process for accepting a program or incorporating it into their competitive 
strategy, if such a strategy exists.   
Unlike the hierarchical structures found in most corporate and governmental 
organizations, the loosely coupled structure of the schools studied required that the 
faculty program owners continually sell and resell their programs internally.  A program 
was not accepted simply because it had been a success or even because it was accepted 
by faculty and administration at some time prior.  For example, the Shopper Marketing 
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Forum Director at the Pilot School relayed one of his biggest issues is that he has to 
repeatedly convince and motivate Pilot faculty and administrators as there is no 
organizational structure in place to mobilize faculty resources behind a successful 
strategy.  
Build execution into the strategy. 
 Lack of a mechanism to steer resources to a successful move.  In spite of the 
success of these three strategic moves, the majority of the effort and resources committed 
to each continue to be the individual faculty who championed the move.  The Diamond 
School seems unwilling to incorporate the International Luxury Brand Management 
MBA program into their overall competitive and branding strategies even though it seems 
that the program would help further bolster their success.  The PEMBA program at the 
Pilot School is not a strategic priority for the school, and no significant faculty or 
program resources have been committed to grow Pilot’s reputation in this area.  Finally, 
even though the Shopper Marketing Forum is attracting companies and students who 
were not interested in the Pilot School beforehand, the bulk of the program continues to 
rest upon the back of one overworked faculty member. 
 Little use to bolster general market visibility and position.  Each of these three 
moves has attracted significant cooperation from external constituencies; however, none 
of the schools have incorporated these programs into their overall marketing strategies in 
any significant manner.  The Diamond School continues to use generic positioning to 
compete directly with other schools for general programming.  The Pilot School does not 
use PEMBA or the Shopper Marketing Forum in their overall marketing and branding 
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campaigns as a way to position the Pilot School as a global leader in these markets.  
Instead, the Pilot School largely continues to market its individual programs as 
standalone entities instead of contributing to the Pilot School’s overall image and market 
position. 
Connection between strategic moves and overall school performance (RQ3).  
In response to Research Question 3 concerning any connection between the pursuit of the 
reconstructionist strategy and the overall performance of the business school, the findings 
are organized below according to whether the performance effects are associated with the 
schools’ external reputation, branding and external constituencies or their internal 
capabilities and constituencies. 
Reputation, branding, and external constituencies. 
 Increased visibility, strong corporate partnerships, and global differentiation 
were aided by reconstructionist moves. Both the Diamond Business School and the Pilot 
Business School have benefited from the increased visibility that comes with 
programming that successfully serves a market.  The PEMBA program at the Pilot 
School holds a top ranking now compiled by an industry trade publication whereas the 
Diamond School International Luxury Brand Management MBA program and the 
Shopper Marketing Forum at Pilot continue to be unique offerings.  The Diamond School 
International Luxury Brand Management MBA program and Pilot School Shopper 
Marketing Forum have fostered corporate partnerships between the schools and industry 
players interested in these segments.  However, even though the positioning of these 
differentiated programs would seem to offer a way for the Diamond and Pilot Schools to 
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differentiate their schools from the overcrowded marketplace, the majority of marketing 
and communication focuses on generalist programs and positions. 
Internal capabilities and internal constituencies. 
 Internal capabilities, competencies, and finances were strengthened.  The three 
strategic moves researched for this study fostered the development of internal capabilities 
and the strengthening of internal constituencies.  Each of the faculty involved in these 
programs has been given an opportunity to pursue their interests and have also enriched 
the development of their colleagues.  Through these programs, faculty have developed 
competencies and relationships that are truly unique.  In the case of PEMBA and the 
International Luxury Brand Management MBA, faculty from across the schools teach in 
these programs and benefit from exposure to the companies and students who are 
involved.  The PEMBA program gave its founding faculty member a way to rejuvenate 
his career after serving in the Pilot School Dean’s office.  The Shopper Marketing Forum 
has provided a way for a key marketing faculty to influence his entire department.   
Each of these programs has attracted students to these schools that probably 
would not have otherwise considered them as options.  The Diamond School’s program 
has proved a key cog in internationalizing Diamond’s student body.  The PEMBA 
program boasts over 400 physician alumni from across the globe, and the first Shopper 
Marketing Forum Fellowship recipient will graduate from Pilot’s MBA program later this 
year.  Finally, each of these programs deliver surplus funding back to the overall schools 
in support of the schools’ missions. 
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Summary. The three strategic moves undertaken by the Diamond and Pilot 
Business Schools have captured uncontested markets and delivered positive returns to 
these two schools in the form of faculty development, strong corporate partners, 
additional students, and financial support.  The academic environment seems to nurture a 
reconstructionist approach when the school’s culture and competitive position properly 
align as they do at both the Diamond and Pilot Schools.  The influence of individual 
faculty members to identify and launch programs cannot be understated in these cases.  
Although the environment of these schools is friendly to innovation, a system for support 
and nurture was not found in any of the cases.  Instead, the individual faculty continually 
sold and resold their programming both internally and externally and could not depend 
upon the school to provide significant organizational support.  Finally, these three 
strategic moves have provided an opportunity for the Diamond and Pilot Schools to 
differentiate themselves from other schools, but the schools have not chosen to do so 
based upon the interviews and a review of related documents.  It appears that significant 
opportunity exists for reconstructionist strategy in these schools even if the organizations 
are not as formally supportive and nurturing of it as is seen in corporate environments.  
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Chapter 5  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The purpose of this case study was to explore the pursuit, implementation, and 
potential performance effects of a type of reconstructionist strategy, Blue Ocean Strategy, 
within the context of two collegiate business schools.  This study extends the 
understanding of available strategic options for business school leadership operating in 
today’s turbulent environment.   
The International Luxury Brand Management MBA Program at the Diamond 
Business School, along with the Physicians Executive MBA Program and the Shopper 
Marketing Forum at the Pilot Business School, were the three strategic moves by 
collegiate business schools used as cases in this study.  Information and documentation 
were first gathered about each of these strategic moves to provide a strong base of 
understanding for 15 semi-structured interviews that were subsequently conducted with 
key faculty, staff, and administrators across the three cases. 
The following research questions were used to guide the study: 
1. What organizational and environmental factors led to the pursuit and 
implementation of a reconstructionist approach for the strategic move under 
study? 
2. How were the principles of a reconstructionist approach, as articulated by Blue 
Ocean Strategy, employed during the implementation and execution phases for 
the strategic move under study? 
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3. How has the reconstructionist approach for this strategic move affected the 
overall performance of the business school in which it was implemented? 
 This chapter begins with a summary of the findings that were initially introduced 
in Chapter 4.  Next, the chapter presents a discussion regarding how these findings 
integrate with the existing literature base.  The overall conclusions from this study follow 
the discussion of the findings.  The chapter concludes with implications for business 
school administrators and faculty and finally recommendations for future research in this 
area. 
Summary of the Findings 
Environmental and organizational factors influencing pursuit (RQ1).  In 
response to Research Question 1 regarding the organizational and environmental factors 
that led to the pursuit of a reconstructionist strategy, the findings are summarized below. 
Active relationship with industry partners.   An active relationship between key 
business school faculty, school administrators, and their industry partners aided in the 
successful identification and launch of the reconstructionist moves studied.  Without the 
support given by industry partners, success would have been much less probable. 
Alignment with individual faculty interest and capability.  In each case, an 
individual faculty member was largely responsible for the successful pursuit and 
implementation of the strategic move under study.  For a reconstructionist move to 
successfully advance, the individual faculty member in charge had to possess both a 
personal interest in the strategic move as well as the necessary skill sets to execute the 
strategy. 
 
146 
The heart and mind of a challenger.   The individual faculty leaders and 
administrators from each case had a keen sense that they were a challenger being forced 
to compete on an unlevel playing field due to their school’s relatively poor positioning 
and funding.  This mindset provided the proper orientation and motivation for the 
strategic moves to succeed. 
Organizational acceptance and experience with reconstructionist moves.  Each 
school studied allowed faculty entrepreneurs to individually pursue reconstructionist 
moves and to do so in the name of the school.  This freedom allowed faculty 
entrepreneurs to succeed, albeit still largely through their own individual efforts.  In these 
cases, the schools’ experiences with other reconstructionist moves also bolstered faculty 
and administrators willingness to pursue the strategic moves studied. 
Use of reconstructionist principles during implementation (RQ2).  In response 
to Research Question 2 regarding how the principles of reconstructionist strategy were 
employed, the findings are summarized below according to Kim and Mauborgne’s 
(2005a) six principles of blue ocean strategy. 
Reconstruct market boundaries. 
Appeared to occur naturally through contact with external constituencies.  
Industry partners and school alumni readily offered assistance in identifying uncontested 
markets. 
Focus on the big picture, not the numbers.   
Organizational structure fostered natural big picture focus.  Both faculty 
entrepreneurs and administrators seemed to focus on the big picture, and neither the 
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individual faculty entrepreneurs, nor the school faculties where they served, mandated the 
numbers-based focus common in corporate environments. 
Reach beyond existing demand.   
Lack of organizational support drove search beyond existing demand.  The 
faculty entrepreneurs in each case were forced to seek new demand, as they could not 
compete well with generalist players.  Furthermore, the lack of subsidies from the 
business schools meant the strategic move had to largely stand on its own at each step of 
the way which incentivized the faculty to cast a wide net for new demand. 
Get the strategic sequence right.   
Lack of organizational support forced the correct sequence.  In this somewhat 
counterintuitive finding, either the strategic sequence was correct or the move would 
have simply withered and died due to a lack of organizational support.  In each of these 
three cases, there was a clear market need that the schools could supply at a price point 
acceptable to the customer while maintaining a positive margin to fuel continued program 
growth. 
Overcome key organizational hurdles. 
 Individual faculty success was an initial requirement.  The individual faculty 
entrepreneur who originally took interest and ownership in the move was required to 
successfully get the program off the ground prior to much internal discussion about 
resources and prioritization.  In each of these cases, the faculty entrepreneurs were 
tenured faculty and well respected across the board by their colleagues. 
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 Innovation was supported, but institutionalization was uncertain.  While 
individual faculty were allowed and even encouraged to innovate, no clear pathway 
emerged for faculty entrepreneurs to institutionalize the strategic move they had 
successfully launched as a core part of the schools’ strategies. 
Build execution into the strategy.   
 Lack of a mechanism to steer resources to a successful move.  Even when a move 
was successful and added significant value to the overall school, no formal process 
existed by which the strategic moves could receive additional funding and resources to 
support continued success. 
 Little use to bolster general market visibility and position.  Even when a move 
was successful, these schools did not seem to make widespread use of this success to 
advance the overall position of the school. 
Connection between strategic moves and overall school performance (RQ3).  
In response to Research Question 3 regarding the impacts on performance at the overall 
business schools as a result of the reconstructionist moves studied, the two findings are 
summarized below. 
Reputation, branding, and external constituencies.   
Increased visibility, strong corporate partnerships, and global differentiation 
were aided by reconstructionist moves.  Successful reconstructionist moves did seem to 
bring substantial benefit to the schools in this study by way of increased visibility 
especially on a national and international basis, stronger corporate partnerships which 
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aided in marketing the school’s programs, and differentiation in the crowded generalist 
market for management education. 
Internal capabilities and internal constituencies.   
Internal capabilities, competencies, and finances were strengthened.  Each of the 
strategic moves studied was a vehicle for the schools to build unique faculty 
competencies, draw better students to the school, and return a positive financial margin to 
the school for use in continued program development. 
Discussion of the Findings 
 This was an exploratory study as virtually no research has been published to date 
on business school competitive strategy.  By using the extant research on 
reconstructionist strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005a; Kim & Mauborgne, 2009) within 
the context of collegiate business schools, this study serves to further the understanding 
of the applicability of reconstructionist strategy in business schools.  The intent of this 
section is to discuss how these three cases set within the context of collegiate business 
schools integrate with existing research on reconstructionist strategy and also where they 
diverge from the extant research done in other organizational contexts. 
Business school rankings are often the dominant factor in business school strategy 
and action (Corley & Gioia, 2000; Holbrook, 2007) as business schools experience 
significant peer pressure to play the rankings game (Corley & Gioia, 2000).  In many 
ways, business schools are trapped in the rankings game akin to an animal being trapped 
in a cage.  Institutional theory, which often uses this metaphor of being trapped in an iron 
cage, offers an explanation of the isomorphism in collegiate business schools by 
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hypothesizing that past decisions and behavior patterns are converted into organizational 
myths and rituals that are followed even when they do not necessarily advance the goals 
of the organization (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987).  This isomorphism of 
strategy and approach to the market by business schools was evident even in this 
exploratory study of two schools with known affinities for breaking free of the cage to 
pursue reconstructionist strategies.   
The success of the three reconstructionist strategies examined in this study in 
delivering additional students, funding, and visibility to the Diamond and Pilot schools 
would seem to indicate that at least some of the isomorphism experienced by business 
schools is mimetic as opposed to being normative or coercive.  In other words, business 
schools’ leaders have, at least in some part, chosen to mimic the strategies of other 
successful schools because they thought any difference would make their schools less 
attractive (Porter & McKibbin, 1988).  The issue with this is that it leads to a market 
flooded with similar offerings and a commoditization of management education.  These 
three cases are examples of where schools have partially broken away from the mimetic 
isomorphism driven by rankings, and defined their schools as leaders in management 
education via a different pathway than simply playing the rankings game.  The only 
hesitancy on the part of these two schools to remain the same as all other schools was 
seen in the marketing and promotion of these reconstructionist moves as a central part of 
the school’s general marketing and positioning.  In these cases, it seemed that the pull of 
mimetic isomorphism usually won out, and the schools chose not to highlight what makes 
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them different, instead choosing a direct generalist approach in spite of their poor 
position for success with this approach. 
Environmental and organizational factors influencing pursuit (RQ1).  
According to Kim and Mauborgne (2009), the environmental attractiveness of a market, 
an organization’s capabilities and resources, and the organization’s orientation for 
competition or innovation are the three primary drivers for whether a reconstructionist 
strategy should be pursued.  The findings from the three business school cases studied 
generally align with these three categories of factors.  Previous research has clearly 
communicated that the management education market is becoming increasingly crowded 
(Friga et al., 2003; Khurana, 2007), and the competitive landscape is becoming 
increasingly global (AACSB, 2011).  In these cases, the faculty and administrators from 
all three schools viewed the market for generalized management education as crowded 
and global with the competition growing fiercer with each passing day. 
 Previous research has also shown that organizations would do well to assess 
whether they can compete in direct competition or whether an alternative approach is 
preferable (Friga et al., 2003; Kim & Mauborgne, 2005).  Friga et al. (2003) advised 
business schools who cannot compete directly in a generalist market to compete on the 
basis of their core competencies in a way that differentiates a school from the crowded 
field of competitors.  The faculty and administrators interviewed at the Diamond and 
Pilot Business Schools seem to have incorporated this line of thinking as they have 
pursued alternative or reconstructionist strategies due to their poor positioning to compete 
solely in a head-to-head fashion.  However, contrary to previous research in corporate 
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(Kim & Mauborgne, 2005a) and educational (Friga et al., 2003) contexts, the schools did 
not possess significant demonstrated competencies in the uncontested markets chosen 
prior to the decision to pursue these markets. 
For example, the Pilot School did not have a particular expertise in healthcare or 
physician leadership prior to pursuing the Physician Executive MBA Program nor was 
the faculty entrepreneur for the Shopper Marketing Forum the expert that he has since 
become although these two Pilot faculty members did possess foundational skills and 
strong competencies in key adjacent areas.  The PEMBA Director was a strategy and 
management professor, and the Shopper Marketing Forum Director was known within 
general marketing and supply chain management sectors across which the shopper 
marketing bridge has been built.  The Diamond School was the closest of the cases 
studied to possessing a core competency prior to the pursuit of an uncontested 
marketplace, but this is only because Diamond had developed several courses in luxury 
goods as a result of their initial partnership with the luxury goods industry a few years 
prior to the launch of the MBA program which was the focus of this study.  In contrast to 
the literature, the schools used faculty who were willing to learn quickly, coupled with 
the expertise of industry partners, to quickly build a competency while the programs were 
being launched. 
 An organizational orientation toward innovation was the third major factor upon 
which the decision to pursue a reconstructionist strategy should be made (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 2009).  This organizational proclivity toward innovation was clearly seen in 
the three cases examined, and it was credited by virtually all of the participants 
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interviewed as being one of the factors foundational to the success of the strategic moves 
studied.  As this study examined only two business schools, both of which clearly had an 
orientation for innovation, it is not known whether an individual faculty entrepreneur 
could be successful individually innovating in the loosely coupled organizational 
structure of a business school that was not typically supportive of such innovative 
behavior.  An important idiosyncrasy that emerged from this study is that a school’s 
organizational orientation toward innovation does not necessarily directly translate into 
organizational support and a formal process that nurtures innovation.  This orientation 
toward innovation simply means that the school supports the notion of their faculty 
championing innovative activities. 
Use of reconstructionist principles during implementation (RQ2).  Through 
intensive study of over 150 companies across 120 years, Kim & Mauborgne (2005a) 
identified six principles that repeatedly emerged as organizations successfully pursued 
uncontested markets.  The findings of this study generally support the applicability of 
these six principles within the context of business schools; however, the unusual 
organizational structure of loosely coupled academic organizations posed special 
challenges, especially on principles five and six.  A short discussion of how each of Kim 
and Mauborgne’s (2005a) principles manifested in these three cases follows and is also 
summarized in Table 5 below. 
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Table 5 -- Comparison of Blue Ocean Principles with Study Findings 
Blue Ocean 
Strategy principles 
Kim & Mauborgne 
(2005a) findings 
Current study findings in the business 
school context 
Reconstruct 
market boundaries 
Complete the difficult 
process of reconstructing 
or reconceptualizing a 
market. 
Whether through altruistic or self-
serving motives, external 
constituencies seemed to make this 
process fairly straightforward. 
Focus on the big 
picture, not the 
numbers 
Communicate well, 
especially with 
employees and 
customers, and do not 
have a myopic focus on 
numbers. 
Individual faculty entrepreneurs 
working directly with external 
constituencies in the loosely coupled 
organizational structure of a business 
school seemed to foster a big picture 
focus and avoid the obsession with 
numbers found in corporate 
organizations. 
Reach beyond 
existing demand 
Focus on non-customers 
to identify and capture 
new markets. 
The natural connection with external 
constituencies from the beginning 
combined with a general lack of 
internal organizational support drove 
individual faculty toward non-
customers. 
Get the strategic 
sequence right 
Establish market 
demand, market pricing, 
and how to earn a profit 
before launch.  Do not 
allow R&D funding to 
facilitate bypassing this 
sequence. 
By working with external 
constituencies from the outset and 
having to rely on them even for start-up 
funding, the strategic sequence had to 
be followed.  A lack of internal R&D 
funding ultimately seemed to drive the 
correct strategic sequence. 
Overcome key 
organizational 
hurdles 
Achieve buy-in 
throughout the 
organization and 
institutionalize the new 
move into the culture. 
Business schools offered a nurturing 
environment for the individual faculty 
entrepreneurs, but no clear path 
emerged for institutionalizing these 
strategic moves beyond individual 
faculty or small teams. 
Build execution 
into strategy 
Create a culture that 
executes the spirit of the 
strategy as a natural part 
of the organization. 
Owing to confusion over how to 
institutionalize a successful strategic 
move, it was unsurprising that schools 
also did not seem to fully embrace the 
moves and integrate them with their 
overall strategies. 
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 Many organizations are not adept at systematically searching for blue oceans or 
uncontested markets; therefore, they do not even see the possibility of establishing new 
markets.  To address this gap, “reconstructing market boundaries,” the first principle of 
Blue Ocean Strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 2009) offers a systematic method to search for 
uncontested markets, and this is helpful to organizations which are generally competing 
without significant help from external constituencies.   
In contrast to what Kim and Mauborgne (2005a) described, the business schools 
in the cases studied were significantly aided by external constituencies such as corporate 
partners and alumni, many of whom either have an altruistic desire to see the school 
succeed or a self-serving desire for the school to produce better educated students and 
more relevant research.  This assistance from external constituencies was the driving 
force in the reconstruction of market boundaries in each of these three cases.  Therefore, 
it is deeply concerning that, in general, business schools have deprioritized their 
relationships with industry partners and alumni, instead choosing to pursue increasing 
scientific rigor as part of a strong scholarly guild (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005; Harmon, 
2006; Khurana, 2007; Lorsch, 2009; Pfeffer & Fong, 2002).  This divergence of faculty 
and the practitioners that they purport to serve does not support the process of 
reconstructing market boundaries through conversations with external constituencies as 
seen in the three cases in this study. 
 The second principle, “focus on the big picture, not the numbers,” entreats 
organizational leaders to wade through the muddle and advance a clear, coherent strategy 
for any move that is undertaken.  In the typical corporate environment, many individuals 
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would normally be involved in the pursuit of a strategic move, so how that move is 
communicated across the organization and customers becomes vitally important.  In the 
cases studied, the teams were much smaller than would typically be found in the 
corporate environment; in fact, one faculty entrepreneur performed the lion’s share of the 
work in each of these studies.   
In these three cases, a faculty entrepreneur, working in conjunction with a very 
small team of other faculty and administrators, was able to get the big picture into sharp 
focus.  Kim and Mauborgne (2005a) highlighted the importance of involving employees, 
key partners, and customers in this process, as they often know the business best.  This 
involvement was the critical step in each of these three cases.  Faculty entrepreneurs, who 
align most closely to the employees used in Blue Ocean Strategy vernacular, were drawn 
into conversations with industry partners and even potential students who served in the 
roles of key partners and customers respectively.  These conversations ultimately led to 
the sharp focus on the big picture. 
In the third principle, which is to “reach beyond existing demand,” the external 
constituencies of industry partners and potential students also helped to drive business 
schools toward new demand and new customers.  Kim and Mauborgne (2005a) note the 
abilities of non-customers to provide critical insight into expanding demand to new 
customers.  The Diamond International Luxury Brand Management MBA and the Pilot 
PEMBA both offer examples of how non-customers offered critical insight into required 
program attributes.  Another factor that has applied additional pressure for faculty and 
administrators to look for non-customers is the increasing competition within the 
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generalized market and the saturation it has brought to generalist management education 
(Bennis & O’Toole, 2005, Friga et al., 2003, Iniquez de Onzoño & Carmona, 2007; 
Khurana, 2007). 
In the fourth principle, entitled “getting the strategic sequence right,” Kim and 
Mauborgne (2005a) identified the importance of first establishing market demand, before 
second verifying an acceptable market price, before third and finally ensuring that a profit 
can be made at this market price.  In corporate settings, cross-subsidation of new product 
or service launches is commonplace, and this practice is useful to gain momentum ahead 
of the release of the new product or service.  Unfortunately, it also has the tendency to 
reduce the criticality of following the strategic sequence discussed above, as it does not 
force an organization to immediately take into account market feedback about the 
demand and pricing of the new product or service.   
In the three cases studied, the faculty entrepreneurs used external sources of 
funding to support the front-end costs of their programs.  As these front-end resources 
were obtained from future customers and key collaborators, this was a natural validation 
that the process of “getting the strategic sequence right” had happened.  In other words, 
the future customers and key collaborators would not have expended time and financial 
resources if there was no market demand at the price point offered.  This is a bit 
counterintuitive as formal business cases and pro forma financial statements were not 
commonplace in these cases as they likely would be in a corporate environment; 
however, the deep participation of the external partners in the early planning stages and a 
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total reliance upon them for financial support during the launch seemed to help force the 
correct strategic sequence. 
The fifth and sixth principles, “overcoming key organizational hurdles” and 
“building execution into the strategy”, are critical as an organization can reject even a 
sensible reconstructionist move for a variety of reasons.  If proponents of a strategic 
move are not able to clear the cognitive, resource, motivational, and political hurdles 
within their own organizations while using fair process to build trust and commitment, 
Kim and Mauborgne (2005a) found that strategic moves usually did not find success.  
The context of business schools in this study presented a special challenge for these two 
principles, namely the loosely coupled organizational structures and the freedom given to 
tenured faculty who comprise the overwhelming majority of the human resource pool at 
the Diamond and Pilot Business Schools. 
The findings from this study do support the existence of the cognitive, resource, 
motivational, and political hurdles as articulated by Kim and Mauborgne (2005a).  In 
addition, the use of fair process to build trust and commitment (Kim & Mauborgne, 
2005a) was important in these schools where most faculty have lifetime tenure and the 
freedom to focus on topics of their choosing.  However, the four hurdles outlined by Kim 
and Mauborgne (2005a) do not sufficiently describe the organizational challenges that 
must be addressed to ensure the success of the reconstructionist moves in the business 
schools studied.   
Unlike corporate organizations, business schools often operate from a default 
strategy of sorts.  Essentially, each tenured faculty member works individually to make 
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the most substantial impact possible within their research and teaching, and then the 
aggregate of these individual efforts becomes a default generalist strategy used by the 
school to compete.  The administration does attempt to layer on top a measure of 
coordination and positioning, but the freedom of the tenured faculty to do what they want 
and at the speed they want creates inertia to employ this generalist default strategy. 
In each of these three cases, the faculty behind these strategic moves overcame 
the inertia of a strictly generalist default strategy and led their programs to “success”.  
However, it was apparent that this “success” does not mean that the programs were 
accepted by faculty and administrators as key components of strategy and were given 
appropriate attention and the resources they needed to continue their growth.  Instead, 
“success” meant acceptance of the program as a part of what the schools does, and a 
recognition that the faculty members working on a given move will be allowed to 
continue to do so assuming they do not require any internal funding that would be 
siphoned from other faculty endeavors.  Unlike in corporate organizations, no clear path 
emerged for institutionalization of successful moves.  In addition, the schools did not 
seem to prioritize human and financial resources for the reconstructionist programs, nor 
did faculty and administrators decide to include a program as a key component of an 
organizational level strategy.   
The Pilot School does have an organizational strategy that prioritizes four 
strategic moves, and administrators have prioritized extremely limited resources toward 
these four strategic moves.  However, it is not apparent that faculty hiring, which was 
noted by Pilot faculty as the only way to institutionalize a strategic move, or any 
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significant resource allocation is driven by this organizational strategy.  Instead, hiring 
decisions seem to tend toward hiring the best faculty available, irrespective of their focus, 
which directly supports the generalist default strategy introduced above.  Meanwhile, the 
PEMBA program and the Shopper Marketing Forum, are required to continually resell 
their value to the Pilot School faculty and administrators.  The potential impacts of these 
programs are likely muted by ongoing resource constraints and limited participation.  
While the Diamond School has done more to prioritize its International Luxury Brand 
Management MBA program, the same resource constraints and disinterest in including 
this program as a key component of school strategy seem to remain.  In particular, there 
is extremely little faculty involvement outside of a couple of key faculty entrepreneurs. 
The principles outlined by Kim and Mauborgne (2005a) do seem to generally 
apply within the business school context; however, the additional complexity as 
described above was noted on principles five and six.  In sum, the unique organizational 
structures found in these two business schools tend to naturally nurture and guide 
individual faculty through the initial stages of innovation.  The freedom given to 
individual faculty entrepreneurs, the insight and finances that come with the investment 
of key industry partners, and the lack of systematic organizational support for new moves 
combine to successfully funnel reconstructionist moves through the first four principles 
outlined by Kim and Mauborgne (2005a).   
On the other hand, when it comes to principles five and six, already successful 
strategic moves seem to suffer through repeated exposure to organization hurdles.  This 
appeared to be primarily due to a lack of organizational structure and processes in place 
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to institutionalize any strategic move other than the generalist default strategy.  This 
seemed to be at least partially driven by organizational neglect on the part of faculty who 
are individually self-selecting strategies based upon a strategy’s ability to advance the 
individual faculty member’s position within the faculty guild. 
Connection between strategic moves and overall school performance (RQ3).  
Previous research has called for business schools to embrace the strategy of using 
differentiated programs to establish a market presence instead of pursuing a strictly 
generalist strategy to compete for rankings with schools who are better positioned 
(Gloeckler, 2010; Friga et al., 2003; Porter & McKibbin, 1998; Vidaver-Cohen, 2007).  
In this study, the three cases do suggest that reconstructionist strategies can assist a 
school in its overall performance and positioning.  This is particularly apparent in the 
case of the Diamond School’s International Luxury Brand Management MBA Program, 
which has provided the Diamond School with entry into the global market for students 
and corporate partners, as well as reasoning for top-ranked schools such as Dartmouth 
and the University of Chicago to partner with Diamond for access to this unique 
competency in the thriving luxury goods industry.  
Diamond School faculty and administrators were quick to note that while the 
International Luxury Brand Management MBA is certainly a contributor to Diamond’s 
success, other initiatives happened in parallel that may also have contributed to 
Diamond’s success.  Whatever the exact contribution of each strategic component, the 
Diamond School has climbed to be a Top 10 ranked business school in Europe according 
to a major ranking.  A significant internationalization of the student body, faculty, and 
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curriculum have aided in this climb, and the International Luxury Brand Management 
MBA has been a vehicle through which Diamond has bolstered these key areas. 
Vidaver-Cohen (2007) suggested that schools would benefit from “adopting a 
strategic approach to reputation management—positioning themselves on specific 
characteristics highly valued by their own unique constituents” (p. 301).  Based upon the 
three cases studied, this seems to still be a missing piece in the puzzle for the Diamond 
and Pilot Schools.  Although they have launched programming which differentiates them 
from other schools, school administration has not foregrounded these unique programs in 
the marketing, branding, and positioning activities of their schools.  Instead, the Diamond 
and Pilot Schools continue to position themselves primarily on generic criteria that can be 
claimed by many schools in the marketplace.  Both schools heavily promote their 
reconstructionist moves, but they seem to do so only for the purpose of advertising the 
moves themselves, and not in an attempt to improve the overall position of the school 
through highlighting the innovativeness and uniqueness of its programs. 
The globalization of management education has created opportunities for schools 
to position themselves in a global market based upon their unique competencies or 
strengths and therefore have access to a vast number of new prospective customers and 
industry partners (AACSB, 2011).  Both the Diamond School International Luxury Brand 
Management MBA and the Pilot School PEMBA program compete in a global market 
and have brought diversity of perspective and students to their respective schools.  These 
programs are helping their schools become established successes in the globalizing 
market of management education.  Owing to its relatively recent creation about two years 
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ago, the Shopper Marketing Forum has not yet attracted a global set of partners and 
students; however, the Forum Director has plans to potentially expand in this direction in 
the future.  In these three cases, the schools have accessed a global customer base and 
industry partners that would have been unlikely if they had chosen to pursue only 
generalist programming. 
Methodological Considerations 
 Previous research has identified the hesitancy of business school faculty and 
administrators to discuss their strategy and management processes (Starkey & Tiratsoo, 
2007), and this same hesitancy has been observed in other corporate settings where 
strategic decisions are being made (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984).  Typically, a study will use 
pseudonyms for the organizations and individuals involved to disguise the context and 
allow for more freedom of discussion.  The unique nature of the reconstructionist moves 
under study and the limited number of faculty involved in these moves lessens the 
effectiveness of the organizational pseudonyms used throughout this study and may 
expose the participants to questioning by colleagues, administrators, and external 
constituencies.  As it is imperative that research of this type continues due to the 
challenges facing business school faculty and administrators, several further 
accommodations have been made in the preparation of this manuscript. 
 At the organizational level, some references to competitors, media coverage, 
rankings, and corporate partners were omitted from this final report.  While these factors 
would likely further strengthen this study’s findings and conclusions, their omission 
allows the gracious participants in this study and their schools to possess a bit more 
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anonymity.  The more critical challenge faced in this study was maintaining some sense 
of individual anonymity.  Although most participants in this study are tenured, if 
dissenting opinions or points of view become known, it could negatively affect their 
effectiveness and work climate.  During the course of the study, it became apparent that 
single faculty entrepreneurs or administrators served in key roles for each of these moves.  
Furthermore, most of the participants remain with the Diamond and Pilot Schools serving 
in leadership positions or positions affiliated with these moves, so extreme care was taken 
to not unnecessarily attribute their dissenting or differing positions when it did not 
materially affect the findings of the study.  Often this could be accomplished simply 
through attributing a quote more generically to “a Diamond faculty member” or similar.   
The documents and interviews for each case converged onto an extremely clear 
picture, and very few discrepancies in accounts arose.  This led to the researcher’s 
decision to forgo the member check process (Merriam, 1998) that was included in the 
original study design.  This decision was made as the potential for faculty to censor 
portions of this research that might expose their dissenting opinions was much greater 
than any additional clarity that might be gained through the member check process.  A 
secondary factor also considered in this decision is the fact that faculty who are quoted on 
controversial positions in an attributable way will be able to deflect controversy onto the 
researcher instead of being forced to defend themselves in addition to shouldering the 
extreme load for the reconstructionist moves they are tasked with leading.  This added 
layer of protection for the participants would not have been possible if such a clear 
picture of these moves had not arisen from the interviews and documents reviewed. 
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Conclusions 
 Based upon the extant research on collegiate business schools, literature about the 
use of reconstructionist strategy in business contexts, and the findings from this study, it 
is reasonable to conclude the following. 
1. The pursuit of a reconstructionist strategy is a viable pathway for business schools 
that have assessed the environmental attractiveness of the market in which they 
compete, their own organizational capabilities and resources to directly compete 
or innovate, and their school’s orientation for competition or innovation. 
2. The organizational structure and governance methods typical of academic 
environments simultaneously nurture innovation from individual faculty 
entrepreneurs in early stages through program launches and dampen the 
possibility that successful reconstructionist moves will be institutionalized due to 
a lack of organizational process and organizational will.   
3. Reconstructionist moves do not naturally fit into the paradigm of the generalist 
default competitive strategy employed by schools due to the lack of coordination 
on the part of tenured faculty and administrators and the strong influence from 
rankings to compete in a generalist fashion based upon ranking criteria. 
4. The success of reconstructionist moves are not being fully utilized to boost a 
school’s overall positioning and performance as they do not align with the 
generalist default competitive strategy driven by faculty who pursue individual 
interests and by administrators who pursue an organizational generalist default 
competitive strategy due to pressure from rankings and tenured faculty. 
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These conclusions are drawn from and applicable to the three strategic moves at the 
Diamond and Pilot Business Schools detailed in this study. 
Implications for Practice 
 The stakes are high for the business school administrators and faculty that are 
charged with leading in an environment marked by increased competition (Harmon, 
2006) and being deeply changed through its globalization (AACSB, 2011).  This entire 
study should be of interest to those faculty and administrators charged with the 
responsibility to lead their business school during this challenging time, but two specific 
topics are highlighted below which may be of particular interest. 
 First, business school leaders should be aware of the opportunity that they may 
have to substantially alter their position in the marketplace through the use of 
reconstructionist moves.  Instead of relying solely on direct competition in the rankings, 
the use of reconstructionist moves may allow a school to work directly with industry 
partners and even potential students to identify uncontested markets and then capture 
those markets without the necessity of costly direct competition.  These differentiated 
programs may be the entry point for relationships with top-ranked, high visibility schools 
as was the case for Diamond when top-ranked schools wanted access for their students to 
the luxury goods industry.  By forming relationships with other schools who are already 
top ranked, it would likely be easier to climb in the rankings.  The opportunities 
presented by the globalization of management education add further credence to why 
now may be a good time to pursue a reconstructionist strategy if the market environment, 
the school’s capabilities, and organizational orientation warrant it.  Finally, this is an 
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opportunity to engage in substantive dialogue with industry partners and key alumni who 
may be able to help shed light on an opportunity to which the faculty and administration 
have no insight. 
 The second major implication for practice is the opportunity for business school 
administrators to use successful reconstructionist moves as a way to stake out a 
differentiated position within an increasingly crowded marketplace.  This will likely not 
be in lieu of the pursuit for higher rankings, but it does appear that reconstructionist 
moves may provide a story or a platform from which a school can position itself as 
unique and valuable to a particular group of constituencies.  If business school 
administrators are able to develop and execute an integrated marketing strategy to 
communicate to their constituencies about this differentiation, positive benefits will likely 
accrue from the differentiation.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
 As this was an exploratory study that was designed to begin bridging the gap 
between collegiate business school strategy and corporate strategy as represented by Kim 
& Mauborgne’s (2005a) Blue Ocean Strategy, significant opportunity remains for future 
research.  Based upon this initial study, a few particular areas of immediate interest 
follow. 
• An exploratory case study or experiment where Blue Ocean Strategy principles 
are used from the outset of the pursuit of a strategic move within a collegiate 
business school or other university context. 
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• Research that illuminates how an academic organizational structure can be 
modified or hybridized to stay true to the collegial and scholarly ideals of 
academe but also better support the needs and realities of today’s academic 
marketplace. 
• A broad-based study to survey the use of reconstructionist moves in the context of 
collegiate business schools and how these schools have used these moves to better 
their overall school performance and position. 
• A broad-based study to provide further confirmation that Blue Ocean Strategy 
principles hold in an academic environment and where modifications to these 
principles need to occur to support vastly different organizational goals and 
structures. 
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II. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
 
The purpose of this case study will be to explore the pursuit, implementation, and 
potential performance effects of a type of reconstructionist strategy, Blue Ocean 
Strategy, within the context of two collegiate business schools. Blue Ocean Strategy, 
is a reconstructionist strategy which calls for an organization to pursue distinctiveness 
and uncontested markets instead of relying solely on direct competition.   
 
This study will use a case study methodology to examine three strategic moves 
undertaken at two collegiate business schools to explore the use of Blue Ocean 
Strategy within this environment.  As no study has been undertaken involving the 
utilization of Blue Ocean Strategy within the context of higher education, this case 
study will function primarily as an explorative study. 
 
Business schools are currently the subject of much criticism from their internal (e.g. 
faculty and students) and external constituencies (e.g., business community) who are 
not happy with the performance or direction of business education.  The increasing 
prevalence and importance of school and program rankings have further intensified 
the competitive environment as a large number of schools jockey for a limited 
number of high positions in the rankings.  Globalization is also changing the 
competitive landscape for business schools, and research has suggested that the 
pursuit of differentiation may become a defining characteristic of a globalized system 
of business education.   
 
Business school leaders need to better understand the strategic options available to 
them as they lead their schools in this rapidly changing environment.  This study will 
add to their knowledge as Blue Ocean Strategy has not been formally investigated 
within this context. 
 
Research objectives include: 
• Obtain a better understanding of the utilization of Blue Ocean Strategy as an 
alternative to direct competition for business schools. 
• Better understand how the pursuit of distinctiveness and uncontested markets 
may advance the mission and position a business school for success in a 
market currently characterized by rankings and the demands of globalization. 
• Identify idiosyncrasies in the utilization of Blue Ocean Strategy within the 
context of a collegiate business school. 
 
III. DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
The case study will focus on three strategic moves undertaken by two business 
schools which were purposively chosen because of their history of launching 
distinctive programming.   
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The researcher will request to interview faculty, staff members, and administration 
who are involved (or were involved in the past) in each of these strategic moves.  It is 
expected that each strategic move will involve between two and five people for a 
maximum of fifteen participants. 
 
IV. METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
 
Aligning with established case study methodology, this study will use interviews and 
documents as data sources. 
 
Interviews-Between 10 and 15 one-on-one in-depth semi-structured interviews will 
be conducted as a part of this study.  Interviews will be conducted in-person and will 
last on average 60-90 minutes.  They will be scheduled in the participants’ offices or 
at another place of the participants choosing so long as the location will support the 
privacy and quiet environment needed.  Follow-up interviews may be conducted in-
person or via telephone/email as necessary to gain a thorough understanding of the 
strategic moves. 
 
Informed consent will be obtained from each participant prior to the interview 
through the use of a written document following the UT IRB template.  Participants 
will be reminded that their participation is voluntary, and that they may withdraw 
from the study at any time for any reason without penalty.   
 
An interview protocol will be used as a part of these semi-structured interviews.  The 
purpose of the interviews will be to understand more about the strategic moves as 
elaborated by items in the numbered list below.  The interview protocol is attached. 
 
1. Describe the objectives of the particular program under study. 
2. Describe why this particular program was pursued by the school. 
3. Describe how the decision was made and the factors considered as a part of 
the decision to launch this program. 
4. Are there competitors to this program? What are the similarities and 
differences between competitors and this program? 
5. What features do competing programs offer that this program also offers? 
What features differentiate this program from others? 
6. How did the school come to understand the features which were not being 
fulfilled as a part of competitive programs? 
7. Describe the history of the program launch and how it was initially received 
by potential customers, competitors, and the constituencies of the school. 
8. Has this program affected the positioning of the overall school? If so, how? 
 
As these interviews will be semi-structured, follow-up questions, probes, and 
investigation of other related areas will be pursued by the researcher as a part of these 
interviews.  
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The interviews will be audio taped with the permission of each participant.  A 
transcriptionist will be used to transcribe the interviews from the audio tape; the 
transcriptionist will complete a pledge of confidentiality following the template 
provided by the UT IRB.  Detailed field notes will be taken by the researcher during 
and immediately after each interview to capture any physical details, body language, 
or other data relevant to the inquiry. 
 
Documents-The research will first collect public documents related to these programs 
and use these documents to better understand the nature of the programs in 
preparation for the interviews discussed above.  Public documents will include data 
from the internet including webpages, new releases, articles, blogs, and other 
commentary.  Public documents also include promotional or informational materials 
provided by the schools.  The researcher will also request that the participants provide 
other relevant documentation regarding the strategic moves under study. 
 
Methods and Analysis-All data will be securely maintained in a locked cabinet (328 
Haslam) or on a password protected hard drive which will also be securely stored.  
No one outside of the primary researcher and his advisor will have access to the data.  
Data will be analyzed using an inductive process as established by the scholarly 
literature on case study qualitative methodology.  This methodology involves 
repeated reading and rereading of documents and transcripts to identify emergent 
themes, coding the documents and transcripts for these themes, and then comparing 
them across the breadth of the data collected, with themes from other strategic moves, 
and with the established literature base in this area.  
 
V. SPECIFIC RISKS AND PROTECTION MEASURES 
 
Risks associated with this study are very minimal.  Study participants will be faculty, 
staff, and administrators who are familiar with scholarly research and who have 
voluntarily agreed to participate in this study.  Data collected will be securely stored; 
only the researcher and his faculty advisor will have access to the data from the study.  
Participants will complete a signed Informed Consent Form that clearly assures them 
of the confidentiality of any data provided and reminds them that they can withdraw 
from the study at any time without penalty.  Many of the documents which will be 
collected are already in the public domain. 
 
VI. BENEFITS 
 
As noted above, business schools are in a tough competitive environment, and 
business school leaders need to understand the strategic options available to them.  
This study will add to the body of knowledge available for these leaders to draw from 
as they make strategic decisions.  If Blue Ocean Strategy is identified as a legitimate 
strategic option for business schools, it could potentially open a new pathway by 
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which schools could serve their constituencies without having to engage in costly and 
debilitating direct competition based solely upon the rankings.  Finally, this study will 
also lay the initial groundwork for Blue Ocean Strategy to be investigated in other 
areas of higher education. 
 
VII. METHODS FOR OBTAINING "INFORMED CONSENT" FROM 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
Each participant will be asked to sign an Informed Consent Form prior to the 
commencement of an interview or any other participation in the study.  The Informed 
Consent Form for this study is attached. 
 
The researcher will read and present the Informed Consent Form to the participant 
and collect their signature.  A copy of the Form will be given to the participant, and 
the original will be maintained as a part of the securely held project records. 
 
VIII. QUALIFICATIONS OF THE INVESTIGATOR(S) TO CONDUCT 
RESEARCH 
 
The researcher is completing this study in fulfillment of the dissertation requirement 
for a Doctor of Philosophy degree (Higher Education Administration Major).  The 
researcher has completed significant doctoral level coursework in research 
methodology including a philosophy of science class, a research methods class, a 
qualitative research methods class, a class focused entirely on the use of the case 
study method within qualitative research, and three other research courses in 
quantitative research methods.  The researcher has also completed all required 
training modules as prescribed by the UT Office of Research. 
 
In addition, the researcher is familiar with business school history and the competitive 
environment as well as Blue Ocean Strategy through a thorough review of the 
scholarly literature in these areas. 
 
IX. FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT TO BE USED IN THE RESEARCH  
 
Interviews will be conducted in the participants’ office or in another mutually agreed 
upon location.  Data will be kept in 328 Haslam.  A computer will be used for 
analysis and preparation of the written report; data will be securely maintained with 
password protection. 
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X. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRINCIPAL/CO-PRINCIPAL 
INVESTIGATOR(S) 
 
The following information must be entered verbatim into this section: 
 
By compliance with the policies established by the Institutional Review Board of 
The University of Tennessee the principal investigator(s) subscribe to the principles 
stated in "The Belmont Report" and standards of professional ethics in all research, 
development, and related activities involving human subjects under the auspices of 
The University of Tennessee. The principal investigator(s) further agree that: 
 
1. Approval will be obtained from the Institutional Review Board prior to 
instituting any change in this research project.  
 
2. Development of any unexpected risks will be immediately reported to 
Research Compliance Services.  
 
3. An annual review and progress report (Form R) will be completed and 
submitted when requested by the Institutional Review Board. 
 
4. Signed informed consent documents will be kept for the duration of the 
project and for at least three years thereafter at a location approved by the 
Institutional Review Board. 
 
XI. SIGNATURES 
 
ALL SIGNATURES MUST BE ORIGINAL. The Principal Investigator should keep the 
original copy of the Form B and submit a copy with original signatures for review. Type 
the name of each individual above the appropriate signature line. Add signature lines for 
all Co-Principal Investigators, collaborating and student investigators, faculty advisor(s), 
department head of the Principal Investigator, and the Chair of the Departmental Review 
Committee. The following information should be typed verbatim, with added categories 
where needed: 
 
Principal Investigator: Shay Scott 
 
               
Signature: _________________________  Date: ____________________ 
 
 
Student Advisor (if any): Dr. E. Grady Bogue 
 
 
Signature: __________________________   Date: ___________________ 
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XII. DEPARTMENT REVIEW AND APPROVAL 
 
The application described above has been reviewed by the IRB departmental review 
committee and has been approved. The DRC further recommends that this 
application be reviewed as: 
 
[ ] Expedited Review -- Category(s): ______________________ 
 
OR 
 
[ ] Full IRB Review 
 
 
Chair, DRC: ________________________________________________________ 
 
Signature: ____________________________   Date: _________________ 
 
 
Department Head: _____________________________________________ 
 
Signature: ____________________________   Date: _________________ 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Protocol sent to Research Compliance Services for final approval on (Date): 
___________ 
 
Approved: 
 
 Research Compliance Services  
Office of Research 
1534 White Avenue 
 
Signature: ____________________________   Date: _________________ 
 
 
For additional information on Form B, contact the Office of Research Compliance 
Officer or by phone at (865) 974-3466. 
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Appendix B 
INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT  
 
Sailing Blue Oceans in Search of Blue Ribbons: A Case Study of the Application of 
Reconstructionist Strategy in Collegiate Business Schools 
 
INTRODUCTION  
You are invited to participate in a study exploring the use of differentiation as an 
alternative strategy to a sole reliance on direct competition within the context of 
collegiate business schools. 
 
The goals of this research are to explore: 
• The applicability of a type of differentiation strategy as an alternative to direct 
competition for business schools. 
• How the pursuit of distinctiveness and uncontested markets may advance the 
mission and position of a business school. 
• Identify idiosyncrasies in the utilization of this type of strategy within the 
context of a collegiate business school as opposed to traditional corporate 
environments. 
 
INFORMATION ABOUT PARTICIPANTS' INVOLVEMENT IN THE STUDY  
You will be asked to participate in an initial interview which will involve answering open 
ended questions about a particular strategic move with which you have been involved at 
the business schools under study.  This initial interview will last approximately 60 
minutes.  The interview will be transcribed and coded for themes which emerge. 
 
You may be asked to participate in a follow-up interview and/or provide related 
documentation to further expound upon information related to this strategic move. 
Finally, you will be asked to review the themes identified through the research to ensure 
that they align with the information collected through the interview and documentation 
process. 
 
The total time required for participation in this study will be between two and six hours 
depending upon the necessity of follow-up interviews and the amount of time you spend 
reviewing the draft provided by the researcher. 
 
RISKS  
Risks to participants are minimal.  Pseudonyms will be used in place of your real identity 
as part of any written research report although there is a distinct possibility that readers 
will be able to ascertain your true identity as the strategic moves under study are highly 
differentiated. 
 
________ Participant's initials 
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BENEFITS 
This study will add to the body of knowledge available for business school leaders as 
they make strategic decisions related to their schools.  If differentiation is identified as a 
strategic option for business schools, it could potentially open a new pathway by which 
schools could serve their constituencies without having to engage in costly and 
debilitating direct competition.  This study will also lay the initial groundwork for Blue 
Ocean Strategy to be investigated in other areas of higher education. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Data collected as a part of this study will be kept confidential.  Records will be securely 
stored and will only be available to the primary researcher and his faculty advisor. 
References made in oral or written reports will use pseudonyms to minimize any direct 
link to participants to the study.  
 
CONTACT INFORMATION  
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, (or you experience 
adverse effects as a result of participating in this study,) you may contact the researcher, 
Shay Scott, at 328 Haslam Business Building, 1000 Volunteer Boulevard, Knoxville, TN, 
37996, and (865) 974-6110. If you have questions about your rights as a participant, 
contact the Office of Research Compliance Officer at (865) 974-3466.  
 
PARTICIPATION  
Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate without 
penalty. If you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the study at any time 
without penalty and without loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If you 
withdraw from the study before data collection is completed your data will be returned to 
you or destroyed. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CONSENT  
 
I have read the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I agree to 
participate in this study.  
 
 
Participant's signature ______________________________ Date __________  
 
 
 
Investigator's signature _____________________________ Date __________  
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Appendix C 
Interview Protocol 
 
1. Describe the objectives and the vision of [the particular strategic move under 
study]. 
 
2. Tell me about how the decision was made to launch this program/initiative. 
 
3.  What factors were considered as a part of the decision? 
 
4. Are there alternatives or competitors to this program? If so, what are the 
similarities and differences between competitors and this program? 
 
5. What features do alternative programs offer which are similar/identical to this 
program?  
 
6. What features differentiate this program from other alternatives? 
 
7. How did the school identify and understand the features which were absent in 
alternative programs? 
 
8. Describe what the program launch was like? How was the program initially 
received by potential customers, competitors, and the constituencies of the 
school? 
 
9. Can you tell me about any challenges the program may have faced during the 
launch or establishment phases? 
 
10. Why did the school choose to launch this program? 
 
11. How would you describe the culture of the school? How about the school’s 
orientation toward this program? 
 
12. Has this program affected the positioning of the overall school in the 
marketplace? If so, please describe how it has done so? 
 
13. Is there anything else that you feel important that I know? 
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Appendix D 
Sample correspondence from School Administration announcing the study 
 
 
Dear Faculty or Staff Member, 
 
Business schools, ours included, are under an intense amount of pressure to the meet the 
increasing expectations of their constituencies.  The addition of nontraditional 
competitors and the globalizing market for business education only serve to intensify the 
challenges associated with meeting these expectations.  We, as business faculty and staff, 
need to be innovative in how we meet these challenges. 
 
We have the opportunity to participate in a study that will examine the opportunity for 
business schools to use their core competencies to differentiate themselves from others as 
an alternative to the direct competition for rankings which marks the current 
environment.  This is important information for our school as we plot the course forward 
with a strategy to address globalization and the increasingly crowded marketplace. 
 
The primary researcher on this study, Shay Scott, will be contacting you soon to inquire 
if you would be willing to participate in this study which will require a minimal time 
commitment. 
 
Best regards, 
 
Business School Associate Dean 
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Appendix E 
Sample introductory letter to participants 
 
 
Dear Faculty or Staff Member, 
 
Recently you received a letter from the Associate Dean informing you of a study that I 
am undertaking to explore the opportunity for business schools to build a strategy around 
the factors which differentiate them from other schools.  This study has the potential for 
significant positive impact in a competitive environment currently marked by an intense 
focus on rankings to exclusion of other factors. 
 
This study will use case study methodology to examine three strategic moves undertaken 
by two business schools that differentiate them from other schools.  You have been 
selected as an individual involved with one of these moves, [insert strategic move name 
here]. 
 
Hopefully, you will consider allocating some time to participate in this study which will 
involve an initial interview of approximately one hour in length.  A limited number of 
follow up interviews or requests for documents may be requested depending upon the 
data collected in the first interview.  Of course, your participation is completely 
voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. 
 
I will be in contact with you soon to confirm whether you are willing to participate, and, 
if so, schedule a time for the initial interview. 
 
Best regards, 
 
 
 
Shay Scott 
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Appendix F 
 
 
Research Team Member’s Pledge of Confidentiality 
 
Project: Sailing Blue Oceans in Search of Blue Ribbons 
 
Primary Researcher: Shay Scott 
 
As a member of this project’s research team, I understand that I will be reading  
transcriptions of confidential interviews and discussing confidential data related to the 
cases under study. This information in these transcripts has been revealed by research 
participants who participated in this project on good faith that their interviews would 
remain strictly confidential. I understand that I have a responsibility to honor this 
confidentially agreement. I hereby agree not to share any information with anyone except 
the primary researcher of this project, his/her doctoral chair, or other members of this 
research team. Any violation of this agreement would constitute a serious breach of 
ethical standards, and I pledge not to do so. 
 
 
_____________________________  
 
   Research Team Member     
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 Vita 
Shay Scott is Director of the Global Supply Chain Institute and a Lecturer in the 
Department of Marketing and Logistics at The University of Tennessee. In this capacity, 
Scott works closely with the Institute’s corporate and institutional partners to advance the 
knowledge and practice of supply chain globally.  Prior to joining the faculty he led the 
Americas International Logistics organization at Dell where he had responsibility for 
Dell’s outbound supply chain from the US to points throughout the world. While at Dell 
he also held a variety of other positions of increasing responsibility including a leadership 
position with Dell’s DSi2 project prominently featured in publications such as the Wall 
Street Journal and Businessweek. Scott holds a US patent for innovative supply chain 
processes developed and implemented globally as a part of this project.  
Scott holds an MBA, a Master Science in Industrial Engineering, and a Bachelor 
of Science in Civil Engineering. His research interests include globalization and its 
impact on the practice of management and management education, cross-cultural 
collaboration, and supply chain management strategy. He is a contributing author to the 
Global Logistics and Supply Chain Management handbook (Sage 2006). Scott has 
consulted with firms in the high tech, transportation, international logistics, and chemical 
industries. He has studied, worked, and traveled in over 40 countries on six continents. 
 
